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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
An Overview of MNCH Situation Analysis in NPPI Districts 
 
Maternal and child health status in NPPI districts is low and significantly lags behind national 
estimates. Although cause of death data disaggregated by districts is unavailable, national 
level data suggests that targeted interventions are needed in the peri-natal area with attention 
to institutional deliveries, newborn care and EMNOC services which are presently over-
looked areas, as well as revamping of existing maternal and child care service elements such 
as immunizations, ANC & PNC visits, and preventive care check-ups for children.  
 
MNCH service coverage is provided by both the public and private sectors however coverage 
levels fall much below MDG targets. There has been an increase in coverage of maternal 
services in NPPI district over the last five years driven by increased private sector usage, 
however close to half of pregnant women are still uncovered with coverage significantly low 
amongst the poor and those residing in peripheral areas. Both maternal and child care outputs 
at government facilities have remained stagnant and volume of service is particularly low at 
FLCFs with bypassing of primary tier by clients in favor of hospitals even for routine 
services such as ANC, deliveries and child illness visits. Outreach programs show a mixed 
picture with drop in EPI coverage over the last five years however contraceptive use has 
shown a modest increase and is probably due to the LHW program.  
 
The under-developed context of NPPI districts poses challenges in utilization of health care 
services in terms of i) low levels of retention of skilled staff; ii) lack of peripheral outreach of 
both public and private sector services, iii) poorly equipped and stocked facilities and limited 
opening times; iv) high transport costs; v) poor community awareness for maternal care and 
child preventive services along with low coverage of LHW program; and vi) community 
inability to pay resulting in marginalization of preventive and promotive care.  
 
These constraints to service utilization are aggravated by low priority and lack of 
programming of MNCH services at district level, insufficient administrative control over 
staffing, inadequate budget and supervision, and need for clinical and managerial skill 
building.  
 
Proposed Financing Measures 
  
As both supply and demand side factors are responsible for low MNCH service coverage 
therefore result based financing mechanisms need to be simultaneously placed on both the 
supply side and demand side of the health care system. Given the NPPI context, strategic 
placement of financing measures is needed to i) pull in government staff into government 
EMNOC centers and FLCFs, ii) enhance and ring-fence supplies and equipment budget for 
MNCH; iii) supplementation of government provision with private sector services, and iv) 
increasing client access to transportation and commodity purchase. Specific Measures 
include: 
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A. Supply Side Measures 
i) Provider incentives: Provider incentives for government staff involving topping up of 
basic salary with volume based payments are required to address the acute shortage of staff 
on ground and pull back government staff from private practice during government service 
hours. These need to be calibrated by staff cadre as well as remoteness of health facility. 
Provider incentives are required across all NPPI districts with higher scales for Tharparkar, 
Kashmore and Qambar where staff shortage is particularly acute. 
ii) Budgetary topping: MNCH related drugs and equipment budget needs to be enhanced 
and ring-fenced for all NPPI districts with heavier investment in Kashmore, Ghotki, 
Tharparkar, Umarkot, and Larkana districts where government facilities and coverage 
are poorest. 
iii) Commodity vouchers: In districts of Kashmore, Ghotki, Tharparkar, Umarkot, and 
Larkana districts where outfitting of government services is particularly poor 
commodity vouchers in addendum to enhanced budget can be provided for purchase 
of necessary supplies from retail outlets. Key areas for commodity vouchers are 
delivery kits, diarrhea kits and IV supplies kit. 
 
Purchasing of Private Sector Services 
  
Health staff to population ratios will still remain sub-optimal even with filling in of all 
government staff vacancies unless supplemented with private sector services. However this 
should only be limited to those private practitioners who do not have a dual affiliation so as 
to avoid negative inducement to health staff for strengthening private practices at the cost of 
public sector facilities.   
i) Provider incentives: Given that the private sector mainly comprises of individual 
practitioners rather than organized health care facility set-ups, individual practitioners 
will need to be targeted. Provider incentives involving volume based payments can be 
given in each district to private practitioners for providing services in pre-identified 
public health care outlets in that lack required government staff. Up to 50% of fee 
charged in comparable private sector facilities is acceptable to service providers and 
on average works out to be Rs.50 for ANC, PNC, and well baby visits, Rs.300 for 
child OPD, Rs1000 for deliveries and Rs.5500 for C-Section.  
ii) Service Vouchers: Purchasing services from private sector facilities through use of 
service vouchers can be applied in Ghotki, Larkana, Badin, Shikarpur, and 
Nawabshah districts where well developed and organized private sector facilities are 
present. Use of case based vouchers has better administrative and political feasibility 
as compared to management contracts and private health facility contracting. Cost of 
service voucher based on low client willingness to pay are Rs.600 for ANC and PNC 
visits, Rs.2000 for delivery, Rs.13000 for C-section, and Rs.400 for child OPD. 
Service voucher costs based on higher willingness to pay are Rs.300 for ANC and 
PNC visits, Rs.1350 for delivery, Rs.12500 C-section, and Rs.150 for child OPD. 
 
B. Demand Side Interventions 
Demand side incentives are proposed to address low awareness levels and client inability to 
pay for services.  
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i) In-kind client incentive: These can be used to target ANC, delivery, PNC & newborn 
care and child preventive care visits in the first year of life and are commonly 
preferred by all stakeholders to cash incentives. In-kind incentives can be 
implemented in districts of Tharparkar, Kashmore, and Qambar which have the 
poorest health system performance amongst the NPPI districts.  
ii) Transportation vouchers: Transport vouchers are needed in most NPPI districts of 
Qambar, Jamshoro and Nawabshah to offset the heavy cost of transport for deliveries 
and EMNOC. Transport vouchers while offsetting the expense burden on clients of 
private transport can also serve to pull in private transport to remoter areas.  Mean 
voucher value of Rs.700 is required for delivery and EmONC services with a range of 
Rs.400-700 depending on inter-district variation in terms of physical access. 
iii)  Existing targeting mechanisms are poor and proposed targeting for both service and 
transport vouchers and in-kind incentives to clients can either be piggybacked on the 
Benazir Income Support Scheme or involve universal provision of vouchers and in-
kind incentives to all pregnant mothers and children under 1 years in the more poverty 
stricken and peripherally located Tehsils or Union Councils. Separate selective 
targeting schemes will be administratively complex and involve high transaction 
costs.  
Highest amount of financial and technical investment will be required for the districts of 
Tharparkar, Kashmore and Qambar which have the lowest aggregate score in terms of health 
system performance. Comparatively lesser assistance will be needed by the middle ranking 
districts of Umarkot, Larkana and Jamshoro followed by the relatively higher ranking 
districts of Badin, Ghotki, Shikarpur, and Nawabshah. 
 
Over-arching Governance Measures Needed 
 
For effective implementation of result based financing measures overarching governance 
related measures will be needed as outlined below: 
 Human resource strengthening would require filling of vacant, provision of listed 
supportive measures for female staff safety and security, provision Class-I administrative 
powers on trial basis as given to PPHI to strengthen district administrative control over 
staff retention, clinical training of staff as well as use of general cadre staff for EMNOC 
services in districts having more acute staff shortage.  
 Improvement of health facility services would require increased allocation and ring-
fencing of budget for commodity, equipment and monitoring for MNCH, development of 
red-stock out checklist, improved frequency and quality of supervision, and political 
sensitization of district managers regarding MNCH services.   
 The government’s stewardship role involving strategic planning, purchasing and 
monitoring of services will need to be strengthened.  Key measures would involve i) 
sensitization and capacity building of district health managers, development of district 
health plans linked to annual budgetary processes, retention of trained managerial staff 
for at least a period of 2-3 years, enhanced practical linkages between MS DHQ, EDO-
Health, PPHI, and community outreach under the umbrella of a district health plan, 
increased information collection and frequency of field based monitoring.  It would also 
require enhanced coordination with private sector, development of accredited lists of 
private practitioners, minimum standards of care and skill building of private sector.  
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Implementation Modalities 
 
Implementation of result based financing schemes in NPPI districts will require four 
components. Firstly, strong service improvement role of government is required. Secondly, 
an independent agency for management of financial rewards and monitoring of service 
volume will be required for placement for transparent and efficient functioning and has 
overwhelming acceptance from all stakeholders. Thirdly, external validation is needed on 
annual basis to provide robust results on actual service coverage and trickle down effect to 
community. A provincial based party can be assigned to annually conduct validation checks 
in each of the districts. Fourthly, technical assistance is needed in three key areas of clinical 
training for health staff, managerial training for health mangers, and sensitization training of 
district stakeholder. These can be provided by a single out-sourced agency or different 
agencies.  
All four functions involving improved service provision, independent management of 
financial awards, external validation and technical assistance will require oversight by broad 
based committees at both district and provincial levels.  
Way forward would involve piloting of financing interventions in few selected districts 
accompanied by robust operations research before expanding to other districts. Law and order 
is an overarching issue that needs to be addressed for either private or public sector to 
succeed in some of the surveyed districts.  
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Section  1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 NPPI Financial Feasibility Study 
 
This study was commissioned by MNCH Program Sindh and UNICEF Sindh for a feasibility 
assessment of use of Result Based Financing Mechanisms (RBFMs) for improving Maternal, 
Newborn and Child Health (MNCH) care in rural Sindh. The study is part of the Norwegian-
Pakistan-Partnership Initiative which intendeds to provide catalytic support to improve 
MNCH in 10 selected rural districts of Sindh province. Flexible funding of $50 million will 
be provided by the Norwegian grant to strategically strengthen health system through use and 
implementation of result based disbursements (NPPI 2008). Financing will be provided over 
a five year period (2008-2012) and will be targeted to the 10 low performing districts of 
Sindh which include: Jamshoro, Badin, Tharparkar, Umarkot, Nawabshah, Larkana, Kambar, 
Shikarpur, Ghotki and Kashmore. This is an exploratory study aimed to provide a strategic 
direction on use of RBFMs in the selected districts.   
 
1.2 Background of Result Based Funding Mechanisms 
 
Slow progress in improvement of MNCH services through traditional funding methods 
involving input based funding to discrete projects has shifted attention to use of output based 
financing for quick and radical achievement of targets. The common purpose of output based 
financing is to improve health system performance through strategic and innovative use of 
financing measures. Output based mechanisms are diverse and can be placed either at the 
supply or demand side of health service provision or involve a mix of mechanisms targeting 
both supply and demand. Amongst the more commonly known supply side mechanisms are 
Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs), contracting of health services and provider pay-for-
performance incentives while popular demand side mechanisms include Conditional Cash 
Transfers (CCTs) and Vouchers.  
 
Available research evidence shows that the implementation of result based funding 
mechanisms is a politically and organizationally challenging area, and has produced mixed 
results that are often highly context specific. Hence there needs to be careful consideration of 
both positive and negative impacts of result based funding mechanisms in a given setting and 
what modifications need to be put in place to protect quality, equity and efficiency aspects of 
MNCH services.  
 
The success and failure of result based funding mechanisms are affected by a number of 
inter-linked factors. The organizational context is a major factor and influences the working 
of result based funding mechanisms through availability of financial resources, equipped 
facilities, staff and supplies; presence of adequate MIS and financial systems; and effective 
planning, budgeting and management practices. Political feasibility is another key factor with 
political hindrances or support in implementation of such schemes affecting whether they get 
initiated, the scale at which they are implemented, the resulting appropriateness of 
implementation and provision of appropriate policy and technical support. Furthermore, 
health seeking behavior of patients and clients also influences the success of result based 
funding mechanisms as client awareness and valuation of service and its underlying factors 
socio-cultural and economic factors influence the  uptake of MNCH services. Organizational 
context, client behavioral dynamics and political support vary from country to country 
underscoring need for financing mechanisms to be designed with relevance to the local 
context. (Detailed literature review and references are provided in Section 2) 
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This study in recognition of the complex nature of result based funding mechanisms explores 
in-depth the feasibility of their implementation so as to come up with locally relevant, 
politically feasible and administratively simple financing mechanisms for improvement of 
MNCH services in selected  NPPI districts.  
 
1.3 Aim & Objectives 
 
The study explored health systems of selected rural districts to come up with locally 
responsive, politically feasible and practically workable strategies for improving MNCH 
outputs. Specifically it aimed to examine how use of different financial modalities may 
improve MNCH outputs and included the following objectives: 
 
 To identify where to place funding (e.g. Supply or demand side; Public or Private sector) 
 To identify recipient target group (e.g. Community/Service providers/District managers) 
 To identify the type of funding mechanism or mix of mechanism to be implemented (e.g. 
Vouchers, CCTs, provider incentives, contracting, district awards) and its accompanying 
strengths and risks  
 To identify what supportive measures are needed in place for implementation of out-put 
based financing mechanisms. 
 
1.4 Outline of Result Based Financing Mechanisms 
 
1.4.1 SWAPs (Sector Wide Approaches) 
 
Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs) involve topping up of operational funds at the policy level 
conditional to achievement of targets agreed between policy makers and donors. Intended 
target audience is of policy makers and are used by donors to negotiate policy priority to 
particular service outputs while providing a relatively free hand for implementation. They 
present the ‘second generation’ approach to donor funding with a move away from input 
based disbursement to discrete project to funding linked to negotiated outputs. SWAPs can be 
applied at national, provincial or district levels.  
 
1.4.2 Contracting 
 
Contracting principally involves purchase of specified health services by the government 
from other providers for a specified time period based on a formal written agreement or 
‘contract’ between the provider and purchaser. It is a mechanism of institutional reform and 
aims to increase the stewardship role of government, involving a shift from direct health 
service provision to strategic purchasing of services and their enhanced monitoring and 
regulation. It is intended to improve the quality, cost efficiency and transparency of services 
and relies on use of a detailed performance based contract and the engendering of 
competition. Contracting is of particular use where the government does not have 
infrastructure to provide or is a poor manager of health services.  
  
 
 
1.4.3 Provider Incentives 
 
Provider incentives are an institutional reform mechanism linking service provision with 
performance awards for health care provider.  Payments can either be linked to volume of 
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service and made on per case basis or on number of client  visits or alternatively involve a 
performance bonus linked to service outputs. Provider incentives have two principal uses. 
They can be used to improve service performance of government health staff or alternatively 
to purchase services of private practitioners for service provision at government health 
facilities with level of compensation linked to service output.  
 
 
1.4.4 Client Cash Transfers [CCTs] 
 
Involves a cash transfer to client/ patient at the health service delivery outlet for availing 
specified health services. It is an aggressive demand inducing mechanism and newly 
introduced for improved utilization of selected health care services. 
  
1.4.5 Vouchers 
 
Vouchers principally target client related financial barriers to service utilization. Voucher is a 
pre-paid card or token provided to clients for a particular service or package of service and is 
used to obtain specified service from identified health service providers at partial payment or 
free of cost. Service provider can be either from public or private sector. Vouchers intend to 
increase access to health services and are known for their pro-poor value.  They are also 
expected to improve quality of service provision by stimulating competition between service 
providers.  
 
1.5 Study Components & Methods 
 
The study was a multi-dimensional and mixed method study involving triangulation of 
existing evidence and primary data.  
 
 Multiple Components: The study comprised of 4 main components: i) organizational 
analysis; ii) expenditure analysis; iii) political risk analysis; and iv) client behavior 
analysis.  
 
 Mixed Methods: Both quantitative and qualitative tools were used and included: i) in 
depth interviews of provincial and district stakeholders; ii) focus group discussions with 
health facility staff; iii) focus group discussions with LHWs, mothers and fathers of 
children under 5 years; iv) review of MIS and financial systems of MNCH related 
programs; v) review of programmatic data related to MNCH; vi) review of budgetary data 
where available; vii) analysis of patient expenditure; vii) review of evidence from other 
settings on RBFMs.   
 
 Cross-cutting levels: The study collected data across provincial, district, and health 
facility and community levels.  
 
A detailed overview of components and methods is provided in Table 1.1.   
 
 
1.6. Data Collection 
 
The study relied on a mix of secondary and primary data as detailed below  
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a) Primary data collection  
 
 Key elements of primary data included i) in-depth stakeholder interviews, ii) focus group 
discussions (FGDs) with health staff, iii)focus group discussions (FGDs) with communities, 
iv) review of government MIS and financial systems, and v) review of implementation 
systems and performance records of similar financing models in Pakistan. A list of identified 
provincial and district stakeholders was developed for conduction of in-depth interviews, in 
consensus with the MNCH Program Sindh and UN agencies and further interviews were 
added through snowballing. MIS and financial system review included the EDO Health 
systems, the PPHI system, and key vertical programs including LHW, EPI and Population 
Welfare Programs. Conduction of FGDs of health staff and community was initially based on 
cluster sampling of RHC and BHUs in each district. However, this was later revised by AKU 
in the larger interest of the study and the sampling frame of the baseline study was followed 
to allow for better coherence in findings of the two studies. 
 
Data included: data included in this report is summarized in table 1.1.  
 
 
b) Secondary data collection 
 
Secondary data collection involved i) review of published literature, government 
programmatic and budgetary records, and commissioned study reports, and ii) analysis of 
household expenditure data from NPPI baseline study.   
 
A systematic search of international peer reviewed literature was conducted on result based 
financing mechanism using Cochrane online database and was supplemented by relevant grey 
literature.  Public sector data was collected and reviewed on available infrastructure, staffing, 
service outputs, authority tiers, fund flows and budgets. In addition, relevant research reports 
of commissioned studies in Pakistan were reviewed and included quality of care and 
performance assessment studies as well as studies on devolution, health care financing and 
public-private partnerships. Expenditure analysis involved input on tool development for 
baseline household study and use of collected raw data for development of cost packages.  
Table 1.1: Data Included  
Components  Number of FGDs / IDIs  Details  
Catchment Communities  of BHUs 
and RHCs 60 FGDs  FGDs involved 489 participants  
Health Facility Staff of BHUs and 
RHCs 10 FGDs FGDs involved 122 participants  
District Stakeholder 47 IDIs 
IDIs with EDO- H, MS of DHQ/ Civil 
hospital, district PPHI coordinators, 
DPWO, DCO and Nazim  
PMA Representatives  10 IDIs PMA representatives/ prominent private practitioners 
Provincial Stakeholders 15 IDIs IDIs with Health, Finance and P&D Departments, PPHI and DSSP.  
Review of Management 
Information system   
Review of MIS including HMIS, DHMIS, LHW, EPI, WFP, Population Welfare 
and PPHI. 
Review of Finical Flow and 
Information System  
Review of financial flow and information systems of EDO Health, DHQ/ Civil 
Hospitals, PPHI and vertical programs.  
Site Visits and Meetings of 
Existing / Recent Incentive Based  
Models 
such as the World Food Program, Population Welfare RHS-A Centers, FIGO 
project and Tawana Pakistan Project. 
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Further details on methods and data collection are outlined separately in each chapter. 
 
1.7 Analysis 
 
Findings from different sections of the study were triangulated and synthesized to form a 
coherent picture of existing health system gaps and needed financing mechanisms as well as 
administrative capacity and political feasibility for these mechanisms. A systematic analysis 
was undertaken of both qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative analysis development of 
thematic codes for interview and FGD data and followed by both manual as well as use of 
NVivo 8 for analysis. EXCEL and SPSS were used for analysis of quantitative data. Specific 
areas of analysis included: 
 
 Identification of snags in delivery of MNCH service 
 Identification of demand side barriers  
 Assessment of MNCH expenditure and Willingness to Pay 
  Assessment of institutional capacity for RBF  
 Determination of political feasibility for RBF 
 Identifying lessons learnt from global & local experiences  
 Based on findings of above, a mix of financing mechanisms and their implementation 
modalities were proposed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2 Overview of Study Components, Underlying Areas and Research Methods 
Components  Areas Examined  Methods  
Organizational 
Analysis  
 
 
 
Supply side constraints to service delivery 
Governance issues 
Review of MIS systems 
Review of financial systems 
 
 
Stakeholder interviews 
FGDs with service providers 
Document review  
Budgetary Review 
Spot-checking 
Review checklists 
Expenditure 
Analysis 
Cost package development 
Willingness to Pay 
 
SPSS analysis 
FGDs with community 
Political Risk 
Analysis  
 Political preference & fears for different RBF  
 
 
Stakeholder interviews 
Group discussions with HF staff 
Group discussion with community 
Document review 
Client Behavioral 
Analysis  
Barriers to MNCH utilization 
Existing expenditure 
Willingness to pay 
 
 
FGDs with community: 
Mothers 
Fathers  
LHWs  
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1.8 Report Layout 
 
The report is divided into 5 sections: 
Chapter 2 provides a synopsis of global evidence on result based funding mechanisms in 
terms of effects achieved as well as factors associated with success or failure 
Chapters 3, 4 & 5 review the overall health system identifying demand and supply side 
constraints affecting MNCH outcomes in NPPI districts 
Chapters 6&7 give a detailed review of existing financial and monitoring information 
systems and their absorptive capacity for result based financing  
Chapters 8, 9 & 10 examines political feasibility of result based financing mechanism, 
provide cost packages, proposes targeting systems and outline lessons on implementation 
modalities gained from other programs 
Chapter 11 provides a summary of findings and proposes way forward in NPPI districts  
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Section  2. GLOBAL EVIDENCE ON RESULT BASED FINANCING 
MECHANISMS  
      
2.0 Introduction 
 
This section reviews global evidence based on experience of result based financing 
mechanisms in developing countries examining the extent of implementation of so far in 
developing countries, effectiveness of result based financing mechanism and factors 
underlying success and failure with a view to provide lessons for the NPPI districts 
 
2.1 Methods 
 
A systematic literature search was conducted using Cochrane online database and 
supplemented with grey literature including commissioned study reports, summary of 
government projects, and thesis work in this area. Primary emphasis was to examine work 
related to developing countries and the MNCH area with expansion to other service contexts 
in cases where little material was found. Material examined included rigorous evaluations 
which were comparatively fewer in number and a larger body of material involving case 
descriptions and review articles.  
 
2.2 Overview 
 
In recent years there has increased international interest in use of result based financing 
mechanisms as a means for quick and radical improvement of health care systems. This has 
been primarily due to slow progress in improvement of government services in developing 
countries through traditional funding methods involving input based funding. Output based 
mechanisms are diverse and can be placed either at the supply or demand side of health 
service provision or involve a mix of mechanisms targeting both supply and demand.  
 
Available research evidence shows that experience with the implementation of result based 
funding mechanisms is still emerging in developing countries, has produced mixed results 
that are often highly context specific and needs more rigorous impact assessment.  
Additionally implementation is a politically and organizationally challenging area with the 
wider health system and political context playing a key role in success or failure of these 
mechanisms.  
 
2.3 Supply Side Mechanisms 
 
2.3.1 SWAPs (Sector Wide Approaches) 
 
The mechanism: Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs) involve topping up of operational funds 
at the policy level conditional to achievement of targets agreed between policy makers and 
donors (Cassels 1997). Intended target audience is of policy makers and are used by donors to 
negotiate policy priority to particular service outputs while providing a relatively free hand 
for implementation. They present the ‘second generation’ approach to donor funding with a 
move away from input based disbursement to discrete project to funding linked to negotiated 
outputs (Walt 1999). SWAPs can be applied at national, provincial or district levels.  
 
Requisites: SWAPs are dependent on agreed output goals between donor and recipient 
government as well as political ownership, ability for strategic planning, leadership and 
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innovative management, and absorptive capacity for management of funds on the part of 
recipient government (Walt 1999). It also requires participation of private sector providers in 
planning and implementation for effective achievement of results. Furthermore, SWAP-like 
arrangements require frequent joint review meetings and a single agreed upon and robust 
monitoring system as opposed to reliance on multiple monitoring systems.  
 
Origin and Application: SWAPs were introduced by international donors in the 1990s as a 
means of health sector reform in developing countries. They have been primarily applied in 
African countries including South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia and Uganda as well as 
certain Asian countries such as Cambodia and Bangladesh. Arrangements have been mainly 
at the national level and scope of application to increase the performance of provinces and 
districts has not been fully explored. Recently, there has been revival of interest in SWAPs 
based on lessons learnt from past experiences.  
 
Effect: Evidence on SWAPs is mainly descriptive and rarely provides an established link 
with improved outcomes. So far conclusive evidence is limited to increase in immunization 
rates and supervised deliveries (Walford 2007). Some effect has also been found in terms of 
increased ORS use and doctor visits for child diarrhea cases, medicine availability and 
improved TB cure rates (Walford 2007). However lack of standardized assessments of 
SWAPs makes it difficult to generalize findings obtained from individual case studies.  
 
Over-arching issues: Results of SWAPs have been diluted due to both political and 
administrative issues related to their design and implementation. Politically, SWAPs present 
the danger of becoming a top down agenda and require political commitment at both the top 
and bottom tiers of the health system (Jeppsson 2002). In addition, donor pressure to disburse 
funds and corruption in fund utilization by recipients has also been linked with sub-optimal 
results. Moreover, strong control by national and provincial as compared to district 
stakeholders has been found to increase centralization and reduced required flexibility and 
ownership for responsive implementation (Walt 1999).    
 
Administratively, SWAP like arrangements require careful selection of few output indicators 
having high impact and third party validation of improved outcomes. Capacity for SWAP 
related flexible planning and implementation has been generally poor in developing country 
governments, technical assistance has come in late, transfers in government have further 
eroded available capacity, while bureaucratic inter dependence on various government 
departments have delayed disbursements (Walt 1999, Jeppsson 2001). Positive atmosphere, 
strong stable leadership, flexibility and adjustment as opposed to use of rigid blue-prints and 
reduction of red-tape have been key factors associated with success (Jeppsson 2002, Pfeiffer 
2003, Pavigani 1999)  
 
2.3.2 Contracting 
 
The mechanism: Contracting is a mechanism of institutional reform and aims to increase the 
stewardship role of government involving a shift from direct health service provision to 
strategic purchasing of services and enhanced monitoring and regulation (Taylor 2003). It 
principally involves purchase of specified health services by the government from other 
providers for a specified time period based on a formal written agreement or ‘contract’ 
between the provider and purchaser. It is intended to improve the quality, cost efficiency and 
transparency of services and relies on use of a detailed performance based contract and the 
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engendering of competition (Walsh 1997). Contracting is of particular use where the 
government does not have infrastructure to provide or is a poor manager of health services.  
 
Types of Contracting: There are two types of contracts: ‘management contracts’ involve out-
sourcing the management of government facilities through provision of operational funds and 
administrative control to the contracted agency while ‘service delivery contracts’ involve 
leasing out of private sector facilities or provision of particular service.  
 
Contractors can be from the private sector as is more often the case, or from other 
government agencies or semi-autonomous government agencies. The former process 
involving leasing out of services to private/ NGO sector is called ‘contracting out’ while the 
latter process involving involves leasing out within the government is called ‘contracting-in’.  
 
Requirements: Contracting requires a well developed market to provide adequate 
competition for contracts, use of an independent agency for awarding and management of 
contracts, and clearly defined performance based contracts (Mills 1998). It is also dependent 
on effective monitoring by the purchaser and presence of a trust based relationship between 
purchasers and contractors. 
  
Origin and Application: Contracting originated in OECD countries with UK’s National 
Health Service reform being the most radical example of a health service delivery system 
based on competitive contracting involving contracts with both private as well as government 
health facilities. Until recently it had  extremely limited application in developing countries 
however supported by high donor interest contracting is being increasingly applied to replace 
or supplement weak government services. Contracting has been implemented in Saharan 
Africa and parts of Asia including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Cambodia. 
Results are mixed so far and are highly influenced by country context.  
 
Effectiveness: Standardized assessments of contracting are few and emerging. Existing 
research shows that contracting has resulted in increase in immunization coverage, ante-natal 
visits, number of children given ORS and general curative care utilization (Loevinsohn 
2005). While contracts in general have worked in roll out of services to remote areas 
comparative penetration into the more hard to reach areas has been lower (Palmer 2006, 
McPake & Hongoro 1995). There has been little known about impact on technical quality of 
services however evidence from OECD countries shows less time to process of care as 
opposed to volume (Meagher 2003, Stewart 1993). Contracting has been seen to result in 
better availability of drugs and contraceptives and improvement in health facility 
maintenance and cleanliness in some settings. Overall, effects of contracting are highly 
variable differing across diverse settings and are dependent on a number of inter-related 
factors (discussed below). Hence while contracting can potentially improve aspects of service 
delivery, the exact output and level of its achievement is likely to vary across settings.  
 
Lessons learnt: Contracts in developing countries are usually input based and fail to specify 
output services with interpretation of contractual output depending on contracted provider. 
While move to performance based contracts needs to be made, a balance must be kept in 
extent of detail specified as sophisticated contracts require high cost of monitoring. Providers 
deliver even on loose contracts if there is like-mindedness and coordination between 
purchaser and service provider (Gilson 1997). In general, capacity to write contracts and 
accompanying monitoring systems and skills has been found to be weak amongst both 
purchasers and provider.  
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The presence of an organized private sector in health care highly varies within developing 
countries, however even where private markets are available, interest can be low for 
contracting with government due to fear of rent-seeking pressures, delayed disbursements and 
loss of independence (Zaidi 2007, Mills 1997). Both the private for-profit and non-profit 
sectors prefer an independent intermediary for management of contracting. Political 
ownership of contracting has been linked with responsive implementation with most case 
studies showing indifference or hostility to use of contacting amongst government managers.  
 
In summary, effectiveness of contracting is linked to the nature of the written contract, 
competitiveness of bidding, type of relationship between government contractors and private 
providers and political acceptance of contracting (Zaidi 2007, Palmer 2006). 
 
2.3.3 Provider Incentives 
 
The Mechanism: Provider incentives are an institutional reform mechanism linking service 
provision with performance awards for health care provider.  Payments can either be linked 
to volume of service and made on per case basis or on number of client  visits or alternatively 
involve a performance bonus linked to service outputs. Provider incentives have two 
principal uses. They can be used to improve service performance of government health staff 
or alternatively to purchase services of private practitioners for service provision at 
government health facilities with level of compensation linked to service output.  
 
Origin: Provider incentives have an established history in OECD countries while application 
in developing countries is very limited (Politt 1988). They are part of the New Public 
Management Agenda involving a series of best practice lessons borrowed from the private 
sector for civil service reform. They have typically involved provision of more attractive 
salaries to government service providers and managers in OECD countries through adoption 
of i)market pay scales, ii) performance bonuses to top up salaries or iii) or case or volume 
based payments.  More recently in India, provider incentives have been used to buy into 
services of individual private practitioners for improving functioning of government facilities 
for MNCH and is particularly applicable for settings where there are chronic staff shortages.   
 
Requirements: Increase in service outputs is heavily dependent on modality of payment e.g. 
capitation based, visit based, or lump sum increase in service. Volume setting standards for 
expected service need to be prepared to guard against over-use or under-use of service as well 
as development of minimum standards for quality of care (Walsh 1997). In addition 
supportive monitoring systems are needed to track outputs as well as movement as linkage of 
financial systems with outputs.   
 
Effects: General findings from OECD countries show that provider incentives increase 
utilization of curative care at health facilities and in cases where they have been linked to 
preventive and outreach services have also resulted in immunization levels and home visits to 
patients (Barnum 1994). In developing countries they have had limited application as well as 
poor documentation of results. Available evidence shows provision of general curative health 
services by private practitioners in remote rural areas uncovered by government facilities as 
seen in South Africa (Palmer 2003)  while increase in antenatal care, institutional deliveries 
and post-natal care has been seen in India as a result of provide incentives to both 
government and private providers (JSY 2005).   
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Over-arching issues: Caution needs to be exercised in terms of what services are 
incentivized and what is the modality of payment. In cases where there has been lack of 
specified emphasis to service providers on preventive care, there has been little change in 
preventive services as opposed to rapid increase in curative care (World Bank 2006). As 
opposed to flat salary scales, volume based re-imbursement has shown rapid increase in 
cases. However volume based compensations have been associated with ‘skimming of the 
patient population’ with less time given to more complicated and demanding cases as 
opposed to easier cases, and fewer visits to far-off located as opposed to closer located cases 
to fulfill service targets (Stewart 1999, Politt 1988). Volume based compensations have also 
been linked with over-provision of services and needs to be guarded against for curative care 
provision. Furthermore, administrative costs of provider incentives have been high requiring 
sophisticated monitoring and financial tracking systems.  
 
2.4 Demand Side Mechanism  
 
2.4.1 Client Cash Transfer [CCTs] 
 
The Mechanism: Involves a cash transfer to client/ patient at the health service delivery 
outlet for availing specified health services. It is an aggressive demand inducing mechanism 
and newly introduced for improved utilization of selected health care services.  
 
Origin: The mechanism of cash transfer to clients for selected health services is a relatively 
recent mechanism and has been borrowed from the education sector which has a longer 
experience of its application for increasing enrollment of school children. Extension of CCTs 
to health services originated in Latin American countries and experience of its 
implementation is primarily limited to this setting. There has been some limited expansion of 
CCTs to certain parts of Africa and lately to India. Within the health sector, CCTs have 
mostly targeted preventive services for mothers and children. 
 
Requirements: Implementation of CCTs requires administrative capacity and financial 
transparency as well as clearly defined roles and responsibilities between the different 
administrative tiers. It also requires client behavioral and willingness to pay studies to 
determine which services to incentivize and determine level of incentives. Above all the 
availability of supply side factors like service infrastructure, human resources and medicine 
an essential is an essential factor needed for implementation of CCTs. 
 
Effect:  Compared to other result based mechanisms, CCT have had the most rigorous and 
well documented assessments. Results have shown high uptake of services in response to 
CCTs, with evidence seen in terms of improved nutritional outcomes (reduction in stunting, 
improved mental milestones, higher hemoglobin levels), increase in immunization levels, 
increase in child curative and preventive visits, and increased in pre-natal care visits and 
institutional deliveries (Rawlings 2004, Rivera 2004, Lagarde 2007, Barham 2007).    
 
Over-arching issues: Effects of CCTs where found have been due to the demand induction 
power of cash-for-service. Cash payments received have usually not been spent on the 
intended clientele and hence there is little conclusive evidence on expected secondary benefit 
of poverty reduction and gender empowerment. The main issue related to CCTs is uncertainty 
in terms of long-term sustainability of client behavior with danger of reversion to old 
practices if CCTs are withdrawn. The Latin American contexts in which CCTs have been 
implemented raises issues of applicability to other geographical settings and although a large 
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scale project is underway in India its results post-CCT withdrawal are still awaited. Other 
demand related issues include unintended consequences such as increase in family size to 
avail cash benefits related to births. CCTs also fail to address the problem of geographical 
access as the payments are only made when the recipients have already reached the health 
facility and there are questions as to whether the remoter populations are benefiting from 
CCTs. Finally, CCTs are dependent on supply side factors which were mostly in place in the 
Latin American setting where it was implemented and in India were boosted through 
placement of provider incentives for service delivery (Heinrich 2007 & JSY 2005). Pilferages 
and misappropriation are potential concerns linked to CCTs however there is needed for more 
documentation in this area (Deverux 1994).  
 
In summary, while CCTs have resulted in high service utilization in the MCH area, their 
effect on long term demand is questionable particularly when applied to settings other than 
Latin America.  
 
2.4.2 Vouchers 
 
The Mechanism: Vouchers principally target client related financial barriers to service 
utilization. Voucher is a pre-paid card or token provided to clients for a particular service or 
package of service and is used to obtain specified service from identified health service 
providers at partial payment or free of cost. Service provider can be either from public or 
private sector. Vouchers intended to increase access to health services and are known for 
their pro-poor value.  They are also expected to improve quality of service provision by 
stimulating competition between service providers.  
 
Origin: While food vouchers popularly known as food stamps have traditionally been used in 
OECD countries, the use of voucher for health services is a new mechanism and principally 
designed for application in developing countries. Application is as yet limited, and its origin 
and application has been chiefly confined to Latin American countries.  
 
Requirements: Although vouchers present an attractively simple mechanism with potential 
for quick roll out of services, their implementation is linked to certain pre-requisites. Careful 
determination is needed of average cost of service prior to introduction of vouchers. 
Moreover, it is dependent on sufficient availability of health care services in the targeted area 
to provide service access, an adequate market to allow choice of provider and engender 
healthy competition and appropriate quality of services. Targeting systems also need to be 
developed for identification of needy groups and equitable distribution of vouchers.    
 
Effect: Voucher is a relatively new mechanism and evidence on effectiveness is still 
emerging (Palmer 2004). Vouchers have been applied in the Reproductive Health area and 
results have shown increase in family planning visits, increased utilization of STI services 
and improved patient satisfaction (Borghi 2005). They have also been used for malaria 
control and resulted in increased use of bed nets (Kweku 2007). Although vouchers have also 
been tried for selected areas of child health, however results are as yet unclear. Potential of 
use for no-medical expenses, such as transport costs, also needs to be explored particularly 
for accessing emergency maternal, neonatal and child health care.  
 
Over-Arching Issues: Vouchers have a pulling power over the health care market and have a 
potential edge over CCTs in increasing service access in remote areas. However, they 
principally address financial barriers related to client utilization and it is seen that service 
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uptake can be hindered by low social perception or intrinsic value of the targeted service for 
clients. Hence in certain socio-cultural settings vouchers need to be accompanied by 
awareness raising measures also. Vouchers have been found to have a high transaction cost 
for targeting, disbursement and tracking systems, ranging from 30-70% of total funds (World 
Bank 2008).  Moreover, in case of curative services careful selection of service package is 
needed as there is risk of moral hazard involving service over use by patients and over-
servicing by providers. Furthermore, while vouchers have increased service use in the poor 
their ability to reach the poorest is an area that remained underexplored.  
 
In summary, vouchers involve a high administrative cost and also carry a risk of 
misappropriate targeting especially particularly needs to be examined when applied to non-
Latin American settings.   
 
2.5 Section Summary 
 
 Results of output based mechanisms vary by country setting and are influenced by nature 
of implementation modalities, health system issues and political context. 
 Most established effect documentation is seen for CCTs and least for SWAP like 
arrangements.  
 Types of service outputs achieved are highly dependent on their specification and linkage 
with payment, presence of provider skills and extent of emphasis during monitoring.  
 Presence of a private sector market is required for measures that involve purchasing of 
services such as contracting, provider incentives to private providers and vouchers.   
 Transaction costs are lowest for SWAP-like arrangements are high for other mechanisms 
particularly vouchers.  
 Output based mechanisms in general require an enhancement of the strategic role of 
government and need prior capacity building. 
 Result based mechanisms are associated with political risks and include poor 
acceptability for measures involving purchasing of services as well as inappropriate 
targeting for demand side mechanism.  
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Table 2.1 Summary of Evidence on Result Based Financing Mechanisms 
 Service Utilization Health Systems Requirements Issues / Constraints  
SWAPS 
 
Further research needed on 
linkage of SWAPS with improved 
health outcomes 
 
Administratively easier financing mechanism 
Requires strong planning and managerial skills 
Requires careful selection of few output indicators having high 
impact 
Danger of being a top down agenda  
Can result in increased centralization 
Corruption in fund utilization 
Contracting 
Mixed results varying by setting 
 
Lower coverage of hard to reach 
areas  
 
Performance based contracts with protection of preventive services 
Competitive bidding and market presence 
Independent purchasing agency  
Overseeing too many contracted providers can be taxing for 
coordination. 
 
Uncertain political acceptance 
Potential for kickbacks on contract awarding 
and financial disbursements  
Provider 
Incentive 
General increase in service outputs  
 
Lesser coverage for more 
demanding cases & remote 
populations 
Cost versus quality trade off 
Cost versus equity trade off 
High administrative costs 
Standard setting for minimum quality of care 
 
Political acceptance of provider incentives 
CCTs 
Well documented increase in 
service output, questionable 
sustainability 
 
Questionable access for  more hard 
to reach groups 
Adequate availability of services 
Transparent financial systems at health facility and above. 
Clearly defined roles of different administrative tiers  
Quality monitoring of services 
Sustainability of client demand post-CCTs 
Negative spill over effects on demand for 
other services. 
Does not induce provider to improve quality 
of service 
Leakage of funds. 
Vouchers Evidence still emerging 
Determination of average cost of services.  
Identification of needy groups for targeting 
High administrative costs 
Quality monitoring of services 
Inappropriate distribution of vouchers. 
Induces provider to improve quality of care. 
Service over use  
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Section  3. HEALTH STATUS & HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
Section 3 provides a reference background context for subsequent chapters outlining 
challenges presented by low health status, sub-optimal service coverage and socio-
demographic difficulties in delivery of MNCH services in NPPI districts and recommending 
broad areas of intervention. 
 
3.1 District Context Poses Challenges In Terms of Physical and Financial Access, 
Low Community Awareness and Vulnerability to Communicable Diseases 
 
Demographic and health indictors of selected districts are amongst the poorest in Sindh 
province. The districts comprise 29% of total province population and are thinly populated 
with population figures ranging from 1.5 to 0.8 million per district and population density 
between 72 to 1246 persons per square km (Table 3.1). Population is mainly scattered into 
small villages making access difficult to health care services. The districts are largely 
underdeveloped comprising of predominantly katcha houses, little access to tapped water 
while adequate sanitation facilities extend at best to two-thirds of households. Adult literacy 
is confined to a third of the population in most of the districts while female literacy figures 
are even lower at 37%.  Evidence is indicative of high dependency ratio as seen by high 
levels of TFR and large household size.  Poverty ranking of districts in Sindh province on a 
scale of 1-16 shows that most of these districts fall in the higher poverty bracket with ranking 
between 1-7. District level poverty incidence in Pakistan was determined through poverty 
indexes calculated using estimated non-monetary variables such as demography, education, 
housing etc, and were correlated with the respective weights coefficients. 
 
 
The district context presents a number of key challenges for effective delivery of MNCH 
services. These include poor physical access to health care services due to scattered 
Table: 3.1 Socio-Demographic Status  
Districts  Demography 
Districts  Population1 
% Households 
with Adequate 
Sanitary 
Facilities1 
% 
Literacy1 
Household 
size1 
% Pacca 
House1 
% Households 
with Tap 
Water1 
Poverty 
Rank2 
(1-16) 
TFR1 
Badin 1,355,564 31 32 7.2 16 24 6 6.01 
φ Umarkot 945,641 30 37 7 20 17 11 6.58 
Shikarpur 1,013,510 73 37 7.7 12 2 1 5.83 
Ghotki 1,333,962 51 40 6.9 16 1 4 6.38 
φ Jamshoro 776,265 40 42 7.4 22 25 5 6.83 
Tharparkar 1,251,455 17 36 6.6 6 6 10 6.41 
Larkana 1,321,701 63 37 7.8 11 4 3 6.18 
φ Qambar 1,218,228 63 37 7.8 11 4 3 6.18 
φ Kashmore 641,056 34 28 6.7 13 3 7 5.72 
Nawabshah  1,288,733 53 37 7.2 20 7 9 6.14 
φ Data for newly created districts of Umarkot, Jamshoro, Qambar and Kashmore was taken from parent districts and actual 
figures are expected to be lower 
 Source:    1MICS 2003-04; 2 SPDC 2007   
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population and low affordability of services. Moreover, unsafe water and inadequate 
sanitation result in continued vulnerability to preventable childhood infections while low 
literacy presents challenges in terms of health awareness in the community as well as supply 
of local female health staff. 
 
3.2 Health Status of Mothers and Children Significantly Lags Behind Provincial and 
National Average 
 
Although reductions in IMR and MMR have been prioritized by the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) these continue to be high in Pakistan and even higher in NPPI 
selected districts. National U5MR is high at 94 per 1000 live births while national IMR has 
been fairly stagnant at 78 per 1000 live births with little decline seen during the 1990s (World 
Bank 2005). Although provincial estimates for Sindh are similar to national data, huge 
variations exist between the rural and urban areas with the developed urban districts in Sindh 
having an IMR of 46 and U5MR of 28 (MICS 2003-04).  In contrast, in NPPI districts IMR 
ranges between 81-90 while U5MR ranges between 118-125, far exceeding both national and 
provincial statistics (Table 3.2).  
  
MMR in Pakistan is high at 320 per 100,000 live births while comparative figure for Sindh is 
314 per 100,000 live births (PDHS).  Although disaggregated data by districts is not available 
for MMR however MMR in NPPI districts is estimated to be high as provincial figures are 
primarily driven by high maternal mortality in rural districts. Furthermore, available evidence 
indicates that there has been little improvement and even worsening of maternal mortality in 
Sindh as suggested by an inverse increase in sex ratio of males to 100 females from 110 
males to 100 females to 112 males to 100 females (World Bank 2005).  
 
Table 3.2 Health Status 
Districts MMR1 U5MR1 IMR1 % Undernourished <5 yrs Children1 TFR1 
Badin NA 124 87 48 6.01 
φ Umarkot NA  121 85 47 6.58 
Shikarpur NA 120 85 47 5.83 
Ghotki NA 125 88 48 6.38 
φ Jamshoro NA 114 81 45 6.83 
Tharparkar NA 123 87 48 6.41 
Larkana NA 118 84 46 6.18 
φ Qambar NA 118 84 46 6.18 
φ Kashmore NA 128 90 49 5.72 
Nawabshah NA 125 88 48 6.14 
Sindh2 350 101 81 NA 4.3 
Pakistan2 320 94 78 NA 4.1 
φ Data for newly created districts of Umarkot, Jamshoro, Qambar and Kashmore was taken from parent districts and actual 
figures are expected to be lower  
Source:      1MICS 2003-04 ; 2 PDHS (2006-07) 
 
3.3 Re-focusing of MNCH Service Package is Required in Line with Cause of Death 
Data 
 
Maternal Deaths: Although breakdown of cause of death data by NPPI districts was not 
available, national level statistics show that majority of maternal and child related deaths and 
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complications occur around the peri-natal period. Maternal deaths are mainly due to 
postpartum haemorrhage (27.2%), puerperal sepsis (13.7%) and eclampsia (10.4%) and need 
to be addressed through institutional deliveries, quick access to emergency care and provision 
of postnatal services (PDHS 2006/07). These need to be backed with supplementary services 
such as antenatal care and health education of mothers and community. However services for 
delivery, emergency and post-natal care services have usually been overlooked by 
government health programs and the traditional emphasis on antenatal care at health facilities 
and community education through LHWs is unlikely to impact on maternal deaths and 
complications. The National MNCH Program is a new initiative targeting emergency 
obstetric care at government secondary tier and supervised deliveries at the community level 
however its implementation is still to be initiated at the district level.   
 
Child Deaths: Amongst children the majority of deaths are due to birth asphyxia (22%), 
sepsis (14%) and prematurity (9%) occurring in the neonatal period while pneumonia (13%) 
and diarrhoea (11%) are major causes in the early childhood period (PDHS 2006/07).  The 
data from NPPI districts showing high IMR and U5MR is suggestive of a high burden of 
deaths both in the peri-natal as well as the early childhood period. Moreover, close to half the 
children in NPPI districts are found to be undernourished placing them at increased risk of 
infections as well as deaths due to complications (Table 3.2). Re-focusing of child care 
services is required in line with cause of death data. Existing child health services selectively 
address preventive care areas such as childhood immunizations, Vitamin A supplementation 
and provision of preventive health messages however critical newborn care, acute child 
management and under nutrition remain largely overlooked areas and require expansion in 
existing range of services.  
   
3.4 Health Service Coverage is Sub-Optimal and Improvement in Service Coverage 
Where Found Are Due to Private Sector Provision. 
Utilization is low across the continuum of MNCH services in NPPI districts and rates are 
lower than the national average and provincial averages in most cases (Table 3.3). Upper 
Sindh districts of Larkana and Qambar and lower Sindh districts of Badin and Jamshoro are 
Table 3.3 Service Utilization 
Districts 
* %Antenatal 
Care 1 
% Supervised 
Deliveries1 
%Post Natal 
Care1 
% EPI –Children 
(12 – 23 months) 
immunized upto 
Measles1 
** %TT 
Vaccination
1 
% Use of 
Modern 
Contraceptive1 
Badin 62 60 51 66 46 22 
Umarkot 58 57 55 45 37 18 
Shikarpur 59 50 23 53 25 18 
Ghotki 51 60 59 26 25 27 
Jamshoro 61 59 34 66 54 22 
Tharparkar 37 27 38 28 28 10 
Larkana 52 88 72 51 37 22 
Qambar 63 59 61 68 58 21 
Kashmore 42 33 15 25 23 12 
Nawabshah 51 55 39 63 45 26 
NPPI districts 54 55 45 49 38 20 
2Sindh 42 38 35 72 62 26 
2Pakistan 61 39 27 60 53 29 
* Women who received 2 or more antenatal care visits 
** Women who received at least 2 doses of Tetanus Toxoid  
Sources:     1Baseline study for NPPI, Sindh (2009);   2 PDHS (2006) 
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relatively better performing than others in terms of MNCH service coverage while 
Tharparkar, Kashmore and Nawabshah are the lowest performing districts.   
 
Coverage of maternal care services has improved from last assessment in 2003/04 but 
continues to be lower than national service targets for achieving MDG goals (Figure 3.1). 
Antenatal coverage has increased from 29% to 54%; institutional deliveries have shown two 
fold increase while post-natal care coverage previously very low also has gone up to 45% 
(Table 3.3). Use of modern contraceptives is low across all districts with contraception being 
used by 20% of eligible population as compared to figures of 26% in Sindh and 29% in 
Pakistan. EPI services however have fallen over the last five years with a decline seen in both 
child immunization and TT vaccination (Figure 3.1). Service performance therefore present a 
mixed trend with increases in pregnancy care and delivery services unaccompanied by 
increase in vaccination and family planning services. Evidence suggest that coverage increase 
in maternal care services is due to increased contribution of the private while services such as 
EPI and contraceptive services that mostly fall under the public sector domain have shown 
little improvement (See Section 5 for details).  
Figure 3.1 Service Utilization Trend
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3.5 Section Summary  
 
 Maternal, neonatal and child heath status significantly lags behind national estimates 
and would require building in targeted interventions in the peri-natal area as well as 
revamping of existing maternal and child care services. 
 Government provided public goods such as EPI and family planning have remained 
stagnant or seen a decline while recent advances in pregnancy care provision and 
supervised delivery have been due to increased private sector provision. Strategies for 
service coverage therefore need to jointly address both public and private sectors.  
 Given the under-developed context of NPPI districts, innovative supply side strategies 
will be needed to increase health service access such as through improved functioning 
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of peripheral government facilities, supplementary use of private sector and improved 
access to transportation (See Section 5 for details).  
 Low literacy levels in NPPI are indicative of low community awareness and would 
require measures for enhancement such as through use of demand side financing 
measures and health education through LHWs and NGOs (See Section 4 for details).  
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Section  4. HEALTH SEEKING BEHAVIOUR  
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
Section 4 describes utilization patterns of MNCH Services in the ten districts of Sindh 
Province.  It is divided into two subsections (A) review of utilization of MNCH services, 
barriers and provider preference; and (B) notable differentials by i) villages covered by Lady 
Health Workers (LHWs) versus uncovered villages, and ii) villages located close to health 
facilities areas versus peripheral villages.  
 
4.1 Methodology  
 
Data on client behavioral dynamics and health seeking pattern was collected across all 10 
NPPI districts.  The Focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with i) mothers of 
under five children; ii) fathers of under five children and iii) LHWs as community level key 
informants. Altogether 60 FGDs were conducted involving 489 participants with an average 
of 8-10 participants per FGD.  
 
In each district two government FLCFs were selected randomly from the list of health 
facilities covered by the NPPI baseline study. FGDs with LHWs involved random selection 
of 10 LHWs from the list of LHWs attached with each selected health facility. FGDs with 
clients involved selection of a near and a peripheral village from the FLCF catchment and 
invitation to mothers and fathers of children under five years for voluntary and informed 
participation in the FGDs. One set of client FGDs was conducted in the villages close to 
FLCF within the distance of five kilometers and the other set of the FGDs was conducted in 
the peripheral villages of FLCF at the distance of 10-15 kilometers in each district. The 
villages were selected in consultation with the staff of the selected health facilities. The 
convenience sampling method was used for the selection of clients.  Altogether 1 FGD of 
LHWs, 1 of mothers and 1 of fathers were held per health facility catchment.  
 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of number of FGDs 
Target Group  Number of FGDs per district   Total number of FGDs by category  
Mothers 2 20 
Fathers 2 20 
LHWs 2 20 
Total  6 60 
 
Topic guides were developed for facilitation of FGDs and were pre-tested and adapted after a 
trail in one district. A note-taker and facilitator was assigned per FGD and transcriptions were 
prepared based on audio recordings as well as notes taken during the discussions. The 
responses were coded according to themes emerging from the discussions and analysis was 
done through NVIVO and manually.  
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A)     UTILIZATION OF MNCH SERVICES, BARRIERS & PROVIDER          
PREFERENCE 
 
Service utilization is low across the continuum of MNCH services and particularly low for 
maternal care services. Underlying reasons include lack of functional services, inability to 
pay for transportation costs and low awareness levels. 
Across the ten districts most of the MNCH clients prefer private health care sector for the 
utilization of MNCH services as compared to public because of perceived better quality of 
care; round the clock availability of female staff; accessibility to diagnostic facilities; positive 
attitude of staff; hygiene maintenance, and perceived efficacy of treatment. The description of 
MNCH service by utilization patterns and barriers is given as follows.  
 
4.2    Antenatal Care  
 
“We don’t have much money (to spend) to seek care in the absence of pain or ailment 
during pregnancy” A father (Islamkot, Tharparkar.  
 
Utilization: The utilization of ANC was found to be very low in all the ten NPPI districts of 
Sindh. The utilization of ANC in the LHW uncovered areas is comparatively lower due to 
unawareness regarding the importance of routine ANC; long distance to health care facilities 
and non-availability of routine transport and as well as lack of funds to pay for ANC related 
costs. Mothers and fathers were unaware that pregnant women need care “check ups” during 
pregnancy without serious complication in the peripheral areas. 
 
The most common narrative recorded was that most fathers and mothers do not consider it 
necessary to seek routine care during pregnancy without any reason such as 
complication/ailment or to determine the sex of unborn. 
 
The mothers were relatively more aware about the importance of ANC within the LHW 
catchment areas than the mothers from peripheral and LHW uncovered areas. Some of the 
participants reported seeking ANC in case of minor complication as well on advice and 
Referral from LHWs.   
 
“We do not consider it necessary to seek care without any ailment” (a father of village 
Laoowari of District Ghotki 
 
Barriers: LHWs were of the view that poverty is major constraint towards the utilization of 
ANC. 
 
“Those who don’t get ANC…. the reason is poverty! While they (women) realize that how 
much ANC is necessary but they (women) use to say, from where we arrange money for 
transportation & other medicine” (A LHW from Daur Nawabshah).   
 
 Main barriers reported to low utilization of ANC are 
 
 Unavailability of female staff and ultrasound in the public health care facilities.  
 Lack of funds to seek care from private clinics  
 Mistrust on public health System  
 Non-availability of routine transport from periphery villages to health facilities  
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 Un involvement of fathers  in maternal and child interventions particularly education and 
information activities   
 
“We don’t have to eat; who will go to get ultrasound” A mother (Naseer Abad, district 
Qambar).  
 
Provider Preferences: The families who cannot bear the cost of the qualified professionals 
are dependant on traditional methods of traditional birth attendants. 
 
4.3 Institutional Delivery 
 
“Almost all of women delivers at home……………We don’t have other low cost option. If Dai 
(TBA) feels that delivery at home is not possible then she refers the mother to deliver at Civil 
(government) or private hospital” (A mother village Aadabio Tharparkar). 
 
Utilization: Across all districts institutional delivery is not a norm and utilization is very 
low. The deliveries at the facilities are sought only in case of complication like prolonged 
labor or when TBA in home delivery is failed to handle the case. In addition to this, 
institutional deliveries are also sought if ultrasound findings suggest breach or serious 
complication. Mothers from well off and educated families prefer institutional deliveries 
mostly at private maternity homes. In addition, the fear of home based maternal deaths and 
unavailability of experienced TBAs in surroundings has also pushed some mother to seek 
institutional deliveries.  
 
One of the most significant reasons for higher utilization of private sector of institutional 
deliveries was referral by government doctors to their own private setups.   
 
“The Doctors from public hospitals are suggesting us to get check up from their private 
clinics as there are no facilities for conducting deliveries and also suggesting to get tests 
from private laboratories” (A father Aadil pur Ghotki).  
 
Barriers: The main barriers to seek institutional delivery are: 
 Mistrust: Fear of Caesarian Section and vaginal examination  
 Accessibility (long distance and transport issues)  
 Lack of diagnostic facilities and female provider for institutional delivery at public sector 
facilities  
 High cost of Institutional deliveries in private sector  
 Poverty : Lack of funds and unable to pay for institutional birth  
 
“We do understand the importance of delivery at health care facility, because it is quite 
critical time, and one can easily manage the emergency during delivery at hospital (in 
comparison to home)…. But here isn’t any maternity home near to our village, given that 
poor people cannot afford private clinics” (A father, Khanoth Jamshoro).  
 
“If we get our women to deliver at hospital, doctor will surely operate … because she 
(doctor) is only interested in (making) money” (A Father from Kanoth Jamshoro). 
 
“The reason to get deliveries from TBAs is poverty because we earn and can pay when we 
get crops of rice and wheat” (A mother, Village Aareeja, Larkana). 
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Provider Preferences: TBAs are low cost, easily accessible, well-known and trusted by 
communities. 
 
“When I was pregnant, my husband decided for institutional delivery. But I did not agree I 
had overwhelmingly shown my wish to be delivered at home. I delivered first baby at private 
hospital (where) I suffered a lot of pains because of her (doctor), she did internal 
examination again & again. Later on when I delivered baby at home I was much better than 
that of hospital (A mother of Rajukhanani district Badin). 
 
Besides this TBAs are providing additional services for newborn and mothers, including 
massage of newborn and mother. Poverty was cited as one of the key factor for home births 
and services of the TBAs and can be sought on credit if funds are unavailable.  
 
4.4      Maternal Complications 
 
 “We get treatment in maternal complication because of fear of death or any complication or 
of miscarriage” (A mother, Naudero, Larkana).  
 
Utilization: Higher recognition of need and seeking treatment in case of maternal 
complication is reported by majority of participants throughout the study districts. In case 
of maternal complications (like, excessive bleeding, vomiting and vaginal discharge) majority 
of mothers seek treatment at their earliest form nearest female lady doctor/LHV or other 
provider. If funds are not available to seek care, money is borrowed on interest is taken to 
seek the emergency obstetric care. Well-off families seek care from private sector because of 
perceived quality of care. The government health care facilities are utilized usually by those 
who cannot afford or cannot bear the cost of treatment of private sector. Across the ten 
districts mothers were found sensitized regarding the importance of skilled care in maternal 
complications. 
 
Barriers: Non-availability of skilled female staff, medicines and lack of emergency and 
diagnostics facilities at public health facilities are the main barriers to seek immediate care. 
Even if an equipped public facility exists its limited timings force mothers to seek care from 
private sector clinics.  In the peripheries again the problem of transport and long distances to 
the health facilities are crucial barriers. Moreover, unavailability of transport in peripheries 
makes it even difficult and expensive to seek emergency and obstetric care. The communities who 
are living in remote and hard to reach areas such as Kacho1 (Jamshoro, Qambar, Shikarpur, 
Ghotki, Kashmore and Larkana) face lot of difficulties to access health facilities. Sometimes 
mothers have to only rely on traditional birth attendant (TBAs) and homemade therapies 
during maternal complications due to lack of funds and the access to health system issues. In 
addition to all these factors, law and order situation due to tribal conflicts in district 
Kashmore and safety and security issues particularly in North Sindh have also hindered the 
immediate care seeking during maternal complications. 
 
“Though civil hospital of Shikarpur is near to us but because of tribal conflicts we cannot go 
to Shikarpur. We cannot even travel through the road which enters into city, that’s why we 
have to go to Kandhkot (A father Oghahi community of district Kashmore). 
 
 
                                               
1 Areas spread along the banks of river Indus which is very hard to reach 
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Provider Preferences: 
“The people who haven’t a penny in hand seek care from civil hospital” (A Father village 
Aadabio Tharparkar). 
 
For maternal complications (like, excessive bleeding, vomiting and vaginal discharge) nearest 
female lady doctor/LHV or other providers are immediately asked for care.  
 
4.5 Family Planning & Immunization 
 
Family Planning 
 
“Everything is at God’s will, after having pills twins have been born” (A Father, Larkana) 
 
Utilization: Low contraceptive usage was observed throughout the NPPI districts. The 
LHWs reported 30 to 50% contraceptive usage in their catchment areas across all the districts 
but was not confirmed by the clients. The mothers and fathers of district Tharparkar and 
Umarkot reflected similarly with lower utilization of contraceptives primarily because of the 
unawareness and inappropriate supply of contraceptives in the peripheries. The failure of 
contraceptives is ultimately strengthening and encouraging the communities’ fatalistic 
approach. 
 
Barriers: The main barriers reported for the low prevalence rate of contraceptive are as 
follows; 
 Consider using contraceptives as sin and religiously wrong 
 Fatalism (the number of children is pre determined by God) 
 Unawareness about the availability and usage  
 Desire of having a male child 
 Lapses in regular supply of contraceptives to the existing users 
 Low effectiveness  
 Side effects  
 fear of infertility 
 
 “Some women of this area used injection but after getting this, they had started vaginal 
bleeding because of that we are scared to use contraceptives” (A mother, Humayoon Sarif 
Shikarpur).   
 
Provider Preferences: 
“No one refers or suggests us for getting contraceptive & we did not receive any 
contraceptives through any government employee or LHW” (A father from Umarkot). 
 
The community is not been referred for family planning treatment with any of the providers. 
 
 Immunization  
 
“They (Vaccinators/LHWs) come only for polio drops not for other vaccines even we don’t 
receive any education about benefits of vaccine” (A mother of village Akheraj Umarkot).   
 
Utilization: The acceptance and demand for vaccination programs at the community level 
is higher than the past. The trend has changed mainly after the Polio campaigns and 
awareness created through the messages disseminated through mass media. The clients are 
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willing to get vaccines for children and pregnant women mainly because it is free, provided at 
homes and due to perceived severe outcome of the disease such as polio 
 
Previously there was some level of resistance to vaccines as it was believed that the vaccines 
were designed for the purpose of family planning. The majority of the clients was familiar 
with only Polio vaccine and lacked information about the routine vaccines and how to receive 
the routine immunization. They were also unaware where and when to seek routine 
immunization and for what diseases the vaccines are available. The peripheral communities 
of Tharparkar, Umarkot and Badin districts reported some resistance for vaccination due to 
side-effects of fever, especially in case combo vaccine.  
 
Barriers: The main barriers identified to immunization services are: 
 
 Lack of awareness about routine immunization 
 Lack of information about the availability and schedule of immunization.  
 Fear of side-effects 
 Willing to receive vaccines at home but are reluctant to seek at health facilities 
 
Provider Preferences: The routine immunization is received largely by the children from the 
villages where public health facilities are located. 
 
4.6 Acute Childhood Illnesses 
 
“Dr. Salim Sheikh is a child specialist and his diagnosis is very good & child recovers 
quickly from his treatment, he gives appropriate care & attention to the child, that’s why 
people of his area trust him” ( A mother from Larkana) 
 
Utilization:High recognition of acute child illnesses and utilization of private sector was 
reported for the early management of child illnesses. The care seeking for acute child 
illnesses depends upon multiple factors including perceived severity of illness, distance and 
ability to pay. The well off and affording families receive care from private sector 
irrespective of severity of the illness and distance to the health care facility.  
In the initial phase of the illness treatment is sought from BHU/RHC at the facility based 
villages and sometimes from LHWs. In the remote and uncovered areas first option is self 
medication and use of home remedies if unable to utilize health care system due to poverty or 
transport issues. In case of the severe illnesses such as pneumonia, fever and severe diarrhea 
even the remote areas clients prefer private sector due to its perceived quality of care.  
 
“Boiled breast milk with black paper is given to child for pneumonia as a first line therapy” 
LHW, Ghous pur).  
 
“We wrap Beatle leaves round the chest and back of the child as first line therapy. Mostly 
children get relief by this therapy, which we have been practicing since generations” (A 
father, Khnoth Jamshoro). 
 
Barriers: 
The clients showed mistrust on public health systems for care seeking of child illnesses due 
to poor quality of care,  due to lack of confidence and fake medicines. The summary of 
barriers to the utilization of MNCH is given in table 4.2 
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Table 4.2 Summary Table: Barriers to Health Care Utilization 
MATERNAL CARE 
 ANC Deliveries Maternal complication PNC 
Barriers for low 
usage (list by 
order of priority) 
Lack of awareness  
Lack of female staff  
Poorly functional health facilities  
Lack of faith in govt. 
Poverty 
Non-availability of transport  
Religious / Cultural / Gender Issues  
Safety and Security 
Poverty 
Lack of female staff  
Poorly functional health facilities  
Lack of faith in govt. 
Non-availability of transport  
Religious / Cultural / Gender Issues  
Safety and Security 
Poverty 
Lack of female staff  
Poorly functional health facilities  
Lack of faith in govt. 
Non-availability of transport  
Religious / Cultural / Gender 
Issues  
Safety and Security 
Lack of awareness  
Lack of female staff  
Poorly functional health facilities  
Lack of faith in govt. 
Poverty 
Non-availability of transport  
Religious / Cultural / Gender Issues  
Safety and Security 
CHILD CARE 
 Newborn Care Immunization Acute Illness  
Barriers for low 
usage (list by 
order of priority) 
Poverty 
Poorly functional health facilities  
Lack of faith in govt. 
Non-availability of transport  
Safety and Security  
Poverty 
Poorly functional health facilities  
Lack of faith in govt. 
Non-availability of transport  
Safety and Security 
Poverty 
Poorly functional health facilities  
Lack of faith in govt. 
Non-availability of transport  
Safety and Security 
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Provider Preferences: 
Private sector is more preferred for the treatment of acute child illnesses due to its perceived 
quality of care.  
 
B) Differentials in utilization of MNCH services by location and coverage 
In this subsection summary of notable differentials in terms of MNCH utilization patterns by   
location of health facilities and coverage of LHW program are described. The differentials 
are summarized at the levels of (a) LHW covered vs. uncovered areas and b) close to public 
health facility areas versus peripheral areas. 
 
4.7 Utilization in Areas Covered by LHW versus Uncovered Areas 
 
Main differences in terms of utilization of MNCH services by coverage of LHW program are 
summarized in Table 4.3.   
  
 
4.8 Utilization in Close versus Peripheral Villages  
 
Main differences in terms of utilization of MNCH services by distance to government health 
facility are summarized in table 4.4.   
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3  Main differences in utilization of MNCH services by LHW program 
coverage  
LHW Covered Area Uncovered Area 
1. Low level of awareness regarding the 
importance of ANC services and 
higher utilization of iron folate and 
TT vaccines for pregnant women  
2. Low level of awareness regarding 
post natal care 
3. Low awareness among clients 
(Mother and fathers) related to routine 
immunization but high awareness of 
Polio drops 
4. Some level of awareness regarding 
family planning methods  as well as 
free availability of contraceptives if 
stock is available with LHW 
5. Clients sometimes receive few 
essential medicine  free of cost from 
LHWs to cure maternal and child 
minor ailment  
 
1. Low level of awareness regarding the 
importance of ANC services and lower 
utilization of iron folate and TT 
vaccines for pregnant women 
2. Low level of awareness regarding post 
natal care 
3. Low awareness among clients (Mother 
and fathers) related to routine 
immunization excepts Polio drops 
 
4. Low level of awareness regarding 
family planning methods  and non 
availability of  free contraceptives to 
clients  
 
5. Clients have to buy essential medicine 
at cost from pharmacies  to treat minor 
maternal and child ailments   
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4.9        Section Summary 
 
Service utilization is low across the continuum of MNCH services with particularly low 
utilization of maternal care services and is due to a low utilization of MNCH services by 
community is due to a combination of community level factors, low awareness and inability 
to pay as well supply side factors.  
 
Community Level Factors  
 Demand for prenatal and postnatal care is particularly low and is due to lack of sufficient 
awareness amongst the majority of clients while cultural resistance to use of service is 
confined to only pockets of population.  
 Inability to pay is a major barrier to utilization of health care services. Increasing poverty 
level and high level of transportation and direct medical expense results in poor 
community willingness to utilize health care facilities except in the case of acute illness 
and maternal complication.  
 
Supply Side Factors  
 Poor access to functional health services is a major constraint behind low utilization. 
Access is poor for both government and private services but particularly for government 
services, and leads to frequent bypassing of FLCF tier.  
  Better uptake of ANC is seen in covered villages and is due to demand inducement by 
LHWs.  
 There is a general mistrust of the government system and major hindrances indentified by 
clients include lack of female staff, limited opening timings, insufficient medication and 
lack of supportive diagnostic and emergency services.  
Table 4.4 Main differences in utilization of MNCH services by villages close to health 
facilities versus peripheral villages 
Villages Close to Facilities Peripheral Villages  
1. Majority of the villages located 
close to the public health facility 
are covered by LHWs 
2. Easy access to public health 
facility  
3. Immediate care seeking  for 
emergency maternal and child 
complication   
4. Utilization of both public and 
private sector facilities 
5. Lack of faith in public health 
system  and some level of 
mistrust with private sector as 
well   
6. Lower level of safety and 
security issues faced in 
utilization  of  health system 
 
1. Low coverage of LHW program in most of the 
peripheral villages  
2. Difficult access to public health facility  
3. Sometimes care seeking is delayed even for 
emergency maternal and child complications 
4. Private sector utilization is higher  
 
5. Lack of faith in public health system  and some 
level of mistrust with private sector 
 
6. High safety and security concerns faced in 
seeking care after dusk, as in emergency 
situations, particularly in the peripheries of upper 
Sindh 
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 Client prefers private sector utilization over government sector despite heavy charges, 
however, this result in debts and depletion of savings, and greatly reduces access for the 
poorest groups.  
 Preventive outreach services such as childhood vaccination and contraceptive provision 
by respective EPI and LHW program are favorably received due to provision of free of 
cost services at the doorstep, however there is poor coverage of these programs in the 
more remote villages.  
 
Recommended Measures  
 Client incentives linked to health services are needed but must be simultaneously 
accompanied by improvement in health care services. Incentives are particularly needed 
to target antenatal care, delivery, post natal care and well baby checkups.  
 Vouchers for transportation are needed to offset heavy cost of transport for deliveries and 
Emergency Obstetric and Neonatal Care.  
 Enhanced health education at village level through LHW program and alternatively 
through NGOs in areas uncovered by LHWs is needed to target importance of maternal 
care and newborn services, recognition of danger signs by mothers, and information to 
clients on where to obtain services.  
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Section  5. HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM  
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
The previous section outlined demand side factors affecting service utilization. Section 5 
reviews the government health sector and the private health market in NPPI districts 
identifying key supply side areas where result based financing mechanisms need to be placed 
as well as listing supplementary measures needed to make them work.  
 
5.1 Methods 
 
A triangulation of both secondary and primary data was done to identify supply side 
constraints and come up with suggestions. Secondary data analysis involved use of 
government records and independent studies to assess the availability of key health inputs 
such as health infrastructure, staffing and funds; use of government HMIS and vertical 
program records to review health service performance, and use of NPPI baseline survey data 
to review quality of care at health facilities. Primary data analysis drew on qualitative insights 
provided by interviews of provincial and district managers, government health facility staff 
and key informants from private sector on factors behind low MNCH service output in the 
health care delivery system and measures needed for improvement.  
 
I. GOVERNMENT HEALTH SECTOR 
 
5.2 Infrastructure Availability:  Availability of Government Beds and FLCFs is 
Below National Statistics Requiring Public Private Partnerships for Quick Roll out of 
Service Coverage and Reduction in Service Overlaps. 
 
An overview of the government health system shows that hospital bed to population ratio in 
NPPI districts is far below the national average indicating poor preparedness for maternal and 
child emergency services (Table 5.2). The exception is Larkana district where the ratio of 78 
beds to 100,000 population exceeds national average of 65 beds per 100,000 population and 
is mainly due to the presence of a teaching hospital. Other districts have extremely low bed 
strength as seen by a mean of 23 beds/ 100000, population with a lower range of 5 beds per 
100,000 to a higher range of 28 beds per 100,000 population. Maternity and pediatric beds 
would be expected to be substantially lower across all districts and absent in some. 
Availability of infrastructure at the health facility level is similarly low with an average of 3 
health facilities per 100,000 population in NPPI districts as compared to the national average 
of 10 FLCF per 100,000 population.  
 
Inter-district variations show that Larkana comparatively is relatively ahead of other NPPI 
districts in terms of government tertiary infrastructure however it is difficult to ascertain 
whether there is sufficiency of MNCH beds. Other districts need further availability of both 
hospital as well as first level care facilities with Tharparkar, Nawabshah and Ghotki seen to 
have the lowest infrastructure availability.   
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Table 5.1 Infrastructure Availability: Government Health System 
District Ranking Districts Hospitals1 Beds/100,000 population2 FLCFs
1 FLCF/ 100,000 population1 
Low  
  
  
Tharparkar 3 5 33 2 
Nawabshah 2 10 44 3 
Ghotki 4 NA 33 4 
Jamshoro 2 38 25 2 
Qambar 4 78 29 2 
Umarkot 1 13 16 1 
Kashmore 1 13 20 2 
Medium 
  
Badin 5 17 49 3 
Shikarpur 5 28 41 3 
High Larkana 9 78 59 4 
 NPPI districts 5 23 43 3 
 Pakistan 417 65 5289 10 
Sources: 1 National HMIS (2006);  2  SPDC (1996) 
 
Low infrastructure to population ratio when combined with low population density in NPPI 
districts further decreases access to health care facilities. Investment in new infrastructure 
involves substantial capital costs and has been associated with long delays. Quick and 
efficient measures for increasing health facility access involve use of available private sector 
outlets and provision of incentive to private sector for expansion in uncovered areas and are 
also expected to result in efficiency gains through avoidance of service overlaps.  
     
5.3 Availability of Skilled Staff: Strength of Specialists & Female Health Staff Will 
Remain Sub-Optimal Even if Sanctioned Posts are Filled  
 
Existing health staff strength in NPPI districts indicates extremely low capacity to provide 
emergency services and at best patchy strength for routine services. Specialists are either 
absent or available in extremely low numbers with a total of only 3 gynecologists and 2 
pediatricians across NPPI districts translating to an average of 1 specialist per district and a 
ratio of 0.05 specialists to 100,000 population (Table 5.3). Staff vacancies are the main 
reason behind shortage of gynecologist’s shortage of pediatricians results from a combination 
of insufficient number of posts as well as staff vacancies (Table 5.4). Extremely low strength 
of specialists raises serious concerns of public sector ability to provide comprehensive 
maternal and neonatal emergency care.   
 
Amongst the general cadre, female doctors and female paramedics are in particularly short 
supply as compared to male doctors and male paramedics. Presently there is 1 female doctor 
to 100,000 population and an average of 7 female doctors per district. This would increase to 
20 female doctors per district if vacancies are filled but still would be able to cover less than 
half of existing government health facilities. Female paramedics are also in short supply with 
1 per 100,000 population and an average of 13 per district. Improvement in ratio of female 
paramedics to doctors is also needed which is currently inverse (1female paramedic: 4 
doctors) and requires rapid expansion in number of LHVs and nurses. Actual staff strength on 
ground of all staff is lower than presented as mentioned figures do not take into account the 
actual number of staff reporting to work and given the high level of reported absenteeism 
there is expected to be further dilution of staff strength.  
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Table 5.2. Availability of Skilled Staff 
Districts 
Ranking  Districts  
Specialist1 Female Doctors1 Male Doctors
1 Female Paramedics1 
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Low 
Kashmore 2 0.2 3 0.3 48 5 10 1 
Qambar 0 0 6 0.4 42 3 2 0.1 
Umarkot 0 0 2 0.1 23 2 15 1 
Larkana 0 0 3 0.2 58 4 9 0.6 
Tharparkar  - - - - - - - - 
Medium  
Ghotki 1 0.1 1 0.1 25 3 11 1 
Nawabshah 0 0 8 1 35 2 6 1 
Shikarpur 0 0 13 1 51 4 19 2 
High  
Jamshoro 1 0.1 16 2 59 6 25 2 
Badin 1 0.1 22 2 91 6 21 2 
 NPPI districts 1 0.05 8 1 48 4 13 1 
Source: 1Government Record (2008)  
 
Staff vacancies are particularly high for female in comparison to male staff indicating that 
supportive measures to draw in female staff need to be particularly addressed. Inter-district 
variations show better specialists and female health staff availability in the lower Sindh 
districts of Badin and Jamshoro, followed by Nawabshah as compared to districts in upper 
Sindh and Tharparkar region and are probably due to poor security conditions in upper Sindh 
and extremely remote locations in the Tharparkar district.   
 
 
Filling of staff vacancies will be extremely difficult to tackle unless underlying reasons 
behind unwillingness to serve in the government sector are addressed (See Section 5.7). 
Table 5.3: Sanctioned and Working* Staff Positions 
District 
Ranking  Districts  
Specialists 1 Female Medical Officers1 
Male Medical 
Officers1 
Female 
Paramedics1 
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Low  
Larkana 3 0 19 3 55 58 45 9 
Qambar 3 0 13 6 40 42 20 2 
Medium  
 Umarkot 4 0 27 2 90 23 49 15 
Kashmore 4 2 12 3 54 48 34 10 
Ghotki 6 1 28 1 66 25 27 11 
High  
Jamshoro 4 1 30 16 76 59 51 25 
Badin 3 1 34 22 92 91 38 21 
Shikarpur 2 0 33 13 75 51 29 19 
Nawabshah  2 0 24 8 57 35 14 10 
Source: 1 Government Record (2008) 
* working: staff positions which are filled and detailed 
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However, although staff strength will improve after filling of vacancies it will remain sub-
optimal and requires supplementation through private practitioners. A considerable expansion 
is needed in the female paramedic cadre and will require local production of LHVs at the 
district level in addition to drawing in LHVs based in the private sector. 
 
Way forward requires a two-fold strategy of filling of vacant posts through use of provider 
incentives backed by strong policy emphasis on staff retention as well as supplementation of 
government staff with use of private practitioners. Other measures include the provision of 
specialist skills to general cadre in the more remote districts where availability of highly 
skilled staff will continue to be a problem, and addressing the inverse doctor LHVs ratios by 
increasing local production of LHVs.  
 
5.4 Service Performance: MCH Service Indicators Have Remained Stagnant and are 
Below National Figures for Government Facilities 
 
Performance of MCH services, with the exception of EPI is other than the national average 
and there has been little improvement over the last three years and (Figure 5.2 & 5.3). Health 
facility utilization for MNCH services is particularly low as compared to vertical outreach 
services. Only 9.2% of pregnant mothers are registered for antenatal care at government 
facilities while service figures further drop as pregnancy progresses with only 3.6% of 
pregnant women delivering at health facilities and 1.2% of delivered women provided with 
post natal care (Table 5.4A).  
 
Table 5.4 (A). Maternal Outputs in Public Sector 
Districts  % ANC Registered1 
% Deliveries by 
Trained Staff 1 
% Post Natal care out of 
expected deliveries in previous 
month1 
% Women 
Received at least 2 
doses of TT1 
Badin 17 6 3 26 
Umarkot 0 0 NA 20 
Shikarpur 29 11 3 26 
Ghotki 8 4 1 25 
Jamshoro 0 0 NA 44 
Tharparkar 7 2 1 18 
Larkana 5 1 3 33 
Qambar 0 0 NA 52 
Kashmore NA NA NA NA 
Nawabshah  16 8 1 31 
NPPI districts  9 4 1 32 
Source: 1 Government Records (2007) 
 
Facility based child care services show relatively better rates of curative as compared to 
preventive care with an average health facility output of  141 child illness cases treated per 
month while an average of only 9 children  <5 years of age are monthly monitored for growth 
(Table 5.4 B). Evidence on maternal care shows that the FLCF tier is poorly utilized even for 
routine services such as antenatal care and delivery with comparatively much higher 
utilization of government hospitals (NPPI Baseline Study 2009). Similar data on child illness 
is not available however qualitative evidence reports frequent bypassing of first level tier. 
Skewed utilization involving high dependence on hospital tier results in poorer access and 
involves higher per capita cost of service.  
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Outreach services such as EPI are much better than facility indicators however there is 
considerable inter-district variation in terms of level of EPI coverage. Overall up to 77% of 
children are immunized up to measles however coverage of pregnant women is much lower 
with only 32% of pregnant women having received two dosages of TT (Tables 5.4 A&B).   
 
Table 5.4 (B). Child Health Outputs in Public Sector 
Districts 
<1yrs children monitored 
for Growth / health facility 
per month 1 
Child Illness cases/ 
Health facility per month1 
% child Fully  
Immunized upto  
Measles1 
Badin 10 148 86 
Umarkot 8 75 90 
Shikarpur 11 212 73 
Ghotki 2 149 65 
Jamshoro 7 108 65 
Tharparkar 2 103 64 
Larkana 1 86 74 
Qambar 7 102 110 
Kashmore NA NA NA 
Nawabshah 7 271 91 
NPPI Districts 6 142 77 
Source: 1 Government Records (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Health Facility Utilization for Maternal Health 
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Health facility based MNCH services need a considerable boost in all NPPI districts while 
outreach EPI services need improvement in some of the districts. Maternal care particularly 
needs strengthening in all areas including pregnancy care, delivery, post natal care and 
family planning. Skewed utilization of health system involving needs to be addressed to 
improve cost efficiency and access with FLCF tier made operational for dealing with routine 
case and filtering of cases to hospital level.  
 
5.5 LHW Program:  Coverage Extension, Health Facility Linkage and Stringent 
Monitoring Required to Enhance Potential 
 
LHWs have a key role in increasing uptake of MNCH services through creation of client 
demand and referral of cases to health facilities. LHW covered areas show higher client 
demand for ANC, family planning and immunization over uncovered areas as discussed in 
Section 4.6. However presence of substantial uncovered areas and relatively weak program 
monitoring in NPPI districts limits further effectiveness of the LHW program.  
 
LHW coverage in NPPI districts is limited to less than half of the population (Table 5.5) and 
falls even lower to a third of the population in districts such as Umarkot and Jamshoro. LHW 
to population ratio in NPPI districts is 5 per 10,000 populations, lower than both the required 
number of 10 per 10000 population and national average of 7 per 10000 population. As a 
result only 54% of newborns are registered and weighed, merely a third of pregnant women 
are visited by LHWs for ANC while use of modern contraception is confined to 28% of 
eligible clients. Ghotki and Nawabshah are relatively better performing than other districts 
with approximately two thirds of the population covered by LHWs and service coverage 
falling within a higher range.  
 
Knowledge of key health messages amongst is comparatively poorer in Sindh as compared to 
national average, as indicated by a recently conducted LHW evaluation survey (LHW 
Evaluation 2007), with the situation likely to be worse in NPPI districts.  Knowledge is 
particularly poor for antenatal care, diarrhea and ARI management and comparatively better 
Figure 5.2. Health Facility Utilization for Child Health 
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for anemia, contraception and breastfeeding.  Furthermore, supervision, monitoring and 
linkage with health facility in Sindh also fall behind national level. Only 43% of LHWs in 
Sindh regularly attend monthly meetings, LHW supervisor visits the community in only 30% 
of visits, only 56% of LHS use supervisory checklist and feedback is provided in only two-
thirds of cases. Facility linkage is also weak due to severe shortage of back-up female staff at 
BHUs and RHCs for building necessary referral and monitoring linkages while in addition 
coordination linkages also need to be developed between the LHW Program managed by the 
EDO-Health Office and the newly introduced PPHI at BHUs.   
 
Table 5.5. LHW Coverage & Service Performance 
Districts % Covered Population1 
% of newborn 
registered and 
weighed1 
% of pregnant 
women visited 
for ANC1 
% CPR1 % of clients using MC1 
Badin 60 59 41 16 28 
Umarkot  34 69 45 16 31 
Shikarpur 51 77 43 18 37 
Ghotki 70 43 35 14 23 
Jamshoro 32 64 45 17 29 
Tharparkar 32 40 19 12 15 
Larkana 55 50 29 17 30 
Qambar 55 56 27 15 26 
Kashmore 45 22 68 15 23 
Nawabshah 62 63 37 19 35 
NPPI Districts  47 54 39 16 28 
Source: 1Government  Records (2007) 
 
More effective role of LHW program is needed for increasing client demand and requires 
i)expansion of LHW coverage, ii)tightening of supervisory control, iii)targeted improvement 
in LHW knowledge and skills for risk assessment and referral, and iv)stronger linkage with 
health facility. Coverage expansion should be in a phased manner involving short and long 
term strategies such as introduction of a career pathway for upward movement of LHWs, 
relaxing eligibility rules for more remote areas and incentivized school education linked to 
job provision.  
 
 
5.6 Quality of Care at Public Sector Facilities: Attention needed to Out-fitting of  
Facilities, Supplies Availability and Friendlier Staff Attitudes 
 
Quantitative Insights: Quality of care at secondary health care facilities in rural Sindh is poor 
and requires substantial improvement. NPPI baselines survey of THQs and DHQs showed 
that majority of them lack 24 hours supply of electricity. EmONC services round the clock 
needs upgrading in terms of medicines and supplies such as magnesium sulphate, antibiotics 
and IV fluids, clearly shown as in Table 5.6 (A). Emergency medicines and CPR availability 
for maternal at both the levels are deficient and need attention. Similar lack of equipment and 
supplies is seen in child and neonatal care services such as presence of heater, incubator, 
nebulizer, and ambo bag.  
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Table 5.6 (A) Quality of Care in DHQ and THQ 
 DHQ THQ 
Infrastructure  
Provision of Running Water 100% 80% 
Availability of 24 hours electricity  20% 12% 
Availability of telephone facility (landline)  100% 100%  
Presence of Delivery Room 80% 88% 
Presence of Operation Theater  100% 80% 
Maternal Care  
Availability of blood transfusion facility 80% 52% 
Availability of Magnesium Sulphate 0% 4% 
Availability of antibiotics 64% 48% 
Provision of Family Planning supplies 60% 43% 
Availability of 24 hours IV fluids  93% 49% 
Availability of 24 hours CPR facility 13% 8% 
Child/ Neonatal 
care  
Presence of Incubators 20% 0% 
Presence of Phototherapy 20% 0% 
Presence of Heater 20% 0% 
Availability of Ambo bag 20% 20% 
Presence of Nebulizer 60% 40% 
Availability of 24hours neonatal services 100% 32% 
Source: Baseline NPPI Survey (2009) 
 
The results of the recent NPPI baseline survey of FLCFs for Quality of care in rural Sindh 
exhibited that majority of BHUs and approximately one third of RHCs require major inputs 
in terms of the availability of the delivery rooms, oxygen cylinder and functional toilets for 
patients. Laboratory for base line investigations is deficient at BHU level. 76% of the safe 
delivery kit and essential emergency care supplies such as availability of antibiotics is 
missing in most BHUs. Availability of essential emergency services such as CPR for mother 
and newborn is also particularly poor particularly at BHU level.  
 
Table 5.6 (B) Quality of Care in RHC and BHU 
 RHC BHU 
Infrastructure  
Provision of Tap Water 75% 51% 
Availability of electricity supply through main connection   98% 84% 
Availability of functional Toilets for patients 57% 25% 
Presence of Delivery Room 62% 20% 
Presence of Minor OT  43% - 
Presence of Oxygen Cylinder 60% 12% 
Presence of basic laboratory 50% 6% 
Maternal care  
Availability of CPR for women during working hours 24% 15% 
Presence of safe delivery kit 50% 24% 
Availability of IV fluids administration to women  90% 
Availability of antibiotics 29% 
Provision of Family Planning supplies 57% 46% 
Child / Neonatal 
care  
Availability of ORS 79% 
Availability of IV fluids administration to infants and children< 5 59% 
Availability of CPR for neonates during working hours  21% 13% 
Presence of Nebulizer 14% - 
Source: Baseline NPPI Survey (2009) 
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Qualitative insights: Qualitative data from both service provider and client group discussions 
in NPPI districts reinforces poorly functional health services. Services timings are limited to 
morning hours while range of services provided is narrow with almost no provision for 
deliveries, acute child illness and MNCH complications at FLCF facilities and low 
availability in government hospitals. Most FLCFs were reported to lack basic equipment and 
supportive diagnostic services. Medicine for acute illness, dietary supplements for pregnant 
mothers and supplies for delivery and emergency services are present in insufficient quantity 
leading to purchase from private pharmacies and high cost of care for patients. Staff attitudes 
were also reported to be poor as compared to friendlier attitudes in private sector facilities. 
 
5.7 Competing Workload and Poor Clinical Skills Hamper Quality of Care 
 
Health facility staff reported low emphasis on MNCH from district supervisors resulting in 
overlooking of MCH in favor of general curative services. ‘We don’t do because we are 
never asked’ was a frequent rejoinder with service accountability checks by managerial staff 
limited to OPD and staff attendance registers. Additionally, heavy time consumption of staff 
in polio eradication activities was felt to affect all services particularly low priority ones such 
as MNCH. Moreover, most staff felt that their existing clinical were for appropriate 
screening, case management and referral for MNCH. Many of these areas were felt to be 
inadequately addressed during medical training and as there is no system of on job refresher 
trainings most health staff rely on pharmaceutical representatives for updating of knowledge.  
 
Provider training in overlooked areas such as IMCI, newborn care and maternal 
complications, supervisory emphasis on MNCH, and ring-fencing of service provision time 
from polio and other vertical activities are measures needed in addition to outfitting and 
stocking of health care facilities.  
 
5.8 Factors Underlying Low Female Staff Retention: Filling of Vacancies Will Be 
Ineffective Unless Backed Up With Provider Incentives and Supportive Security 
Measures  
 
Low strength of female staff is due to two distinct issues: i) a ban on staff appointments; and 
ii) unwillingness of available appointed staff to service in NPPI districts. A ban on public 
service commission appointments above grade 11 has been in place since 2001 resulting in 
prolonged staff vacancies of both doctors as well as paramedic staff. Some recruitment has 
been done over the years through different projects however these are non-regular project 
based posts. The ban on appointments has recently been lifted however staff selection and 
appointments is a centralized process handled at the provincial level and vulnerable to 
political pressures. This results in delays and often leads to hiring of staff that are unwilling 
to serve in appointed districts.  
 
However even if staff is speedily appointed against vacant posts there is likely to be  low 
retention at place of posting due to a number of inter-related issues. Safety and security due 
to general poor law and order situation is the foremost issue amongst female staff in Kambar, 
Kashmore, Shikarpur and Ghotki districts. In other districts the remote and underdeveloped 
locations of health facilities is the main barrier.  Issues with such postings include high 
private transport charges due to lack of public transport and are ill afforded by existing 
salaries. Additionally, lack of livelihood for spouse and education facilities for children, non-
functional and poorly repaired staff residences, and general isolation make these postings 
unattractive for staff and their families. Above all, risk of harassment of female staff 
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remained even in better security areas from area influentials, government superiors and 
accompanying male relatives of patients and was attributed to entrenched cultural attitudes on 
‘easy’ sexual availability of women. Lack of chowkidar and absence of other female staff 
such as ayah, midwife or other paramedic after regular opening time particularly expose staff 
to harassment risks.  
 
Existing compensation is considered to be well below the market and the practice of uniform 
salaries across government sector with failure to build in hardship and transport allowance 
further reduces willingness to serve in peripheral postings. The notion of incentivized salaries 
are well received by all both administrative and general cadre (See Section 8 for further 
details) and have drawn female staff into the PPHI as well as provided inducement to non-
earning male family members (e.g. father, father- in-law, younger brother) into 
accompanying female staff. However, even with incentivized salaries most staff preferred 
daily outbreak over 24 hour postings at peripheral facilities  
 
Staff appointments will not be sufficient in addressing shortage of female staff and requires 
both sufficient level of provider incentives as well as supportive security measures such as 
pairing of female staff for non-regular duty hours, provision of male chowkidar, adequate 
night stay facility, and strong political emphasis on all local stakeholders for protection of 
female health staff.   
 
5.9  Planning Related Challenges 
 
5.9.1 Low MNCH Priority at District Level & Lack of Provincial Oversight Post-              
Devolution 
 
Low priority to MNCH is seen across NPPI districts in comparison to competing curative 
care agendas. Extent of priority given to MNCH at district level rests mainly with district 
level stakeholders. Fiscally, the districts receive a one line budget allocated from Provincial 
Finance Commission and district health budgets are subsequently decided within the district 
involving the EDO-Health, District Government and approved by District Legislature. 
Administratively, the devolved EDO-Health Offices report directly to the Provincial Health 
Secretariat instead of the Health Directorate, which houses provincial preventive and 
promotive programs, and was previously the reporting tier for district health systems. Lack of 
administrative authority of Health Directorate over district health systems results in poor 
linking with provincial MNCH goals while shortage of provincial monitoring funds limits 
provision of technical support and advice to districts. Furthermore, international donor 
agencies promoting MCH programs have mostly continued to interact with provincial 
government and as yet have had little engagement with district governments despite the 
devolved set-up.  
 
Loss of provincial and donor oversight post devolution has contributed to low district level 
emphasis on MNCH and requires sensitization of districts stakeholders and district 
performance review exercises both internally within the district as well as at the provincial 
level. The monitoring role of the Health Directorate also needs to be strengthened through 
provision of earmarked funds for monitoring and inclusion in oversight bodies for district 
based projects.   
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5.9.2 District Based Needs Assessment and Planning Need Institutionalization 
 
District based needs assessment and planning is not an established practice in any of the 
NPPI districts and is unlikely to be followed in other districts in Sindh. Annual planning and 
budget making process is limited to inflation adjusted changes made to the operational 
budget. New targets and initiatives when introduced are top down and introduced by vertical 
programs raising questions on the functionality and responsiveness of health service 
devolution. Similarly, planning for development budget does not involve a needs assessment 
exercise, is traditionally confined to use of budget for capital works as opposed to flexible use 
of development budget for enhanced monitoring or providing training and results in 
incremental infrastructure addition to the existing health care delivery system.  Responsive 
strategies for MNCH and maximizing potential of devolved powers can only be made if 
needs assessment and planning is established as an institutionalized exercise and linked with 
the budgeting process.  
 
Periodic, three or five yearly, district level needs assessments are required followed by 
development of annual heath sector plans linking operational budget and ADP development 
process with targets of annual district health plans. District needs assessment exercise should 
be conducted by EDO-Health, PPHI, DPWO, district government and other relevant 
stakeholders including private sector with assistance provided by provincial and UN 
agencies and endorsed by district assembly while annual planning exercise need to be 
regularized and linked to the budget making and approval process.  
 
5.9.3 Under-budgeting for MNCH: Low Spending, Lack of Budgetary Growth and 
Increasing Squeeze on Non-Salary Items 
 
Overall per capita funding is low and inclusive of district operational budget and vertical 
program budgets amounts to Rs. 275 (USD 3.4) / person/year.  The figure is higher than the 
estimate of Rs 210 provided by the World Bank analysis of 2004/05 however after 
adjustment for inflation there actually seems to be a regression in public sector expenditure at 
the district level. Exact figure for MNCH expenditure is not available due to lack of 
budgetary break-up by service outputs but given the low emphasis on MNCH services across 
NPPI districts it is expected to be low. District level allocation to health ranges between 13-
16% of district budget and the share appears to remain stagnant with adjustments confined to 
yearly inflation adjustments across the entire district budget.  Provincial after recent increase 
is at 4.6% of total budget and spending post-devolution has steadily declined.  
 
While per capita spending levels are low and there appears to have been little significant 
increase in budget over the years, the share allotted to non-salary items is extremely small. 
86% of the EDO Health budget comprises of salaries with little left over for supplies, 
maintenance and monitoring and has serious implications on quality of care. Staff salaries 
have grown at a higher scale than inflationary adjustments to the budget thus indicative of a 
steady erosion of the non-salary component. (See Section 7).   
 
On the development side, there has also been a reduction in funds however available budget 
is traditionally utilized for capital works such as facility construction schemes which in turn 
have increased and lasting recurrent cost implications. More innovative and cost-effective 
utilization of development funds is needed as in purchasing of private sector services in lieu 
of facility construction diversion to staff training and enhanced monitoring of MNCH 
services.   
NPPI Feasibility Study on Result Based Financing Mechanisms in Sindh 
AGA KHAN UNIVERSITY, KARACHI     Page 51 
 
 
Overall spending is low, is suggestive of little budgetary growth over the years, and there is 
poor earmarking of non-salary budget. Policy measures include increasing health allocations 
by increasing budgetary share at district level and reversing the decline at provincial level; 
tracking of funds for MNCH through move to output based budgets; and significant increase 
and ring-fencing of non-salary funds. Furthermore development funds should by flexibly used 
towards soft projects such as monitoring, training and public-private partnership schemes to 
avoid increased cost implications of further facility construction.  
 
5.9.4 Shift to Stewardship Role needed and Requires Sensitization, Capacity building 
and Ear-marked Budget 
 
The planning and strategizing function is fundamentally the government’s responsibility and 
should provide a strategic direction for the entire health sector. However, focus of the 
government health sector remains traditionally confined to implementation of directly 
provided services and planning exercises even when conducted are limited to the public 
health service delivery system. Lack of a strategic planning role encompassing the entire 
health sector has resulted in ignoring the parallel working of the private sector which is a 
significant provider of MNCH services. This has resulted in missed opportunities causing 
service overlaps and resource duplication in certain areas, lack of tapping into private health 
care and diagnostic services in areas having patchy government services, and generally poor 
regulation of private sector services.   
 
Government at present lacks orientation and skills for its stewardship role and requires focal 
capacity development of district health managers and strengthening of EDO-Health offices 
and DHDCs. Better availability of data and improved field based monitoring are also needed 
and require increase in monitoring budget which at present is minimal due to heavy 
budgetary commitment to staff salaries.  Moreover, suspicion of private sector and turf 
politics over service provision leads to low willingness for strategic partnerships (See Section 
8) and requires sensitization of both district and provincial managers on the role of a 
‘strategic centre’.   
 
District sector wise plans need to be developed to map and harness the potential of the 
private sector identifying areas for strategic use of private sector for district MNCH targets, 
and need to be accompanied by capacity building for stewardship role of government and 
ear-marking funds for monitoring and regulation.  
 
5.10 Administrative Challenges 
 
5.10.1    Weak Administrative Control Over Staffing 
 
Centralized staff management powers and frequent political interference therefore 
substantially weakens administrative control of district health managers over staff postings 
and retention. Administrative control for grade 16 and below, which involves nursing and 
paramedic staff, lies with district health managers while powers for grade 17 and above, 
involving the doctor and specialists cadre, continue to be concentrated at the provincial level. 
Political interference for staff appointment and transfers is seen at both districts and province 
thereby diluting EDO authority over paramedic staff while leaving negligible control over 
doctors. As a result staff easily obtain transfers from peripheral facilities to urban locations 
and are assisted by collusions at various levels over obtaining a ‘visa’ for exiting posted 
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facilities while others retain designated posts but maintain a nominal attendance while setting 
up their independent private practices. This is in contrast to the PPHI which has full 
administrative control over staff of contracted BHUs in terms of appointments, postings and 
salary packages. The ‘special status’ of PPHI also limits political interference from 
influentials.  
 
Class I powers on trial basis in NPPI districts, as already done for PPHI, are needed 
accompanied by policy emphasis on reduction of political interference for staff postings.  
 
5.10.2 Fragmented Health Care System Hinders Implementation of Integrated Services 
 
Existing health system is fragmented into four distinct tiers managed by different 
stakeholders hence complicating the implementation of integrated services required by the 
MNCH context. The different tiers include: the i) the tertiary tier involving the DHQ Hospital 
/ Teaching Hospital and managed by the Medical Superintendent; ii) the secondary care tier 
of Taluka Hospitals and Rural Health Care centers managed by the EDO-Health; iii) the 
primary care tier involving the BHUs managed by the PPHI; and iv) the outreach community 
services implemented by the vertical programs. Each tier has its own budget, accompanying 
administrative powers and parallel monitoring systems (See Sections 6&7). However at 
present there is lack of coordination across the different tiers in terms of planning and 
monitoring of MNCH services, effort has not been made to develop referral linkages, and link 
between the vertical community based programs and the BHUs has weakened since 
implementation of the PPHI.    
 
Provision of effective integrated services will require i) reduction in compartmentalized tiers 
with BHUs and community outreach services to be managed by a single agency; and ii) 
tangible coordination across the different tiers in planning, implementation and monitoring 
of MNCH services under the umbrella of a coordinated district health plan.  
 
5.10.3 Lack of Output Based Systems 
 
Government has low capacity and lacks precedence for output based financing and 
monitoring systems. Financial systems are input based, follow the general public sector 
financial rules of business and there is no system for linking with service output data. Staff 
managing financial data have inadequate training for moving to new output based systems 
while health managers coming from medical backgrounds have received little training in 
budgeting, costing and forecasting and typically make little use of financial data in 
programming health services. The Health Management Information System (HMIS), 
designed with USAID support in mid 1990s, is more sophisticated than the financial 
information system and provides computerized service outputs at the district level however 
there has been no updating of civil service rules to link service outputs with staff 
performance. Career progression continues to be based on number of years of service and 
there is no system of performance appraisal or cash rewards. Moreover, there is poor use of 
available information due to lack of work culture and skills, and quality of information is 
often suspect due to false recording of data. Move towards output based systems would 
require introduction of new financial systems and their linkage service output data. (See 
Sections 6 & 7).  
 
Shift to output based systems in government health department will require larger civil 
service reforms. Result based funding mechanisms in NPPI districts will have to rely on an 
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outside agency having necessary capacity for output tracking and its linkage with financial 
data. 
  
5.10.4 Monitoring Frequency and Quality Needs Improvement  
 
Monitoring frequency and quality is considerably lower than required and makes little use of 
available MNCH performance indicators. Monitoring typically involves conduction of 
occasional health facility visits by district health managers with emphasis on staff attendance 
and OPD while MNCH services usually receive negligible attention due to low priority as 
well as lack of technical skills of supervisors in the MNCH area. Numbers of visits vary 
across districts and as such there is no system of required number of monitoring visits. Visits 
to community level are rare and hence there is little cross-verification of health facility 
records. There is little practice of use of information for monitoring despite compilation of 
service output data through the computerized Health Management Information System.  
HMIS data is largely maintained for forward routing of data to provincial and national tiers. 
Moreover, only the health service database out of the 4 HMIS databases is maintained and 
updated, while health facility, health personnel and training databases are not in use despite 
being potentially vital sources of information.  
 
Monitoring at the provincial level is mainly desk based and is also poorly tied to service 
outputs except for vertical programs such as the EPI, World Food Program and Population 
Welfare. The presence of multiple parallel monitoring systems creates difficulty in 
reconciling information for evidence based monitoring while absence of linkage between 
service outputs and service recognition leads to indifference for use of information. (See 
Section 6) 
 
Strengthening of monitoring will require linking of service outputs with salary bonuses or in 
performance appraisal, earmarking funds for district HMIS and greater number of field 
visits, and capacity building to improve quality of supervision.  
5.10.5 Managerial Capacity Building Needs to be Institutionalized 
 
District heath managers and their associated staff are in need of orientation and skills for 
health systems management as well as for MNCH specific needs. Existing focus of 
managerial staff is on day to day routine administration and curative care services. While 
similar capacity constraints have been raised by past donor funded projects such as Family 
Health Project-1 and TAMA, capacity building remains an un-institutionalized process. At 
present there is no ‘grooming’ system for government health managers as found in the civil 
service cadre which builds capacity at the time of intake into government service or later 
during the pathway of career progression. Capacity building even when undertaken with 
donor support is limited to one-off training workshops the effects of which get dissipated due 
to poor absorptive capacity of existing public administration system as well transfer of 
trained staff.  
 
Capacity building in health systems management is required but needs to be accompanied 
with measures for increased uptake of capacity building training. Mandatory training for 
administrative cadre linked to service entry and career progression, retention of trained 
managerial staff at place of posting for at least a three year period, and provision of greater 
administrative control can improve linkage training and application linkage . Key areas for 
formal skill development are district health planning, stewardship and purchasing skills, 
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output based budgeting, and improved monitoring and need to be accompanied by focal 
trainings on MNCH needs assessment, programming and monitoring.  
 
II. THE PRIVATE SECTOR MARKET 
 
5.11 Private Sector is the Major Provider for Maternal Care and Child illness 
 
Quantitative Insights: While overall use of MNCH services is low across NPPI districts, the 
private sector is the preferred provider over government for most services except public 
goods such as EPI and family planning.  A review of secondary data shows that 655 of 
antenatal check-ups and 43% of all deliveries are conducted by skilled staff and of these the 
majorities are conducted by private health providers (Table 5.7A). Child illness data similarly 
shows that private providers are the main recourse for treatment of child illness with 60% of 
case treated by private sector as opposed to 19% at government FLCF or hospital. However 
public sector dominates in the provision of public goods and is the main provider of family 
planning services (Table 5.7A) as seen from NPPI baseline survey and in immunization to 
children and pregnant women as indicated by provincial estimates of PSLM (PSLM 2006).  
 
Qualitative insights: Qualitative evidence from NPPI sites shows that the private sector 
remains the major recourse even for the poor with expenses met through use of available 
savings and/or borrowing from relatives and money lenders. Institutional deliveries amongst 
the poor are extremely rare and occur usually in the case of life threatening complications. 
Similarly, postnatal visits even to private provider are extremely infrequent and occur in case 
of complications following delivery. Private sector is the main and preferred provider for 
child illnesses including newborn complications, diarrhea and pneumonia in under five 
children despite higher costs. However public sector dominates in terms of preventive 
services with free services and easy access at the doorstep being the main reasons behind 
client uptake of government provided EPI services and LHW provided contraceptives. (See 
Section 4 for details). 
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Table 5.7 (A). Utilization of Maternal Health Services by Type of Provider 
Districts 
Deliveries 1 Antenatal Care 1 Family planning 1 
% Skilled  
% 
Unskilled  
% Skilled  
 % Unskilled  % Public sector % Private sector 
% Other 
sources
* 
Govt Hospital 
/ Clinic 
Private 
Hospital / 
Clinic 
Home 
Govt 
Hospital / 
Clinic 
Private 
Hospital / 
Clinic 
Badin 10 38 52 1 14 61 24 67 30 3 
Umarkot 7 31 61 3 3 42 32 76 21 3 
Shikarpur 6 42 52 2 27 61 32 61 38 1 
Ghotki 2 37 54 5 6 64 35 27 52 21 
Jamshoro 14 39 47 1 37 47 28 63 25 12 
Tharparkar 2 16 82 8 17 9 51 80 18 2 
Larkana 4 44 48 4 15 53 36 47 35 18 
Qambar 5 41 54 4 10 42 27 57 43 0 
Kashmore 1 29 71 3 4 49 44 26 61 13 
Nawabshah  8 41 51 0 20 47 42 77 13 10 
NPPI Districts 6 36 57 3 15 48 35 59 32 9 
* other sources include: shop (not pharmacy) / friend / relative / Dai / others   
Source: 1 Baseline study for NPPI (2009) 
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Table 5.7 (B). Utilization of Child Health Services by Type of Provider 
Districts 
  
% Govt Hospital / Clinic1 %  *Private Practitioner1 
Badin 22 63 
Umarkot NA NA 
Shikarpur 34 55 
Ghotki 12 78 
Jamshoro NA NA 
Tharparkar 20 30 
Larkana 9 67 
Qambar NA NA 
Kashmore NA NA 
Nawabshah  15 67 
NPPI Districts 19 60 
Source:  1 MICS (2003-04)   
*Includes allopathic, providers and hakeems 
 
5.12 Overview of Private Sector 
 
Private sector in selected NPPI districts is an active and rapidly growing sector with 
economic compulsions the key factor behind growing private practice trend.  It is mostly 
dominated by the private-for-profit sector while presence of the non-profit sector is sketchy 
with minimal involvement in clinical service provision. Although expansive in terms of 
general curative care, the private sector is as yet small scoped in terms of MNCH providers 
and service outlets. The exceptions are the two districts of Larkana and Nawabshah which 
have a higher private sector concentration in the MNCH area as well as in general curative 
care areas. Across all districts, private sector services are mainly clustered in the urban 
centers of the districts as compared to the peripheries where services are largely provided by 
unskilled birth attendants or ‘mobile’ quacks offering limited curative care.   
 
5.12.1 Private Sector Comprises Mainly of Individual Practitioners While Organized    
Infrastructure is Less Developed  
 
The private sector mainly comprises of individuals and their outpatient practices while 
organized infrastructure is weak for provision of emergency and inpatient care. Maternity 
homes or medical centers providing maternity and neonatal and child care services are either 
very few or absent and those present are confined to urban centers of the district. Number of 
registered facilities and beds is generally lower than that in the government sector however 
figures may be underestimated as registered facilities are lower than reported facilities 
(Table 5.8). In only two of the districts, Nawabshah and Umarkot, private beds are 2-3 folds 
higher than government beds. Available maternity outlets in many cases are run by doctors 
lacking specialty training and thought to provide sub-standard care. Peripheral services 
comprise of small out-patient clinics for general curative care run by MBBS doctors or 
quacks and occasional home based set-ups of female providers for conduction of deliveries.  
 
Provider incentives to individual private sector providers can be used to tap into individual 
private providers for supplementing service provision at government facilities in the areas of 
both routine and emergency care. Contracting and vouchers of private sector facilities have 
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limited application due to lack of well developed private sector facilities in most NPPI 
districts.  
 
5.12.2 Private Sector has Better Strength of Female and Specialist Staff However 
Female Staff Shortage is a Cross-Cutting Issue Across Public and Private Sectors 
  
Shortage of female and specialist staff is also seen in the private sector however their strength 
appears to be better than government sector. Specialists where found are clustered in urban 
areas and are often attached to DHQ or teaching hospitals. Pediatricians are in relatively 
greater number as compared to gynecologists with estimates of 28 pediatricians present 
across 4 NPPI districts while gynecologists are estimated to be 21 in number and present in 
only 2 districts. Female MBBS doctors are in lower supply than male doctors even in the 
private sector with 6 districts having 10-20 female doctors with remaining 4 districts having a 
much greater supply (>50). Strength of female paramedics in only 3 districts is 3-5 times 
higher than that of female doctors while it is lower or at best equal to that of female doctors 
in remaining districts. The inverse female paramedic to doctor ratio seen in most of NPPI 
districts may be due to either low supply of LHVs or that they are in government employee 
and do not maintain distinct private set-ups.  
 
Although private sector has comparatively better staff strength than government sector and 
can supplement government services, however combined strength of medical staff is still low. 
Incentivised measures to draw  in more medical staff into the districts and as well as focus on 
increasing local supply of female paramedics for provision of routine care.  
 
5.12.3 Private Sector is Small Scoped after Adjustment of Overlaps with Public Sector  
 
High overlap exists between private and public sector across all categories of health care 
providers. In 7 of the 10 districts, majority of staff practicing in the private sector are also in 
government including PPHI employ with estimates varying between 60-90%. Overlaps are 
lesser in Nawabshah and Larkana districts where there are robust private markets with 
estimates of 40-50% of practitioners having dual affiliation. Dual affiliation of private 
practitioners is also lower in Kashmore (estimated to be 25%) although reasons are less clear. 
Overlaps are principally due to higher earnings while safety and security issues in case of 
female staff also contribute to setting up of private practice in safer locations. After 
adjustment for dual affiliation, the private sector, with the exception of 2 districts, is small 
scoped and can only be used to supplement government services instead of being the primary 
source for health care delivery.  
 
Purchasing of private sector services should only be limited to those private practitioners 
who do not have a dual affiliation so as to avoid negative inducement to health staff for 
strengthening private practices at the cost of public sector facilities. Incentivized salaries can 
be used for ‘pulling in’ health staff with dual affiliation into the government sector.  
 
5.12.4 Inter-District Variations: More Well Developed Private Sector Market Present 
in Larkana and Nawabshah 
 
Amongst NPPI districts, Ghotki, Larkana, Badin, Shikarpur and Nawabshah districts are 
relatively the most well-developed up in terms of private health infrastructure. They also have 
comparatively higher concentrations of specialists and female staff as compared to other  
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Table 5.8 Organizational Scope of Private Sector 
District Ranking  
 
Infrastructure Availability Staff Availability 
(Qualitative Estimates) Beds/ 
100,000 pop 
Health Care Facilities 
(Registered) 
Health Care Facilities 
(Qualitative Insights) 
Better ranking 
districts 
 
(emergency 
facilities, 
specialists, 
female docs 
>100) 
N
aw
ab
sh
a
h 
21 
Hospitals: 16 
MCHC: 0 
Curative Clinics: 4 
25 notable medical centers: 
50% with OT & surgical facilities; 
50% with selective support facilities; 
12 small scale clinics 
20 gynecologists 
15 pediatricians 
200 female doctors, 
250 male doctors 
50% staff also in government service 
La
rk
an
a 22 
Hospitals: 16 
MCHC: 33 
Curative Clinics: 350 
10% of outlets are medical centers that can 
cope with MNCH emergencies, 
15% can provide limited admissions, 
75% are small clinics 
Female docs :500 
Female paramedics:300 
Male doctors: 2000 
Male paramedics: 2000 
40% of private staff in all categories  is also in 
government sector 
Middle 
ranking  
districts 
 
(female 
doctors >20 
and 
paramedics 
>50). 
B
ad
in
 
9 
Hospitals: 5 
MCHC: 3 
Curative Clinics: 46 
5 hospitals 
1 hospital has small neonatal set-up, 
6 maternity homes 
Predominance of small clinics 
No gynecologist. 
1 pediatrician 
Female doctors very few 
10-15 LHVs 
 
Very few female doctors in government practice 
except PPHI 
G
ho
tk
i 5 
Hospitals: 1 
MCHC:  0 
Curative Care Clinics: 3 
 
 
2 MCH Centres funded by corporate sector 
5 private maternity outlets with limited 
admission facilities 
 
1 gynecologist 
8 pediatricians, 
10 female doctors, 
10 LHVs, 
130 male doctors, 
40  male dispensers 
More than two-thirds also in government service 
Th
ar
pa
rk
ar
 
1 
Hospitals: 1 
MCHC: 0 
Curative Clinics: 3 
No set up for maternal & neonatal 
emergencies 
3 maternity clinics with limited admission 
facilities 
 
No specialists 
180 male doctors 
11 female docs 
1 nurse 
35 male paramedics 
70% of male staff and 90% of female staff  also in 
government practice 
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Table 5.8 Organizational Scope of Private Sector (contd)  
District Ranking 1 
Infrastructure Availability 
Staff Availability 3 
(Qualitative Estimates) Beds/ 100,000 pop1 
Health Care 
Facilities 2 
(Registered) 
Health Care Facilities 3 
(Qualitative Insights) 
Low ranking 
districts 
 
(female 
doctors <20 
and 
paramedics 
<50) 
Sh
ik
ar
p
ur
 5 
Hospitals: 9 
MCHC: 2 
Curative Clinics: 43 
No set up for maternal & neonatal 
emergencies 
35 small scale clinics and few can attend to 
deliveries 
200 male docs 
70 female docs 
10-12 LHVs/ nurses 
70% in government practice also 
U
m
ar
ko
t 33 
Hospitals:  9 
MCHC: 1 
Curative Clinics: 12 
2 medical centres but lack facilities for 
maternal & neonatal emergencies 
 
100-150 small clinics 
No specialist 
Male medics 150 
Male paramedics 100 
Female doc 20 
Female paramedics 100 
50% of paramedics and 80% of doctors also in 
government service 
Ja
m
sh
or
o 
 
6 N/A 
2 Medical Centers in Kotri providing limited 
emergency care, 
No established set-up for maternal & neonatal 
emergencies, 
Mostly small clinics 
Emergencies taken to Hyderabad 
Female doctors: 20, 
Female paramedics: 50, 
Male doctors: 100 
Male paramedics: 130 
80% of female staff and 60% of male staff also in 
government practice 
 
K
as
hm
or
e 
14 N/A 
3  Medical Centres providing limited 
emergency care 
No established set up for maternal & neonatal 
emergencies 
Mostly small clinics 
Emergencies taken to other districts 
Female doctors: 15 
Female paramedics: 25 
Male doctors:100 
Male paramedics: 150 
20% of female staff and 25% of male staff also 
work in government sector 
 
K
am
ba
r 25 N/A 
Pediatric emergencies dealt by pediatricians 
No services for maternal emergencies 
Mostly small clinics 
Emergencies taken to other districts 
Pediatricians : 4 
Female doctors: 10 
Female paramedics:10 
Male doctors: 10 
Male paramedics: 100 
80% of all staff are also in government practice 
Sources:    1 SPDC (1996);   2 World Bank (2005);  3  NPPI key Informant interviews (2009) 
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districts. In comparison, Tharparkar have a small scoped private sector comprising of 
approximately 5-6 maternity/medical centers having potential for further development, 
presence of pediatricians, and a small body of independently practicing female doctors <20 
and paramedics <50) Umarkot, Jamshoro and Kashmore mainly comprise of small clinics, 
lack specialists and have low concentrations of female staff (female doctors <20 and 
paramedics <50).  
 
Contracting and vouchers of private sector facilities can only be applied in districts such as 
Larkana, Ghotki, Badin, Shikarpur and Nawabshah that have potentially well developed 
private facilities while in other districts purchasing of private sector services would rely on 
provider incentives targeting  individual private practitioners for practicing at government 
facilities.  
 
5.12.5 Private Sector Related Issues:  Low Emphasis on Preventive Services, 
Questionable Standard Setting and Poor Capacity for Book-Keeping & Records 
 
A number of issues are associated with private sector use for MNCH services. Firstly, access 
to private sector services although better as compared to public sector services is also less 
than optimal with client complaints of long distances for accessing emergency services 
resulting in transportation as well as cost issues. Secondly, quality of service is also 
questionable. At present there is no practice of maintaining a certified list of private 
providers, collection of evidence on service pricing and regulation of quality of care. Within 
MCH services the focus of private providers is on profit oriented services such as deliveries, 
obstetrical procedures and curative consultation while low profit margins and lack of 
sufficient provider training result in overlooking of promotive and preventive services. 
Economic compulsions and lack of accountability checks have resulted in growing 
commercialization with emphasis on user charges and high patient volume often at the 
expense of quality of care. The practice of quackery is also reported to be on the increase and 
is particularly prevalent in the peripheral areas and in the poorer populations. Thirdly, 
standards of financial transparency are also low due to low capacity for book-keeping and 
record keeping as well as lack of compulsion for declaration of records. Better standards of 
service provision and record keeping are limited to a handful of larger medical centers in the 
NPPI districts.  
 
Implementation of public-private partnerships will involve key measures including 
development of lists of certified providers, clinical training of private providers in MNCH 
service provision and technical assistance on  record keeping of  financial and service data.  
 
5.12.6 Private Sector Strengths:  Better Availability of Services and Client Friendly 
Attitudes 
 
Private sector remains the more preferred and frequently utilized provider in terms of 
deliveries, child illnesses and maternal and neonatal complications. Although most private 
practitioners also practice in the government sector however there is better availability of 
staff and round the clock services as reported by clients, making private sector the preferred 
provider of services. Private sector is also reported to have better equipped facilities in terms 
of diagnostics, blood bank and other supportive services. Friendlier attitudes and valuing the 
client as opposed to dismissive attitudes in the public sector is an added reason for its 
popularity (See Section 4 for details). Underlying reasons for better performance in private 
set-ups, as reported by private practitioners, are market based compensation, managerial 
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independence from government bureaucracy, and performance based further growth and 
recognition. 
Availability of health staff and positive attitudes are key factors for comparative success of 
private sector and require adequate staff compensation accompanied by managerial 
autonomy and positive recognition.  
 
5.13 Section Summary 
 
Service coverage: 
 
 MNCH service utilization of government health facilities is extremely poor, FLCF tier is 
particularly underutilized and services have remained stagnant over the last few years. 
 Although overall community utilization of MNCH services is low, it is the private sector 
which is the main provider for child curative care, deliveries and maternal complications 
despite high charges. Public sector is the main provider of public goods such as EPI and 
contraception through its outreach programs.  
 Service penetration into the more peripheral areas and provision for the lowest income 
populations is poor by both private and public sector.  
 
Areas for Improved Performances  
 
 Existing numbers of government beds and FLCFs are less than required and need 
supplementation with private sector services for quick roll out of services as well as 
attention to transportation issues.  
 Staff strength in government sector, particularly of female health staff and specialists, is 
extremely low and even at full sanctioned strength will remain sub-optimal. 
 Significant attention to health facility maintenance, availability of equipment and 
essential medicines is needed for provision of MNCH services in government facilities.  
 Coverage of the LHW program remains low also requires more stringent program 
monitoring to enhance it demand creating potential.  
 Private health sector while having superior staff strength comprises mainly of individual 
providers rather than well-developed private facilities and has capacity constraints in 
terms of standard setting, record keeping and low attention to preventive services.  
 
Financing Measures Needed 
 
 Incentives to government staff are required to increase staff strength in government 
facilities.  
 Strategic purchasing of private sector services will still be needed to supplement 
government services for quick provision of coverage as well as reduction of service 
overlaps.  
 Given the composition of the private sector, the purchasing of private services will need 
to target individual practitioners through provision of provider incentives for practicing at 
government facilities. Use of vouchers and contracting will be limited to only few 
districts which have an adequate presence of private sector health facilities.  
 
Supportive Measures 
 
Key supportive measures will be required for implementation of result based financing 
measures and include i)earmarking of funds for improving service provision at government 
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facilities and enhancement of stewardship function, ii) increased administrative powers, and 
iii) capacity building of both public and private sector. These are detailed as follows:  
 For improved female staff availability financial incentives alone will not be enough and 
need to be accompanied by Class I administrative powers for stronger administrative 
control, and supportive safety and security measures for female staff. 
 Human resource strengthening is needed through i) clinical training of health staff in 
maternal complications newborn care and IMCI; ii) provision of specialist skills to 
general cadre in the more remote districts; and iii) increasing local supply of female 
paramedics to manage the BHU tier with concentration of trained doctors at the 
secondary care tier. 
 According priority to MNCH during supervision, building necessary technical skills for 
supervision and ring-fencing of time from polio days and other vertical activities are also 
needed for more functional services.   
 LHW Program requires innovative strategies for expansion of coverage as well as 
tightened supervision, improved health facility linkage and further training of LHWs in 
needed MNCH areas. 
 Careful listing of certified private practitioners, development of minimum standards of 
care, and refresher clinical training are required prior to purchasing of private sector 
services. In addition technical assistance for information and financial systems will also 
be needed in instances where private sector facilities are used for contracting and /or 
vouchers. 
 Enhancement of stewardship role is required for result based financing and will require 
sensitization, capacity building and earmarking of funds.  
 Shift to strategic role will require an institutionalized practice of district needs assessment 
exercise on medium term basis, development of annual district health plans, linkage of 
budgetary process with annual health plan targets, dialogue and coordination with private 
sector, provision of stronger administrative control to come up with flexible solutions, 
improved monitoring and use of information, and retention of trained managerial staff for 
2-3 year period. 
 Key budgetary inputs will be required including increased financing for MNCH service 
provision from both district and provincial budgetary shares, significant increase and ring 
fencing of non-salary component, and tracking of MNCH funds through move to output 
based budgets. Additionally, enhanced administrative powers are needed for flexible use 
of salary budget to incentivize staff of peripheral facilities and use of development funds 
towards soft projects such as monitoring and training. 
 Tangible coordination is required between the secondary, first level and community tiers 
under the umbrella of a district health plan to existing reduce fragmentation of the health 
care system and provide integrative services. 
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Section  6. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS  
 
6.1 Relevance of MIS  
 
Monitoring is an ongoing, systematic assessment of information to ascertain if program is on 
track. In contrast, evaluation is a periodic assessment to assess achievement of programs 
against the set targets and to understand the reasons for shortfalls and lessons learned from 
them.  As for any other component, M&E of MIS systems is important. The M&E of MIS 
systems encompasses data recapturing and data triangulation at the point from where data 
originates through program and independent sources and review of information flow and 
usage.   
 
The results based financing (RBF) are intended to improve health system’s performance 
through supply and demand sides’ incentives. A robust monitoring and evaluation system is 
essential for accurate and timely tracking of outputs so as to asses the overall effectiveness of 
financial awards. It is also necessary for maintaining transparency in disbursement of 
financial awards and minimizing chances of leakages and misappropriation. This would 
involve strengthening institutional M&E system and keeping an external eye on validity and 
reliability.   
 
6.2 Methods 
 
Systems reviewed: The study reviewed major health and more specifically Maternal, 
Neonatal and Child Health (MNCH) related MIS in Sindh. For this report, the systems are 
categorized into MIS related to public programs and other MIS systems. The former includes 
First Level Facility Health Management Information System (FLCF-HMIS), District Health 
Information System (DHIS), and Lady Health Worker Management Information System 
(LHW-MIS). This chapter presents the review of MIS related to public programs.   
 
Sampling: The purposive sampling technique was used to select respondents. The majority of 
interviews were conducted with managers and MIS persons sitting together. This helped the 
team to relate MIS and programmatic issues.  
 
Checklists: The structured checklists were developed to review the systems (Annexes 1-
9).The focus of checklists were to indentify the potential RBF indicators, assess the quality of 
the information generated, and Review the means of verification and protocols for data 
storage and entry processes.  
 
Ratings: Each system was rated by the respondents, who were managers and MIS persons of 
the program. The systems were rated based on standard indicators using scale of 1-5. The 
indicators included relevance, reliability, accuracy, usability, timeliness, completeness. The 
operational definitions are given in annex 10. The reviewers then used observations and 
interview notes to rate systems.  
 
Annex 6 presents information flow in the major systems while Annex 3 presents all the 
maternal neonatal and child health (MNCH) related indicators captured by each system.  
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6.3 I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MIS    
 
6.3.1  HMIS for First Level Care Facilities (FLCF-HMIS) 
 
FLCF-HMIS is currently being used in 22 districts of Sindh. HMIS has four databases: i) 
service output database; ii) health facility infrastructure database; iii) personnel database; and 
iv) training database. The service output database captures monthly data on outpatient 
services, deliveries, priority communicable diseases and preventive care including ANC, 
PNC,  newborn registration, growth monitoring, EPI, family and planning services but does 
not provide inpatient data on MNCH emergency admissions. Data entry is done at health 
facilities and computerized aggregation is conducted in districts at EDO-Health Office. HMIS 
also allows for reporting from private health care facilities on the standardized HMIS format 
however except for rare instances, reporting from private sector has not been implemented. 
Updating and record maintenance of other databases is also required. Health facility 
infrastructure database requires annual updating from all health facility on key aspects related 
to presence of basic amenities and availability of furniture and equipment. Personnel and 
training databases require continuous updating on availability of health staff, postings, and 
training. Each district is sanctioned with a post of an epidemiologist (a 17 grade officer), a 
statistician and a data entry officer.  
 
6.3.2 District Health Information System (DHIS) 
 
DHIS is an expanded and more user-friendly version of HMIS and is being piloted in Thatta 
district of Sindh. DHIS captures information on 15 inpatient indicators and 44 outpatient 
indicators and tools used are simpler and more comprehensive. Relevant MNCH indicators in 
addition to those covered by HMIS includes almost all MNCH and EmONC related 
indicators like ante partum hemorrhage, postpartum hemorrhage, preeclampsia/ eclampsia, 
prolonged/ obstructed labors, puerperal sepsis, birth trauma, birth asphyxia, prematurity etc 
(for details refer Annex 3). Data is reported from all FLCFs and hospitals with computerized 
entry intended to be undertaken at the Taluka Hospital level. It relies on client-server 
arrangement for timely transmission of computerized data and hence cut down on time lags 
related to HMIS. The client server arrangement also provides a data back-up system which is 
not present in the HMIS. The computerized program is an easier Windows version as 
compared to the DOS based system of HMIS.  
 
6.3.3 People’s Primary Health Initiative (PPHI) 
 
The PPHI utilizes the HMIS-FLCF system and in addition also has collects information on 
ear-marked indicators of the PPHI program. These include staff attendance, OPD, and stocks 
and are collected through PPHI monitoring checklists. Data on these is separately collected 
through monthly reporting by BHUs on PPHI performs and through surprise checks. PPHI 
puts particular emphasis on surprise checks and facilities are provided with mobile phones to 
make critical information on attendance of staff and number of OPD patients readily 
available. HMIS reports from BHUs are sent to EDO-Health Office for compilation while 
other information is separately compiled by PPHI. Compilation at district PPHI offices is 
manual or at best EXCEL based and as such there is no software for entry, storage and 
snapshot analysis of PPHI data.   
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6.3.4 LHW program  
 
The LHW program is the only source of community based data. It collects information on 
number of clients at the community level, health and demographic profile of clients, 
preventive services provided by LHWs, referrals to health centre and number of deliveries, 
births, and maternal and infant deaths. It has well-designed cross-verification system and 
relies on monitoring and cross checking of information at the community level through Lady 
Health Supervisors and District LHW Coordinators. In addition provincial and federal cross-
checking of data is also in built into the LHW Program. The LHW Program however has no 
software for data entry and analysis with information manually compiled at the district level 
and aggregated in EXCEL at the province.  
 
6.3.5 Key Cross-Cutting Issues: 
 
The review of MIS revealed generic issues that were cross cutting across system and specific 
issues related to a system.  The issues are presented below.  
 
Fragmented MIS system working in isolation: At present there is no single MIS system in 
the government sector. Monitoring comprises of different monitoring information systems 
working in isolation. Amongst the different MIS in place the LHW Program selectively 
targets community based information while rest of the MIS including those of the HMIS, 
DHMIS, PPHI systems, Population Welfare Program exclusively target the health facility 
level. As such there is no system which provides MNCH information across both facility and 
community levels. The current arrangement also does not provide any opportunity to verify 
or triangulate the findings of one system through other. 
 
Relevance of Data Collected:  A concerted effort needs to be made to include all relevant 
MNCH indicators in reporting from districts. At present reporting is being done only on 
routine MNCH services such as ANC, delivery, PNC, growth monitoring, immunizations, 
and child OPD, through the different systems in place however there is no system of 
reporting on EmONC indicators. The DHIS is the only system that allows for reporting on 
inpatient data including key EmONC indicators. The DHIS needs to be expanded to NPPI 
districts for more comprehensive reporting on MNCH services or alternatively a new system 
put in place in NPPI districts for reporting on all required indicators.  
 
Staff Related Issues: Frequent transfer and shortage of female staff at the health facility level 
is a cross-cutting issue that affects data entry and record keeping of MNCH services. 
Recently, PPHI has shown some success in female staffing this area by increasing the 
remunerations of female staff. However newly posted staff lack orientation to MIS leading to 
inaccurate and poor record-keeping. Staff retention measures as well as building in training 
for new staff needs to be implemented for improving record keeping.  
 
Accuracy of Information: Accuracy of information needs to be improved and requires cross-
validation checks. There is a critical lack of crosschecking of data at the level at the level of 
data entry by service providers and LHWs. This is due to low emphasis by program managers 
as well as lack of sufficient budget for fuel. The only check that districts and province run are 
the internal consistency checks on number of facilities or LHWs reporting. In several of the 
visited at health facilities, information on MNCH services is incompletely filled, there are 
discrepancies between the monthly reports sent to district office and registers maintained at 
health facilities with tendency for over-reporting in monthly reports, and instances entry of 
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uniform readings for all patients are seen giving rise to questions on validity of data. 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests under-reporting by LHWs on maternal and infant deaths.  
 
Lack of importance on use of information: Limited use and distrust on information was a 
common theme found across the systems. The only major use of information is to take action 
in case of reporting of notifiable diseases. While the MIS allows facilities to report on service 
outputs and issues but these issues are never followed by the higher authorities nor are linked 
with planning and budgeting processes.  Lack of feedback from higher authorities de-
motivates district MIS staff as service provider and LHWs involved in reporting from the 
field.  The LHW program is designed to take non-reporting more seriously. By protocol, 
LHWs should be issued with three warnings and then termination letter on non-reporting for 
four consecutive months. However, this does not happen often on ground due to difficulty n 
finding LHW replacements and  
 
Inadequate maintenance of health facility infrastructure and personnel database: 
Although eh HMIS and DHIS are designed for maintaining a database on health facility 
infrastructure, equipment and furniture, these databases is not in use in most districts. 
Similarly the personnel databases and training databases of HMIS are also not in use despite 
presence of computerized software for record of information in each of the NPI districts.  
 
Lack of reporting on private sector: The HMIs is designed for registration of private sector 
facilities and reporting of private sector outputs. However for except for a handful of NGO 
projects there has been no attempt made by HMIS to include private facilities in the reporting 
system.  
 
Data transmission related issues: Quick access to aggregated information is lacking in most 
districts. The PPHI and LHW systems at the district level are non-computerized while the 
HMIS is computerized but relies on receiving of reports from health facilities prior to 
computerization at district level and can lead to time lags due to late reporting by health 
facilities. The DHIS system is superior as it provides instant transmission of data through 
internet server however has been facing technical start-up problems. Furthermore, data 
backup, storage and transmission protocols also need to be strengthened of existing programs.  
 
6.4 II. SPECIFIC ISSUES RELATED TO INDIVIDUAL PROGRAMS  
 
6.4.1  First Level Care Facility HMIS (FLCF-HMIS) 
 
Lack of ear-marked funding for HMIS: The HMIS system since its initiation since 1993 has 
been funded through different development projects and lacks a sanctioned regular budget. 
Availability of funds for HMIS implementation and upgrading therefore depends on approval 
of independent development projects, and even when approved is dependent on the more 
onerous process of fund release for development projects. Development funding is mostly 
confined to the provincial level and there is little trickle down of funds to the districts. 
District health budgets also do not have ear-marked funds for HMIS and also are extremely 
under-budgeted in terms of non-salary operational expenses.   
 
Data transmission issues: The data reporting system relies on transmission of collected 
information from district level. The review of data receiving log showed a lag of 6 to 8 
months for 4 districts. Instant accessing such as through the DHIS would reduce time lags in 
reporting. Furthermore, each district uses different modes of sending data with data sent in 
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flash drives, compact drives (CD) and emails and back-ups are kept at both offices and homes 
of HMIS staff. These are critical violations in data management, transfer and storage 
protocols.  
 
Expansion of Training needed: A key feature of the HMIS is the annual conduction of 
refresher training. However these are subject to fund availability and at present are confined 
to yearly refreshers for data entry staff.  Training need to be expanded to data entry training 
for health facility staff and should include BHU staff newly inducted staff under the PPHI. 
Training on use of information initially conducted under the Family Health Project have also 
been discontinued and need to partially address district health care mangers including EDO-
Health Office, PPHI and MS of DHQ and THQ hospitals.   
 
Shift to DHIS: It is planned that the FLCF-HMIS will be replaced by DHIS and funds have 
been requested from MNCH Program and PAIMAN projects. Due to this expected shift, 
there is at present low interest at both province and district levels for improving the HMIS.  
 
6.4.2  District Health Information System (DHIS) 
 
Technical Issues Faced in Piloted Project:  The piloting of DHIS has been marred by 
problems with client server and lack of hands on technical support to trouble-shoot piloting 
issues. The DHIS has a formal client-server arrangement for data saving, backup and 
transmission due to which the provincial office can access district data at anytime cutting 
down on time lags for reporting. However, the Thatta pilot shows that DHIS data could not 
be accessed even once during the past year due to technical issues related with client server 
and there have been multiple crash down of system in the past one year. The change of 
software from LINUX to Windows version has also slowed down the program with 15-20 
minutes taken to run a single save command. The pilot gets very limited support from the 
province and federal offices. The present staff handling data entry person have had no formal 
training and has to multiple tasks besides entry, such as writing memos and letters for the 
EDO office.   
 
6.4.3  People’s Primary Health Initiative – MIS  
 
Issues Related to Use of Two Monitoring Systems by PPHI: While the PPHI uses the HMIS 
it also has its own monitoring system on which major monitoring emphasis is provided. 
While there is good accountability check on data separately collected by PPHI as well as 
timely usage, the separately collected information gives little emphasis to MNCH indicators. 
Use of HMIS given indicators would bring in the required emphasis however compilation of 
HMIS reports from BHUs is presently at EDO-Health Office and would require either 
shifting of BHU related information for compilation at district PPHI offices or increased 
coordination between the two agencies in case of continued aggregation at EDO-Health 
Office. In addition skill building training in data recording and entry are required of health 
facility staff under PPHI as well as training of PPHI district managers on importance of 
MNCH service indicators and their use in programming of health care services.  
 
6.4.4  LHW MIS System 
 
Reduction of workload on LHWs: LHWs are overworked as new programs and 
responsibilities keep coming in. District program managers mentioned that LHWs do not 
concentrate on their primary job fully due to involvement in polio day activities, PAIMAN 
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project and other incoming project which affects the quality of data recorded. Reduction of 
workload on LHWs is needed along with proper emphasis from district and provincial 
managers on timely and accurate record keeping.   
 
Lack of Computerized Information: Districts find it difficult to keep an updated aggregated 
record of information on LHWs program as data is manually collated with computerization 
taking place at provincial level. A computer entry system at district level is being piloted at 
districts Thatta and Ghotki, Tando-Alayar and Matiari.  
 
Emphasis on cross checking however hampered by poor program management: The LHW 
Program is the only system having well-designed cross checking and validation at all levels. 
The monitoring in program entails visits by District LHW Coordinators, Lady Health 
Supervisors and provincial Field Program Officers to determine LHW’s performance. 
Information is used for decision making as was seen in the following areas:  
 
i. Most districts showed letters of terminations for LHWs not reporting.  
ii. The LHW who performed best in providing FP services to her community was 
rewarded.   
iii. The LHS fills out performance based checklist for each LHW where she give 
quantitative ratings in percentage.  
 
However frequent shortage of funds for of fuel hampers LHS monitoring and due to reporting 
pressures the LHSs resort to reporting without adequate field verification of data.  Once data 
grafting practices start these continue even if field monitoring resources are made available. 
Moreover, there is no system of surprise checks with the result that actual on-ground 
performance does not get properly validated. Pressures of presenting a favorable record also 
leads to under-reporting of maternal and infant deaths and over-reporting of contraception 
provision by LHWs.  
 
6.5 Rating of the Systems 
 
The LHW because of capturing community level information and data verification at various 
levels was rated higher. The system has high relevance to RBF schemes as it captures key 
outcome indictors such as maternal mortality ratio and infant mortality and contraceptive 
prevalence rates.  Our review indicated that the information in most cases was complete with 
rare incidences of missing pieces. The timeliness of reports was remarkable.  The only 
discrepancy seen in one of the districts was that the LHW reported that she could not make 
the last visit; however, LHS report showed that visit was made by the particular LHW. 
Moreover, in one district the LHW reported that LHS forces them to underreport MMR and 
IMR and over report CPR.  
 
For FLCF-HMIS, we corroborated the information at the district level with the facility data. It 
was seen in quite a few instances that data from two sources were not consistent. For 
instance, the number of deliveries was over reported in the facility report but registers 
showed less deliveries. Similarly, in one district all births were of 2.5 kg and in other all 
babies weighed 3kg. There were also delays in reporting. The interviews with district staff 
also revealed that due to the absence of cross checking mechanisms, there is no 
accountability on reporting. Moreover, the FLCF-MIS is now shifting towards DHIS and 
therefore it is not useful to invest on this system. 
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The PPHI, although has management that emphasizes on monitoring and quality assurance 
but does not have a fully developed system of its own to provide information for RBF.  
 
System is performing better in terms of timeliness and completeness but need to increase 
their system relevance, reliability and accuracy.  
 
The DHIS is a good system on paper, if properly implemented; it can be a useful system for 
RBF. It has inpatient indictors which makes the system more useful for incentive based 
schemes. However, the system needs a more comprehensive pilot before being utilized for 
such schemes.   
 
6.6      Section Summary  
 
Improvement of existing system is needed:  
 
 The FLCF-HMIS system is not ready for RBF in current form. The accuracy and current 
usage of information by the program is very low. The validity and reliability of 
information is questionable.  
 On paper the DHIS is a better system than the FLCF-HMIS. It is simpler and more 
comprehensive, covering majority of MNCH and EmONC indicators than FLCF-HMIS 
system. However, rating is low in terms of its accuracy and need technical improvements. 
It should be piloted in few more districts, perhaps for a shorter time than Thatta pilot, to 
stabilize the system before taking scaling up.  
 The PPHI- MIS system is better in terms of timeliness and completeness of information. 
However improvements are required in emphases to MNCH indicators  
 The LHW program is the only means for community level information. Ratings indicated 
that the system is better than any other program while measures required to be taken for 
its accuracy and usage of information.  
 
Recommended Measures:  
 
 The MISs should have strong internal monitoring and quality assurance processes to 
implement incentive based projects such as NPPI. The internal monitoring mechanism 
Table 6.1: Reviewers’ Rating of MIS  
 Relevance Reliability Accuracy Usage of info Timeliness Completeness Overall 
LHW - MIS 3 4 3.5 3 4 4 4 
PPHI 2 2 2 2 3 3 2.5 
DHIS 4 2 2 1 1 2 2 
FLCF-HMIS 2 1 1 1 2 2 1.5 
Source: NPPI feasibility study, 2009 
NPPI Feasibility Study on Result Based Financing Mechanisms in Sindh 
AGA KHAN UNIVERSITY, KARACHI     Page 70 
 
should validate the information captured through MIS on an ongoing basis. The internal 
monitoring must include surprise/spot checks. The relevant staff in the districts should be 
trained on internal monitoring, spot checking and reporting mechanisms. Refreshers 
should also be conducted on the definitions of the indicators included in the NPPI 
program.  
 As a pilot, the NPPI should include DHIS and LHW program’s MIS for the pay for 
performance scheme. However, DHIS needs a more comprehensive piloting before being 
fully used for NPPI. The pilot could be done in two to three districts for about six months. 
It should mainly focus on checking the functionality of the client-server arrangement for 
data entry and transmission to the provincial office. For this the two programs should 
have consultative meetings to align indicators for validation.  In areas that not currently 
covered by the LHW program, a short term measure could be the spot checks by the NPPI 
third party in the district. 
 Given the sensitive nature of schemes, there should be an external party to monitor the 
quality and integrity of data.  
 Independent party is needed to monitor the validity of recorded service output data for 
payment of award. An independent party placed in the district could validate the 
information captured by the systems and monitor the functionality and performance of the 
internal monitoring systems. Incentives should be given after validating the information 
given by the MIS and the third party.  
 Survey based validation of information is needed on a yearly basis this could be done by a 
consulting firm chosen through a competitive process. The major role of independent 
party would be to conduct comprehensive representative surveys at district level every 
year.  
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Section  7. FUND FLOW AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION SYSTEM  
 
7.0         Introduction 
 
Section 7 reviews the health care financing system in the public health sector in the province 
of Sindh. The main purpose of this chapter is to contextualize results based financing for 
MNCH within the existing system of budgetary allocations, tiers of authority, and financial 
information systems so as to recommends specific changes that are required at different tiers 
of the financial system for introducing financial incentives.  
 
7.1  Methodology  
 
I) Budgetary analysis was carried out through examination of budget record of the 
Department of Health Sindh and District Governments in the two districts of Shikarpur and 
Badin. However time series data of both the districts were not available. II) Financial flows 
were also discerned from provincial and district data and from interviews with relevant 
financial managers. The same procedure was applied with vertical programs. III) Financial 
information systems were discerned through interviews at the district level at the DCO, EDO 
Health and EDO Finance offices at the district level. In addition, finance officers of the EDO 
health were interviewed in detail and accounting systems observed through developed 
checklists in all ten districts. A similar procedure was adopted to obtain information on 
federal programs.  
 
 
7.2  Health Allocations    
Budgetary analysis is provided to gauge allocations to the health sector in the provincial and 
district budgets and the analyses enables our understanding on three elements: i)  the priority 
given to health by the provincial and district governments, ii) an indicative analysis of per 
capita expenditure on health at the district level, iii) intra budget allocations towards salary 
and non-salary components that provide an indicator for qualitative change through 
budgetary mechanisms.  
 
It needs to be recalled that the importance of the provincial budget as the primary vehicle for 
the delivery of health services in the province has greatly diminished since the devolution of 
powers to local government were instituted in 2001. According to the World Bank (2005, 
p22), roughly 60% of provincial government expenditures were transferred to the districts.  
 
In the current fiscal year, the government of Sindh has allocated 4.6% of its current budget 
for the health sector. On the development side, the share for the health sector is 6.38% of the 
total budget. This is amply reflected in the share of allocations to health taking a significant 
dip in the post 2001-2 periods, both in the case of current and development expenditures (see 
Table 1 below). The share of the current budget has revived somewhat after a sudden surge in 
2005-06 but is still significantly below the levels at the time of devolution. The largest 
component of the current budget is salaries. Even after devolution, salaries of all health sector 
personnel in Grade 17 and above are the responsibility of the provincial government.  
 
A more significant reduction has taken place in the development budget. As we see in the 
table below, the share of the development budget halved in the immediate aftermath of 
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devolution. In fact there has been a steady downward trend in the share of the health sector in 
the provinces’ development portfolio.  
                                                          
Table 7.1. Share of Health in Sindh Provincial Current and Development Budgets 
(2001-09) 
 Year Health as % Share Of Current exp Health as % Share of Development exp 
2000-01 5.64 15.98 
2001-02 5.63 16.36 
2002-03 2.85 7.58 
2003-04 3.01 7.12 
2004-05 3.02 4.41 
2005-06 10.60 7.22 
2006-07 3.25 6.72 
2007-08 4.47 5.77 
2008-09 4.60 6.38 
Source: Annual Provincial Budget Statements (Various Years), Government of Sindh.  
 
 
7.3 District Level Public Spending on Health  
 
Since most of the health expenditure takes place at the district level and a large part of it is 
controlled by the district government, it is more instructive to gauge public expenditure at the 
level of the district. First, per capita expenditure on health through the public sector will 
provide an important indication on adequacy of funding. Second, the allocation on health by 
the district government will provide some insight on prioritization of health in district 
finances. Third, to get a handle on quality of allocations it is useful to disaggregate district 
level expenditure between its salary and non-salary components.  
 
It was not possible to estimate per capita public spending on health for all the 10 districts 
because of non-availability of consistent information. As a result, the following information 
is provided for the Shikarpur District. In some cases, comparison with the Badin District are 
also presented.  
 
7.4         Per Capita Expenditure on Health  
 
The total health expenditure for the district was calculated by aggregating expenditure 
undertaken by the district government as well as expenditure of federal programs related to 
MNCH. Based on the calculation, for 2008-09, the nominal per capita expenditure for the 
district of Shikarpur, as shown in the Table comes to Rs. 274.8. World Bank (2005) had 
earlier done a per capita expenditure analysis for 2004-05 was Rs. 210. Given the high rates 
of inflation, in real terms, per capita expenditure in the district is expected to have declined.  
 
Table 7.2. Per Capita Public Health Expenditure of District Shikarpur (2008-09).  
Total Public Sector Health Expenditure  Rs. 35.5 million 
District Population 1.3 million 
Per Capita Expenditure Rs. 273.07 
NPPI Feasibility Study on Result Based Financing Mechanisms in Sindh 
AGA KHAN UNIVERSITY, KARACHI     Page 73 
 
7.5 Health Allocations of District Government  
 
Health Expenditure of the Shikarpur District government for the current year (2008-09) 
amounted to Rs. 327.9 million. As a share of the total district budget of Rs. 2.39 billion, it is 
13.68%. In comparison, the share of health in the district allocations of Badin was roughly 
16% for the same year. The range of the share of allocations is expected to be about the same 
in other districts also. While time series analysis will be required to track changes over time 
that have occurred, the pattern is that budget shares do not alter much and growth in nominal 
budgets generally match the rate of inflation. Increase in the share of the budget only takes 
place when new schemes are completed and their recurring expenditures are added to it. 
Budget allocations, however, are not indicative of qualitative aspects of spending.  
 
7.6 Salary and Non-Salary Components  
 
Allocations spent on non-salary items provide an insight into the extent of qualitative 
improvements that take place. Spending on medicines, medical supplies, etc. are essential for 
proper medical care of patients. We see that more than 86% of the district budget is allocated 
to salaries. Since salaries of those belonging to Grade 17 and above are paid by the provincial 
government, this indicates that there is significant over employment in the lower grades in the 
district. While we do not have data for changes in the share of the two categories over time, it 
can be safely said that the share in the salary component would have increased over the years 
as salaries increase frequently to keep the real wages intact.  
 
Table 7.3.  share of Salary and Non-Salary Components: District 
Shikarpur 
Health Department Salary Component (2008-2009) (Rs) 
Non-Salary Component (2008-2009) 
(Rs) 
EDO 86.2% 13.8%) 
LHW 61.9% 38.1% 
 
7.6 Financial Flows  
 
Understanding the financial flows helps in understanding the relevant tiers where financial 
authority lies and the degree of transparency of the system. There are four tiers of financing 
for the public sector health system. These are provincial government, district government, the 
PPHI program and the federally funded programs. Details on health sector financial flows to 
the districts from these tiers are provided below: 
 
7.6.1 Provincial Government Flows 
 
After the Devolution Plan, the provincial government’s involvement in primary level health 
care financing has become virtually non-existent. The development component of the 
provincial health department budget now concentrates on development work at the 
provincially owned teaching hospitals and DHQs that have capacity of more than 50 beds. In 
addition, the development budget also picks up certain costs of federal programs. While some 
of these costs are clearly in the domain of recurring expenses but are paid through the 
development budget.   
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On the recurring side, the Health Department’s expenditures are essentially divided in three 
areas. The Directorate of Health Services is now only involved in monitoring & evaluation as 
well as operating the HMIS dataset. Besides the directorate, the provincial recurring budget 
also finances its teaching hospitals and those DHQs that are over 50 beds and remain under 
the domain of the provincial government. Moreover, the provincial government also picks up 
the salary expenses of personnel in grade 17 and above. The financial flow chart is given in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 7.1 Provincial Government Flows 
 
* (New DHQs, Matching Grants for Federal Projects) 
 
 
 
Funding for the districts takes place directly from the finance department of the provincial 
government as a one line transfer to the District Government based on the Provincial Finance 
Commission Formula devised to distribute provincial finances across different districts. Both 
development and recurring expenses on health are then the responsibility of the District 
Government.  
 
7.6.2 District Government Flows  
 
The District Government receives a one line transfer from the provincial government and 
then allocates funds across sectors based on its own priorities. The recurring health budget is 
handled by the EDO health, who is responsible for disbursal of salaries, procurement of 
medicines and other miscellaneous expenses. Apart from salaries, which are tied to the 
number of allocated posts, the largest component of the budget is on a medicine which comes 
under the purview of the EDO health.  
 
The Development budget is conceived by the EDO health office and one included in the 
provincial ADP, its disbursements are made by the EDO finance office, with the works 
department responsible for execution. The operationalisation of the new facility is the 
responsibility of the provincial government that has to allocate staff for the facility while all 
other expenses are the responsibility of the district government.  
 
 
 
Finance Department 
District 
(One line transfer) 
Health Department 
Development*  DG Health DHQs, Teaching Hospitals 
HMIS Monitoring 
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Figure 7.2 District Government Flows 
 
*Development of New Facilities and Up gradation of Old Facilities Including RHCs, BHUs, 
Dispensaries, MCH Centers, THQs and DHQs (THQs and DHQs with less than 50 beds) 
 
 
 
Till recently, all public sector health institutions except District Headquarter Hospitals with 
more than 50 beds came under the purview of the district government. Since the initiation of 
PPHI, in seven out of the ten districts that come under our purview, BHUs and dispensaries. 
The recurring budgets – salary and non-salary - for these facilities are transferred as a one 
line transfer of Rs. 50, 000 per facility to PPHI from the EDO health.  
 
7.6.3 People’s Primary Care Health Initiative (PPHI) 
 
This is an arrangement between a quasi-government service provider and district 
governments. The agreement signed between district governments and PPHI entails that all 
BHUs and dispensaries will be handed over to PPHI. As such all recurring costs (salary, non-
salary and maintenance budgets) of the facilities will be the responsibility of PPHI. For this 
purpose PPHI will be provided Rs. 50, 000 for each facility handed over through a one line 
transfer. The PPHI is responsible for all salary and non-salary expenditure on facilities. 
However it has the flexibility of altering line items according to priorities that it sets for itself.  
 
In order to over come the perennial problem of staff absenteeism, the PPHI has created  
clusters of BHUs that are served by one doctor and depending on the number of BHUs in the 
cluster (that differ between districts), the sanctioned salary for the doctor at each facility is 
provided to the one who is serving the cluster. Depending on the size of the cluster, doctor 
salaries have increased between three to five fold as a result of this institutional innovation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EDO 
(Finance) 
Development* EDO Health 
Medicines 
 
Salaries/Maintenance Office Expenditure Works Department 
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Figure 7.3 PPHI Fund Flows 
 
 
*One-off Grant for Repair and Renovation 
** One-off Grant of Rs.100, 000 per BHU 
*** Includes Salary and Medicine Budget with Authority to Alter Line Items 
 
 
According to PPHI personnel, the budget handed over to them is sufficient for not only 
providing incentives to doctors to attend but by reducing red tape and corruption they are able 
to provide medicines to clients at the facilities also. The administrative budget of PPHI is 
provided for by a federal grant. The financial flow chart is given below.  
 
7.6.4 Federal Government Funded Parallel Programs  
 
There are three federally funded programs relevant to MNCH. The common thread running 
through all federally funded programs is that the bulk of the finances are controlled at the 
federal level. Key expenditure items, such as salaries and supplies are largely controlled at 
the federal level. The provincial offices of the programs carry greater authority than the 
district offices. Details of fund flows for the LHW and family welfare programs are given 
below.  
 
7.6.5 Population Welfare Program  
 
The program works under the Federal Ministry of Population Welfare. There is a one line 
transfer from the Federal Government to the provincial head office of the Program. The 
provincial office then provides funds, heads wise to the district office and to ‘A’ outlets 
separately. The ‘A’ outlets are operated by the Program itself and provides operating facilities 
for Tubal Ligation. The District office handles expenses of ‘B’ facilities. The ‘B’ outlets are 
registered service providers that include doctors, hakims and homeopaths, from where  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PPHI Finances 
Federal Government Government of Sindh* District Government 
One-Off Equipment Grant** Administrative Expenses Unified Budget Per Facility*** 
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Figure 7.4 Family Planning Program Fund Flows 
 
 
 
 
supplies are provided free of cost to those who demand. Funds for salaries and other expenses 
are provided head-wise by the provincial office to the district office and to ‘A’ facilities 
separately. Medicine and supplies, however, are procured at the provincial level and then 
supplied in the same manner as funds are supplied. 
 
7.6.6 LHW Program  
 
As we see in the fund flow diagram, financial authority is centered at the federal level. 
Salaries are the largest accounting head of the Program. They are dispatched to the provincial 
office through the provincial office of the AGPR. From the provincial office, salaries are 
directly dispatched to the bank accounts of the LHW.  The second largest expenditure of the 
program is the provisioning of medicines/supplies and kits. While a kit supply is a one time 
provision, medicines and other supplies are provided on a quarterly basis. Again the system is 
centralized, with purchases taking place at the federal level. It is then transferred to the 
provincial level, from where it is distributed to the district levels and then to the facility level 
from where it is provided to the LHWs. The only head in which fund flows actually go to the 
district level is for district office salaries, office expenses, POL and vehicle maintenance. 
Funds in this case are transferred from the provincial office to the EDO Health’s account and 
it is then disbursed to the district office. The only point of interaction in this program with 
another tier of government is with the district government. 
 
 
Federal Ministry of Population 
Welfare  
Provincial Office 
Procurement of Medicine 
Supplies 
District Office ‘A’ Level Facilities 
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Figure 7.5 LHW Program Fund Flows  
 
 
7.7 Financial Information Systems (FIS) 
 
Financial information systems at the district level are reviewed in terms of existing practices, 
strengths and constraints at the local level in order to provide lessons for administration of 
results based financing. The FIS analysis was conducted on the basis of secondary data 
analysis and structured qualitative interviews. Interviews were conducted at the district and 
provincial levels with the EDO health, the PPHI and the federal programs. There were five 
different categories for which information was sought:  
i) Link between financial systems and MNCH related outputs  
ii) Computerization of financial records  
iii) Frequency with which financial information is updated and reconciled 
iv) Human resources: The quality of human resources and vacancies (if any) in sanctioned 
posts  
Federal Ministry of Health 
Salary Non-Salary 
AGPR (Karachi) 
Provincial 
Headquarters 
Bank Accounts of Staff 
Medicine/Kits Admin Expenditures 
Federal Purchases 
Provincial Office 
District Office 
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LHW 
Provincial Office 
EDO Health 
District Office 
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v) Timeliness of Disbursement of funds at different tiers.  
 
A detailed ranking for FIS systems for each district is given in Annexure 15.  Below we 
summarize relevant variable identified above in their performance across districts.  
 
Table 7.4.  FIS Ranking: Consolidated Across Districts* 
 EDO LHW PWO Overall 
Link with Output  1 1 1 1 
Computerization  3 3 2 3 
Frequency of Record Keeping  4 4 4 4 
Human Resources  3 3 3 3 
Timeliness of Disbursements  4 3 2 3 
*Ranking is on a scale of 1-5 and in ascending order.  
 
 
7.7.1 Linkage With Output  
 
Across the entire system, we did not encounter a single instance where the financial system is 
linked in any way with either MNCH outputs or with other health related outputs. Not only 
was there no output based system in place, in all our interviews with financial managers 
across different programs, but no knowledge of systems elsewhere or intent of introducing 
them either. It is self evident that if an incentive based system is to be put in place linkage 
with output in the financial system will have to be created.  
 
7.7.2 Computerization of the Financial System 
 
Computerization of records facilitates sharing of information easily and in a timely fashion. 
One pattern observed was that wherever the system was fully computerized in the EDO 
health’s office it was also the case with district offices of the federal programs. Full 
computerization of records was also found at the PPHI district offices. Of the 10 districts, the 
EDO health records were computerized in 5 districts – Badin, Jamshoro, Umarkot, 
Tharparkar and Shikarpur. In two districts – Kambar and Shahdadkot – the system is partially 
computerized, i.e. routine entries are done manually but account settlements are done on the 
excel program on the computer. In these districts, the LHW and PW programs have manual 
accounting systems.  
 
In the remaining districts, neither were district accounts computerized nor were those of other 
federal programs.  
 
7.7.3 Frequency of Record-Keeping  
 
In all districts we were informed that account settlements take place on time. The EDO’s 
office reconciles accounts every month and submits them to the DCO’s office. For the federal 
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programs, reconciliation takes place once a quarter and submitted to the provincial office of 
the program.  
 
7.7.4 Human Resources 
 
There are three elements with regard to human resources that are relevant for the purpose. 
First, if sanctioned positions are filled in the accounts office. Second, if the educational 
requirements of the positions are duly complied with and third, if personnel undergo training 
for new systems and methods of accounting.  
 
Across all districts and all programs we were informed that all sanctioned posts were filled. 
We were also told that all officers in the accounts department had the requisite qualifications 
for their jobs. On training, by and large the picture was that the staff had not received any 
training. The only exception was training in computer use in one district at the EDO office (in 
Jamshoro) and the LHW staff in another district had been through training courses (in 
Kashmore).  
 
7.7.5 Disbursements 
 
In terms of disbursement of funds, the EDO offices in all districts did not have any problems 
in receiving disbursements from the EDO finance office. The disbursement cycle is monthly. 
This goes to show that the chain of fund disbursements from the province to the districts is 
also taking place in a timely manner. The federal programs, however, suffered from delays. 
Delays of one to two months in disbursements were generally found for the LHW program. 
Disbursements are made quarterly for the program. In the population welfare program, delays 
were termed as ‘significant.’ In this program, salary disbursements are made monthly while 
non-salary payments are done on a quarterly basis. Delays were being experiences on both 
counts.  
 
7.8 Section Summary  
 
Budgetary Allocations & Required Needs 
 
 Per capita expenditure is low and is suggestive of very little increase over time.  
 60% of the provincial budget has been devolved to the district level and requires 
targeting and capacity building of district managers for improvement in MNCH 
services. However non-salary operational budget has been squeezed over the years 
and requires budgetary enhancement as well as administrative powers for flexible use 
of salary component.  
 Guidelines are lacking for purchase of medicines and use of supplies budget lies on 
discretion of EDO-Health. There is therefore the risk of inappropriate purchase of 
medicines as well as purchase of inferior quality of medication and requires 
development of adequate protocols for supplies forecasting as well as stringent 
guidelines and oversight for purchasing.  
 Salary budget for grade 17 and above has not been devolved to district level and 
financial authority over the medial cadre continues to lie with the provinces. This is a 
constraint in terms of overseeing staff attendance and requires addressing through 
devolvement of powers to district.  
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 District budgets have only been incrementally increased over the years to adjust for 
inflation or to accommodate for government announced rise in salary. Budgetary 
forecasting and development requires to be linked with a needs assessment exercise.   
 
Financial Information Systems for Result based Financing 
 
 Financial systems are input based and managed by staff unequipped for move to 
output based systems. Financial systems need establishment of an interface with MIS 
for implementation of result based financing mechanisms as well as hiring of trained 
staff with relevant capacity.  
 Disbursements from district government budgets face minimal time delays as opposed 
to centralized systems of vertical programs. For speedy disbursements of financial 
rewards, incentivized funds will need to be devolved to district level and follow an 
advance reimbursement system.  
 Financial accountability procedures are less than optimal for introduction of result 
based financing mechanisms. Creation of a post similar to that of the CFO at the 
district level is needed who is then directly accountable for implementing and 
monitoring the financial side of incentivized mechanism.   
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Section  8. POLITICAL FEASABILITY OF FUNDING MECHANISMS 
 
8.0 Introduction 
 
This section explores political acceptability of health care managers, service providers and 
community for different incentivized mechanisms. It examines stakeholder willingness to 
shift to incentivized mechanism, expected translation of effect on improvement of MNCH 
service, as well as fears and expectations related to its implementation. It concludes by 
presenting the relative popularity of individual mechanism as well as potential positive and 
negative features. 
 
8.1 Methodology 
 
The component made use of qualitative data involving in-depth stakeholder interviews of 
provincial mangers, EDOs-Health, MS of DHQ/ Civil Hospitals, district government 
stakeholders and notable private sector provider / representatives of Pakistan Medical 
Association. Group discussions were conducted with key health facility staff involved in 
MNCH including lady doctors, LHVs, MO and vaccinators and included staff from both non-
PPHI as well as PPHI facilities. Separate focus group discussions were held with LHWs and 
community.  
 
Mechanisms explored included: district based awards (SWAP like arrangements; 
management contracts to private sector; contracting private sector facilities for services, 
incentives to providers at government facilities, CCTS, and vouchers (See Section 1 for 
details of mechanisms). All listed mechanisms were explored with provincial and district 
health managers and health facility staff; only contracting, vouchers and provider incentives 
were explored with private providers; while only vouchers and CCTs were explored with 
community. Preference amongst mechanisms, motivations and expectations for explored 
mechanisms, potential positive and negative effects, and preferred implementation modalities 
were examined. Allowance was also given for proposing of alternative mechanisms in 
addition to those listed. Popularity of mechanisms was rated on an ascending scale of 1-4 
using three different raters and presented in a Force field Matrix. An analysis of underlying 
factors behind stakeholder ratings is provided in descriptive text.   
 
8.2 Stakeholder Preferences for Different Mechanisms and Underlying Reasons 
 
8.2.1 High Demand for Vouchers Amongst clients but Mistrust of CCTs: 
 
Vouchers: Vouchers were preferred over CCTs to support the poorer community members 
for making use of MNCH. The pre-paid nature of vouchers was a main attraction as it would 
avoid recourse to borrowing of money on high interest rate from money lenders, sale of gold 
or livestock assets, and also avoid the hassle of arranging for cash at short notice. Moreover, 
the poorer of the poor found it difficult to raise a loan even from money lenders and hence 
unavailability of cash for transport and medical expenses was a major barrier felt to be 
addressed through pre-paid vouchers. It was particularly felt to be beneficial for emergency 
situations. Another favorable feature from community’s perspective was the freedom of 
choice provided for accessing preferred health provider as opposed to restriction of provider 
in CCTs. Lastly, there was less mistrust related to use of voucher in comparison to CCT as it 
did not involve direct cash transaction however community demanded fair and transparent 
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mechanism of disbursement preferably involving a non-government agency and taking 
village elders into confidence.  
 
Client Cash Incentives (CCTs): There was generally poor reception of CCTs due to 
unavailability of ready cash in hand to access services as well as mistrust of health care 
providers in terms for transparently providing cash incentives. Clients who are unable to 
arrange money to seek care or cannot arrange money at short notice may not benefit out of 
such scheme. Cash transactions were also related with high chances of corruption and misuse 
of funds at both public and private sector service delivery outlets and comparatively greater 
suspicion was attached to routing of funds through public sector health facilities.  The main 
demand from clients was of functional and affordable services and assistance with transport.  
 
8.2.2 Health Facility Staff Favor Provider Incentives Supplemented by In-Kind 
Incentives 
 
Amongst health staff there was high acceptance for provider incentives, mixed willingness 
for client incentives and extreme wariness of other mechanisms such district based awards or 
contractual arrangements.  
 
Provider Incentives: Staff was generally willing to work if better payment was provided with 
example given of the parallel PPHI system which provided higher salaries for all facilities as 
well as increased amounts for remoter areas. Volume based payment was acceptable topped 
on  a  basic salary package with rates equal or close to 50% of fee charged in comparable 
private care settings. In addition emphasis was given to calibration of payment according to 
health facility location and by regular versus off-duty hours. Total salary package should be 
adequate to cover high cost of private transport which is usually the only mode of transport 
available in peripheral locations as well as provide sufficient incentive level to work in 
peripheral locations. Emphasis was given to prompt disbursement and direct deposit directly 
into bank accounts. Additionally, there was demand of opening of reward to include all 
categories of technical staff including specialists, non-specialist doctors and paramedic staff, 
whosoever is available to provide services.  
 
Accompanying Measures for Staff Incentives: Safety and security for female staff was a 
main concern with suggestion of pairing of female staff in off duty hours, presence of male 
chowkidar, upgraded facilities for on call and residential staff, sufficient incentivization to 
allow accompanying by male family member and general emphasis at higher level on female 
staff protection (See Section 5). There was also fear of claiming false cases and manipulation 
of data to show falsely high output by service provider. Need for strict attendance and 
monitoring was emphasized, however nature of monitoring should involve positive 
encouragement and technical guidance whereas mere ‘policing’ by superiors would result in 
low work interest despite attractive incentives. Short-term and project linked nature of 
incentives was also a concern with discontinuation after project life resulting in reversion to 
low pay scales but at the cost an increased workload. Finally, accompanying skill 
enhancement was also highlighted with existing skills deemed inadequate particularly for 
dealing with MNCH emergencies.  
 
Contracting: Extreme wariness was seen of working under private sector management due to 
loss of job security, increased workload and maintenance of strict attendance and punctuality. 
Willingness improved with building in of staff incentives under private sector management 
contracts however work willingness even with incentives was linked with facilitatory and 
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encouraging nature of monitoring. There was skepticism of NGOs as effective health care 
managers however there was better acceptance of working under large well known NGOs. 
Lastly, political ramification of contracting on health facility staff was also an added concern. 
Low political acceptance of contracting in the higher government set up, as seen in the case 
of the PPHI initiative, resulted in tussle over staff postings and reporting authority leading to 
unnecessary stress, work disruption and fear of offending ‘two masters’ for staff concerned.  
 
Client Incentives: Low and guarded support was seen for client incentives with extreme 
wariness of cash incentives and relatively better acceptability of in-kind incentives and 
vouchers. Opposition to cash transfers was linked to reluctance to be involved in cash 
dealings as well as its quick fix nature. Reluctance to be involved in cash transfers, pressure 
for fake claims by patients and local influentials, and pressure for ‘cuts’ by superior were 
some of the main cited concerns.  Temptation for misappropriation by service provider was 
also pointed out. Furthermore, slow disbursement or disruption in release of cash incentives 
would create huge issues with patients and cast doubts on integrity of service provider.  
Concerns were also related to effect of cash incentives on patent behavior. ‘Making beggars 
of patients’ by lowering the intrinsic value of health service and expectation of cash rewards 
for other services was a strong concern. Doubtful sustainability after withdrawal of cash 
incentive was an additional issue with example given of World Food Program assisted 
facilities where marked drop in volume of ANC visits are seen during periods of disruptions 
in cooking oil supply. 
 
In contrast in-kind incentives were seen to be a better option as the visibility and risk of cash 
incentives and hence posed less chance of misappropriation by service providers and district 
mangers, lower risk of patient displeasure with service provider in case of disruptions and 
lower drop in patient volume after project discontinuity. Food rations, soap and well baby 
packages for newborns and children were some of the options proposed for in-kind 
incentives.   
 
Vouchers were generally considered a safer option as it avoided cash transaction. However, 
most government staff was of the option that the advantage in terms of client volume would 
be to private facilities as these would be the main choice of patients provided with vouchers. 
Adequate competition could be provided by many government health facilities if these were 
re-equipped and staff provided with incentives and support.  However, targeting of patient 
incentives either vouchers or CCTs was considered to be a politically contentious issues, with 
facility staff wanting only marginal role in targeting and verification mechanism (See Table 
9.2).  
 
District Based Awards: There was poor support for SWAP-like district based awards due to 
fear of poor trickle down to service delivery level.  
 
8.2.3 Private Sector Prefers Vouchers and Provider Incentives over Contractual 
Arrangements with Government. Supplementary Financing by Government is More 
Attractive to Less Established Private Practitioners.  
 
Amongst the private sector, vouchers and provider incentives were better received as opposed 
to health facility contracts with government sector.  
 
Contracting: Hesitancy was seen for use of contracts due to a number of reasons. Lack of 
administrative capacity for performance based contracts was a commonly cited reason across 
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districts. Although some medical centers were offering services offering contractual services 
to private companies however such centers having organized management and record 
keeping were thought to be few. Contracts were also thought to be of limited financial 
interest to the private sector in general, being attractive mostly to charity hospitals and clinics 
or those private set-ups earning low profit margins. Dependence on government projects for 
earning was perceived to carry a risk as opposed to setting up an independent market based 
income. Even for such set-ups, the notion of government managed contract was associated 
with concerns while direct contracts with donors held appeal and had a prestige tag. 
Hesitancy of formal involvement with government was due to the fear of political 
interference in selection and monitoring, and delays in release of payments. Contracts were 
also thought to potentially result in unnecessary care provision and commercialism with little 
avenue for check and balance. Pre-requisites for contracting were fair selection, transparent 
and technically sound monitoring, and mechanism to control commercialism.  
 
In contrast, purchasing of private services through vouchers was considered an attractive 
option for both private practitioners as well as patients. It was thought to provide of freedom 
of choice to patient in terms of health provider selection and at the same time would boost 
patient volume of private practitioner without compromising on their independence. Scrutiny 
of provider credentials was emphasized as well as need for community based referees, such 
as LHWs, with building in an incentivized amount for referee.  
 
Provider incentives were also favorably received however these were felt to be relevant for 
private providers who as yet have to establish a robust private practice or for those who are 
government sector employees. Provider incentives should be calibrated to increase uptake of 
high risk patients and for off-duty hour services. As many of the private providers are also 
government employees, a string need was felt to improve staff incentivization in government 
services through a combination of both proper career pathways and provider incentives. 
Suggested incentive levels were 50% of amount usually charged in private facilities.  
 
Demand inculcating mechanisms of CCT was received with wariness and even outright 
opposition and reservations were similar to that expressed by government health provider. 
Instead alternatives such as ration cards were proposed which could be signed and stamped.  
 
8.2.4 District Stakeholders Require Stronger Administrative Powers for 
Implementation SWAP-like District Awards and Provider Incentives 
 
In general district stakeholders agreed that result based financing would be very effective in 
bringing results. In grained culture of non-attendance, slim working hours and apathy and 
indifference to work was felt to paralyze the government sector in general and the health 
sector in particular which involved off their duties and peripheral outreach. This was a view 
shared by EDOs-Health, DCOs and Nazims. Preference was mainly for district based SWAP 
like awards followed by incentives for service providers.  
 
District awards involving output based topping up of operational budget was thought to 
remove financial constraints, increase financial liberty and provide healthy competition 
between districts. However concerns related to the transparency of award disbursement and 
high potential for political interference as further discussed in Section 9.4.  Secondly, while 
staffing was considered to be the main reason being poor MNCH services, weak 
administrative control over staff was felt to constrain ability to deliver on agreed district 
MNCH targets. Concentration of administrative powers in the province and political 
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interference from both provincial and district level over available powers was felt to dilute 
managerial control resulting in responsibility without authority. Ability to deliver on agreed 
district target was linked with strengthening the hand of district managers with provision of 
Class I powers as given to PPHI.  
 
Provider incentives were also well received and thought to increase service delivery output 
through better staff retention, punctuality and motivation towards work. However this was 
thought to work only if political interference was removed.  Sustainability of provider 
incentives was also an issue, with fear of a negative rebound on staff motivation after 
discontinuation of funding and resulting in a worsening scenario.  
 
Contracting: There was general hostility amongst district health managers across all districts 
for contracting out of services to the private health sector. This was mainly related to fear of 
relinquishing funds and control to private sector. The notion of strategic planning and 
purchasing of health services was missing amongst EDO-Health with private sector mainly 
regarded as a competitor of services. Other concerns included lack of faith in quality of 
private sector services, presence of a limited private sector as well as potential for political 
interference in award of contracts. Reservations were therefore expressed with both 
management contracts as well as specific service delivery contracts. Management contracts 
were thought to be only applicable to selected non-functional government facilities in the 
remoter areas, while similarly NGO outlet in such areas should be confined to hard areas 
uncovered by government facilities.   
 
Community Incentives: While value of community incentives was recognized in increasing 
uptake of services there was general wariness for use of such incentives. Reluctance was 
particularly high for CCTs with potential leakage and misuse at the end of service provider, 
political interference for patient disbursement and poor sustainability of client utilization 
being objections to CCT use. In-kind incentives were considered to be a more feasible and 
acceptable option. Use of vouchers was thought to be of little value as public sector services 
are already free of cost while advantage would be mainly to the private sector. Targeting of 
demand side incentives was thought to be particularly fraught with political interferences 
with district mangers reluctant to be involved in such undertaking (See Section 8.4).  
 
8.2.5 Provincial Stakeholders Favor Provider Incentives Accompanied by Greater 
Provincial Oversight 
 
Provincial health managers generally favored provider incentives, regarded demand side 
incentives with caution and were opposed to SWAP like district rewards.  
 
District Awards: Poor performance of districts in MNCH was felt to be due to loss of 
provincial oversight and provision of district rewards were thereby considered to be of little 
utility in improvement of services.  
 
Contracting: There was also poor acceptance of contracting with issues being similar to 
those raised by district managers. Entrenched perceptions were found of government as the 
direct provider of health services with contracting associated with loss of fund and control. 
Poor coordination between DOH and PPHI had further strengthened resistance to contracting. 
The private for profit market was regarded with skepticism as having low quality services and 
poorly transparent working. Although role of the large non-profit NGOs was acknowledged, 
collaborative partnering was acceptable with little acceptance of purchasing NGO services. 
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The notion of purchasing of private sector services was at most confined to use of private 
providers in government facilities or out-sourcing of non-functional government facilities to 
private organization.  
 
Provider Incentives: There was greater acceptance of provider incentives with benefits of 
addressing staffing issues and decreasing private practice trend. Provision of staff incentives 
were linked to strict monitoring however there were strong concerns of sustaining staff 
performance after discontinuation of project funding. Institutionalization of provider 
incentives by government was poorly received being alien to public sector rules of business 
while shortage of funds was also cited but as a secondary factor.  
 
Client Incentives: In general poor governance was felt to be an issue rather than low demand 
from clients with primary need felt for investment in the supply side.  CCTs were disfavored 
due to high potential for leakages, poor transparency of targeting and disbursement and 
general uneasiness with the notion of cash for utilization of service. Sustainability of CCTs 
was also an issue with difficulties seen after discontinuity both in terms of a negative rebound 
on utilization of government services as well as increasing mistrust between patients and 
providers.  Vouchers were considered a better option due to avoidance of cash dealings 
however the general opinion was that use of vouchers should be restricted to government 
health faculties.  
 
Overall, output based measures although accepted to result in increase in MNCH output were 
perceived as supplementary short term measures that could be financed by donor funds. 
There was little willingness or concrete movement in the form of policy proposals to test out 
and institutionalize new measures for improving health sector delivery.  
 
8.2.6 Overview of Stakeholder Preferences  
 
Political acceptability overall is highest for provider incentives and vouchers, mixed for 
SWAP like district awards, and poor for CCTs and for contracting with private sector. 
Amongst clients and private sector there is high favoring of vouchers, however these are 
poorly received by the public sector where emphasis is largely on supply side mechanisms 
and within demand side mechanisms is on small scale incentivization linked to government 
facility usage. Provision of cash for service is generally disfavored by both public and private 
sector and poorly received by community.  
 
District Based Awards: SWAP like arrangements are highly favored by district managers 
these face political resistance from province. District Based Awards can only work if funding 
is accompanied by increased administrative control and removal of political interference in 
staff postings and retention. While there is agreement on competitive nature of awards, 
transparency of awards is a matter of concern.  
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Table 8.1        Summary of Mechanism Preferences of Stakeholders 
RBF Mechanisms Provincial Managers District Managers Health Facility Staff Private Sector Community 
District Award X XXX X N/ A N/A 
Contracting X X X XX N/A 
Provider Incentive XXX XXX XXXX XXX N/A 
CCT X X X X X 
Voucher XX XX XX XXXX XXX 
Scoring : Ranking is on a scale of 1-5 and in ascending order  
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Contracting: Purchasing of private sector services is poorly received by government 
stakeholders and draws mixed response from the private sector. Main issues include 
perceived loss of government control over funds and authority, small and untested private 
sector market and political interference and rent seeking pressures on contract award and 
monitoring. Greater resistance is seen to contracting out of government facilities for 
management by private sector while there is somewhat better acceptance of small scoped 
contracting of private sector facilities in defined areas. Amongst the private sector, service 
delivery contracts are of interest to those who do not have an established private practice 
while management contracts are of low interest, held to be problematic and better managed 
through contracting-in.  
 
Provider incentives: There is high acceptance for provider incentives amongst all 
stakeholders subject to checks put in for transparent and effective management. Notable 
strengths included reduction in private practice, of government staff and increased attendance 
and work ownership. Concerns include false claiming of client volume, rent seeking 
pressures on staff and delayed disbursements. Furthermore, provider incentives were felt to 
be of little value unless accompanied by measures for adequate protection and security of 
female staff. Extension of provider incentives to private practitioners for service provision at 
government facilities had better acceptance in the public sector as compared to contracting of 
private sector facilities while private sector was open to such arrangements with greater 
benefit seen for practitioners who had less established private practices. 
 
Community Incentives: Supply side factors such as availability of accessible, functional 
services and affordable services is the foremost hindrance to utilization reported by clients 
with low demand a lesser constraint. Vouchers are well favored by clients opening up access 
and freedom of choice for preferred provider. While also favored by private sector these are 
poorly received by public sector due to fear of skewing of patient volume towards private 
providers. There is low demand and general mistrust of cash for service amongst community 
while strong reservations are also present amongst both public and private provider linked to 
potential mismanagement and poor sustainability of client demand. Mistrust of routing of 
cash transactions through government sector is also a source of concern amongst both service 
providers and clients.  More modest in-kind incentives are comparatively better favored 
having less potential for misuse and easier to wean off over time.  
 
8.3  Stakeholder Preferences on Implementing Route & Targeting 
 
8.3.1 Common Consensus for Third Party Implementation of Financial Incentives and 
its Verification 
Overwhelmingly, all stakeholders across different health system tiers wanted a third party 
involvement for management of incentives with impartiality being the foremost and cross-
cutting concern. Health system managers wanted to distance themselves from political 
pressures associated with financial rewards and while acknowledging a role in oversight were 
eager for major third party role in verification of outputs and disbursement of reward. 
Similarly, potential recipients of awards wanted financially transparent processes and 
technically sound checks prior to participation for financial awards.  
 
Main advantage of third party for different mechanisms was i) SWAP-like arrangements: 
transparent selection of districts for competitive awards; ii) contracting: minimizing political 
bias in accreditation and selection of private provider, sound monitoring and avoidance of 
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rent seeking for disbursement, timely disbursements; iii) provider incentives: avoiding ‘cuts’ 
to superiors, prompt disbursements, greater faith and receptiveness to third party monitoring, 
openness of dialogue not possible with government superiors;  iv)  community incentives: less 
chance of pilferage and leakages, avoidance of favoritism in targeting, avoidance in 
breakdown in supply of in-kind incentives and vouchers. 
 
Responses were mixed on use of existing versus separate record keeping systems with some 
stakeholders emphasizing use of separate record keeping to verify MNCH outputs with other 
supporting use of existing records with increased spot checks.  
 
Perceptions of a neutral third party were diverse and included UN agencies, donor agencies, 
and reputed and technically sound organizations. District governments in addition favored 
broad based oversight committees having in addition to third party representation inclusion of 
DCO and health stakeholders such as EDO-Health, Medical Superintendent of DHQ/ Civil 
Hospital, PPHI and DPWOs. Provincial stakeholders similarly supported broad based 
committees having donor, government and UN representation however with locus of control 
based at provincial rather than at district level.    
 
Community representation was disfavored as community representatives given the feudal 
context of NPPI districts would mostly involve local influential and legislators, introducing 
political bias and favoritism. 
 
 
 
8.3.2 Selective Targeting of Clients for Demand Based Incentives is Fraught with 
Risks as Compared to Universal Targeting in Demarcated Geographical Areas  
 
It was generally felt that targeting should be based on poverty and physical access and most 
areas of the selected districts were felt to qualify under these categories. Differentiation of 
income and poverty levels of individual clients was felt to be a difficult and politically 
contentious exercise which could not be undertaken at health facility level and would require 
verification by other various means such as survey at village level, involvement of NGOs, 
inclusion of village elder and LHWs. Bait-ul-Mal systems were considered weak, vulnerable 
to political interference and having little capacity for verification and community targeting. 
The overwhelming response was that incentives if introduced should extend to all pregnant 
Table 8.2    Preferences for Implementation Route and Targeting Mechanisms 
Districts Client Targeting System Implementation Route 
Provincial Managers All MNCH users Provincial stakeholders + neutral third 
party 
District Managers All MNCH users District stakeholders + neutral third party 
Health Facility Staff Some calibration at  Union 
Councils level 
Neutral third party 
Private Sector All MNCH users Neutral third party 
Clients Protection  to poor 
Involvement of village head 
Neutral non-government party 
Village representative 
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mothers and children under five years utilizing government health facilities as only poor 
clients people were likely to utilize government services while affluent clients would 
continue to access private provider. Verification was also through to be administratively 
difficult and would expose health staff to undue pressures from clients. Verification at health 
facility level could at best check local residence through scrutiny of Union Council 
registration number.  
 
Little information was received on particular religious or ethnic minorities particularly likely 
to benefit from targeting with poverty the main factor and cross-cutting across all groups. 
However certain tribal groups in upper Sindh were considered to be more resistant to 
maternal health care seeking and in particular need of demand side incentives.  
 
In terms of services, maternal care was the area most in need of targeting (lack of awareness 
and cultural barriers) followed by prompt attention for newborn and child illnesses (lack of 
awareness).  
 
The emerging picture was that there should be geographical demarcation of remote and lower 
income areas and all pregnant mother and children under five should be targeted within these 
areas. Given the context of NPPI districts, it was felt that this would involve most areas of 
selected districts.   
 
8.4 Section Summary 
 The most preferred incentivized mechanism on the supply side is provision of incentives 
to service provider while in-kind incentives for clients and limited use of vouchers are 
preferred mechanisms on the demand side.  
 Provider incentives of up to 50% of fee charged in comparable private sector facilities 
was acceptable to health care providers, topped onto the basic salary package and 
involving prompt disbursement directly into bank accounts. Calibration by distance and 
regular versus non-regular timings, and opening of reward to both medical and paramedic 
staff were further suggestions put forward by a cross-section of health care providers and 
health care managers. 
 There is little concept of purchasing and stewardship role of government amongst public 
sector stakeholders with entrenched political resistance for purchasing of private sector 
services. 
 Amongst public-private partnership arrangements, both public and private sector show a 
common acceptance of provider incentives to private practitioners, vouchers are favored 
by private sector and have mixed reception in government sector, while there is extreme 
wariness from both sides regarding contractual arrangements.  
 There is overwhelming preference for third party management of financial rewards with 
mistrust of routing of rewards through government system commonly shared by 
government managers, health service providers as well as potential recipients. 
 Stakeholders concur that client targeting should be based on poverty and remoteness with 
most areas of the NPPI districts qualifying under these criteria. Distribution should 
include all pregnant mothers and children under 5 years as selective targeting of families 
within demarcated catchment is felt to be administratively difficult and fraught with 
political interference.  
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Section  9. COST PACKAGES AND TARGETING 
 
9.0  Introduction 
 
In this section, we seek to make some form of estimation of a cost package for maternal and 
child health care, and how much of the cost people are actually willing to pay. The estimated 
cost packages can be used to decide the level of incentives that can be given to beneficiaries 
to make use of maternal and child health care services. Estimates for provider incentives are 
also computed based on fee related expenditures of clients. A review of existing targeting 
systems is also provided and suggestions made for targeting mechanisms for NPPI districts.   
 
9.1 Methods 
 
In our expenditure analysis, we have examined the costs of the following five services: 
i) Antenatal Care (ANC) 
ii) Normal Delivery Procedures 
iii) Caesarean Sections (C-Sections) 
iv) Child Illness Treatment 
 
For each of these five services, we have separately estimated the patient expenditure for these 
services at public and private facilities as well as provided a mean cost computation. We have 
divided the costs into medical costs and transport costs, medical costs being an aggregation of 
doctors’ fees, medicines, tests, investigations and other services. Along with the costs, we 
have also calculated how much people are, on average, willing to pay for each service.   
 
Our cost package estimation and analysis is three-tiered. The top tier is an estimation of a 
cost package for all the ten districts. The second tier is an estimation of a cost package for 
each of the ten districts, and some analysis of the variations between the districts. The third 
tier is a brief analysis of variations in transport costs within districts between locations close 
to and distant from facilities.  
 
In order to work out the costs people incur on maternal care and child care in the ten low-
performing districts, we made use of the results of two surveys: i) NPPI baseline household 
survey as well as ii) qualitative information collected from clients through FGDs conducted 
at by NPPI Financial Feasibility Study. In addition data on willingness to pay (WTP) for each 
of these services was also collected and analyzed by NPPI Financial Feasibility Study. Mean 
WTP for each service is presented in this chapter and provides the basis for estimating extent 
of subsidy to be applied on client expenditure for development of vouchers. (More detailed 
methodology given in Annex 9) 
 
9.2 Overview of Client Expenditure on MNCH Services 
 
The table 9.1  and 9.2 gives estimations of the client expenditure on maternal and child care 
and transport cost for the utilization of these services respectively, averaged across the ten 
districts that were surveyed.  
 
Patient Expenditure: On average client expenditure for ANC is Rs.785, for normal delivery 
is Rs.2737, for C- section is Rs. 16868 and for child illness is Rs.643. A significant amount of 
expenditure is incurred by clients at both public and private sector facilities.  Child illness 
treatment is, on average the cheapest of the five services with C-Sections, being the most the 
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most expensive service. C-section delivery expenditure is, on average, at least five times as 
much as normal delivery procedures.  
 
Client expenditure at public facilities although be incurred by patients is lower than that 
incurred at private health care facilities. The difference is most pronounced in the case of 
child illnesses where private treatment is about five times the client expenditure at public 
treatment. Average transport costs seem to also be lower to public facilities than to private 
facilities, although only slightly lower, with the exception of C-section transport cost, which 
is about the same in both private and public facilities.  
 
Willingness to Pay: We notice that the amount respondents are willing to pay is significantly 
less than the actual client expenditure they are incurring. For private facility treatment, the 
amount people are willing to pay is usually between 25 and 30% of the actual client 
expenditure. In the case of C-sections, people are willing to pay the smallest percentage 
share, but this is primarily because of the substantially higher costs of C-Sections, as they are 
willing to pay the largest amount for C-sections, in terms of amount. In the case of public 
facility treatment, people are still only willing to pay under 50% of the share of the client 
expenditure. The only exception is child illness treatment at public facilities where the 
amount people are willing to pay equals and exceeds the average cost of treatment. Therefore, 
we see in both private and public facility treatment people are unwilling to cover most of the 
cost of maternal and child care.  
 
9.2.1  Antenatal care (ANC) 
  
Public Facilities:  Antenatal care expenditure by clients at public facilities mostly falls 
between Rs.460 - 545. The lowest antenatal expenditure in public facilities is in Ghotki at 
Rs.889, while highest expenditure is seen in Qambar at Rs.2090, with the rest falling in 
between. (For details see Annex 10) 
 
Transport Costs: Transport costs for antenatal care were usually among the lower end 
transport costs in each district. This would be because, if people were availing antenatal care 
facilities, they would probably only make use of those that were within a reasonably close 
proximity. (For details see Annex 10) 
 
Facility Based vs. Periphery:  Aside from a district by district analysis, we can also look at 
intra district analysis from five districts in which transport costs estimated by respondents at 
facilities are compared to transport costs estimated by respondents at peripheral locations. 
Transport costs vary considerably between facility based estimations and periphery-based 
estimations, in inconsistent ways. For example, in Badin, the periphery-based estimation is 
significantly higher than the facility-based estimation of transport costs. On the other hand, in 
Kashmore they are relatively similar, and then in Nawabshah the facility-based estimation of 
transport cost is higher than that of the periphery.  
 
9.2.2  Delivery 
 
Private Facilities: Client expenditures on normal delivery in private facilities tend to fall 
between Rs.3000 and Rs.4000, with a couple of exceptions. Umarkot falls at the lowest end 
of the range, with an expenditure of Rs.2659, while Qambar has the highest expenditure on 
normal delivery procedures i.e. Rs. 4444. (For details see Annex 10) 
 
NPPI Feasibility Study on Result Based Financing Mechanisms in Sindh 
AGA KHAN UNIVERSITY, KARACHI     Page 94 
 
Public Facilities: Public facility expenditure for normal deliveries mostly falls within a range 
from Rs.2000 and Rs.3000 with some exceptional outliers. The highest client expenditure is 
in Tharparkar at Rs.4243, while the lowest is in Kashmore at a mere Rs.1500. In almost all 
the places, public facility delivery expenditure are lower than private facility delivery 
expenditure, with the exceptions of Umarkot, Larkana and Tharparkar. (For details see Annex 
10) 
 
Transport Costs: Transport costs for normal delivery procedures tended to be among the 
higher transport costs from each district. This could be because often taxis were required to 
transport women for delivery procedures, and also, often medical facilities in close proximity, 
would be too small to conduct delivery procedures. Hence, normal delivery procedures tend 
to generate higher transport costs, with a similar level of variation seen in transport costs to 
both public and private facilities, except in Badin where the transport cost to the public 
facility was as low as Rs.30. (For details see Annex 10) 
 
Facility Based vs. Periphery:  When looking at the intra district analysis to compare facility-
based results to results from peripheral locations, we note that there is a consistent trend, with 
transport costs for normal delivery being significantly higher in peripheral locations as 
opposed to facility-based ones. The only exception to this is in Tharparkar, where transport 
costs at the peripheral location are substantially lower.  
 
9.2.3  C-Section 
 
Private Facilities: The client expenditure on C-section is significantly higher than the 
expenditure in any other service. Client C-section expenditure at private facilities mostly fall 
between Rs.15000 and Rs.25000 with some minimum and maximum numbers falling above 
and below this Rs. 1000 range. Jamshoro falls at the lowest end of the range, with a minimum 
of Rs.13500, while Nawabshah has the highest figure at C-section procedures estimated at 
Rs.28250.  The rest fall in between. (For details see Annex 10) 
 
Public Facilities: Client expenditure on C-Sections at public facilities is lower than at private 
facilities. Most C-sections fall within the expenditure range of Rs.9000 and Rs.15000 with 
some exceptions. The estimated client expenditure for a Caesarean section is the cheapest in 
Ghotki where it is estimated at Rs.8750. The estimated client expenditure is highest in 
Shikarpur where it is estimated at Rs.20000. (For details see Annex 10) 
 
Transport Costs:  Transport costs for C-sections tend to be the highest costs in each district, 
as high if not higher than the cost of normal delivery procedures. The reasons for this would 
Table 9.1  Client Expenditure by Type of Service 
Services  
Private Facility Public Facility Mean 
expenditure  Expenditure 
(Rs) 
Expenditure 
(Rs) 
 
ANC 1068 503 786 
 
Normal Delivery 3448 2026 2737 
 
C-Section 21350 12385 16868 
 
Child Illness 1015 271 643 
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probably be the same as those for the higher transport costs of normal delivery procedures, 
with the added issue that facilities that carry out Caesarean sections would possibly be even 
less abundant than those that simply carry out regular delivery services. A similar variation of 
transport costs is seen in both private and public facilities, although there is far less 
information on transport costs to public facilities. (For details see Annex 10) 
 
9.2.4  Child Illnesses 
  
Private Facilities: There are significant variations in client expenditure for child illness 
treatment between districts. In seven of the ten districts the client expenditure of treating 
child illnesses falls between Rs.400 and Rs.800. However, in the remaining three districts, the 
client expenditures are well above Rs.1000, with the expenditure in two of these three, 
namely Tharparkar and Kashmore, being as high as Rs.2175 and Rs.2125, respectively. The 
lowest expenditure were in Umarkot and Ghotki, at Rs.415 and Rs.430, respectively. (For 
details see Annex 10) 
 
Public Facilities:  The treatment of child illnesses at public facilities tends to be quite similar 
across the ten districts, and is significantly cheaper than at private facilities, falling within a 
range of Rs.250 to Rs.350, with just a couple of exceptions. The lowest client expenditure for 
treating child illnesses at public facilities are from Jamshoro with a client expenditure of 
Rs.234. The highest costs are in Kashmore at Rs.393. (For details see Annex 10) 
 
Transport Costs:  Transport costs for treatment of child illnesses tend to be either at the same 
level as or higher than the cost of ante natal care. This is probably because, for mild illnesses 
families are probably only willing to take the children to a facility if it is very close by, and 
will only be willing to consider longer distances and higher transport costs, if the illness is 
very severe. Therefore the transport costs tend to be at the same level as ante natal care costs, 
with severe illnesses pushing them higher in some places. The same trend is evident in both 
private and public facilities. (For details see Annex 10) 
 
Facility Based vs. Periphery: When comparing facility-based results to periphery-based 
results in districts, we notice that the transport costs give us no discernable trend. In some 
districts, the peripheral transports costs are higher than the facility-based transport costs. In 
some places they are around the same, and in some places they are lower.  
 
 
 
 
Table 9.3  Client Expenditure on Transport 
Services  
Private Facility Public Facility Mean Cost 
Transport 
(Rs) 
Transport 
(Rs)  
 
ANC 315 175 245 
 
Normal Delivery 700 545 623 
 
C-Section 770 775 773 
 
Child Illness 360 280 320 
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9.3   Willingness to Pay Inter-District and Intra-District Analysis 
  
In this section we will examine how families’ willingness to pay for different services varies 
from district to district. (For details see Annexes 10) 
 
9.3.1 Antenatal care  
 
In most of the districts people are willing to pay between Rs.200 and Rs.450 for antenatal 
care, definitely less than they are willing to pay for any of the other services discussed in this 
study (For details see Annex 10). Two districts though stand out on either side, in terms of 
their willingness to pay for antenatal care. The lowest result came from Tharparkar where 
people said they weren’t willing to pay any money for ante natal care. On the other hand, 
respondents from Ghotki were willing to pay around Rs. 700 for ante natal care.  
 
9.3.2 Normal Delivery 
 
The willingness to pay results for normal delivery procedures are obviously higher than the 
willingness to pay results for antenatal care. However, the amount people are willing to pay 
makes up only a small percentage of the overall cost of the normal delivery procedure in the 
districts, often little more than 25% of the cost, because people tend to prefer having home 
deliveries instead of institutional deliveries anyhow, which are far cheaper. Therefore, people 
are willing to pay the amount a home delivery costs, but usually little more than that. (For 
details see Annex 10)The responses from each district fall mostly within a range from Rs.500 
to Rs.1250 with the lowest result coming from Tharparkar where the amount respondents are 
willing to pay lies within the range Rs.400-550 and the highest result coming from Umarkot 
where the amount is around Rs.1625.  
 
Badin, however, is an important exception. In the survey in Kadhan in Badin, the response to 
the willingness to pay question was Rs. 500, while the response to the willingness to pay 
question in Rajo Khanani was Rs.5000-6000. This wide variation makes it very difficult to 
decide an overall willingness-to-pay number or range for Badin, which is why we have left its 
results separate from the ranges discussed above.   
 
9.3.3 C-Section 
 
The amount respondents from the different districts are willing to pay for Caesarean sections 
is by far the highest, since it is understood that C-sections are costly, complex operations. 
However, the amount people are willing to pay is still only a small percentage of the amount 
C-sections often actually cost, because they are so expensive and there is only so much 
money people are willing and able to take out for such an operation. Respondents are usually 
willing to pay between Rs.2800 and Rs.5000 for C-sections (For details see Annex 10). 
Respondents from Umarkot seem to be willing to pay the most for C-sections, as they are 
willing to pay up to Rs. 6000. On the other hand, the response from Ghotki was the lowest: 
between Rs.1500 and Rs.2750.  
 
9.3.4 Child Illnesses 
 
 The amount people are willing to pay for the treatment of child illnesses is below Rs. 1000 in 
all ten places, with most responses falling between Rs.150 and Rs.800. (For details see Annex 
10).This shows the people are really only willing to cover the costs of treating mild illnesses, 
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and are not willing or able to cover the costs of treating severe illnesses, since the cost of 
treating severe illnesses is usually above Rs.1000. The lowest response is from Ghotki where 
the amount respondents are willing to pay is around Rs.150, while the highest response is 
from Kashmore, where respondents are willing to pay between Rs.550 and Rs.850 for the 
treatment of child illnesses.  
 
9.4 Cost Packages and Provider Incentive 
 
Cost Packages for vouchers: Cost packages are proposed on client’s willingness to pay 
(WTP) on MNCH services, taking both the lower range and the upper range of WTP figures. 
In ANC the cost package for voucher based on lower range of WTP is Rs.586 while it is 
Rs.336 based on upper range of WTP. For normal delivery the cost package based on lower 
range of WTP is Rs.1942 and Rs.1362 based on upper range of WTP. Moreover, cost 
package for C- section is Rs.13163 and Rs.12463 based on lower and upper ranges of WTP 
respectively. In child illness the proposed voucher based on lower range of WTP is Rs.413 
while its Rs.153 based on upper range of WTP. Although client expenditure data was not 
available for post natal care, its approximate cost for voucher is taken as that of ANC visits. 
On the other hand voucher for normal delivery based on client lower range of WTP is Rs. 
1942 and Rs. 1362 as per upper range of WTP. Vouchers for C- section and child illness 
based on WTP are also proposed in Table 9.3. (For details see annex 11)  
 
Table 9.4: Cost Packages for Vouchers based on Willingness to Pay 
Service Willingness to Pay (Rs) 
Cost package based on 
Lower Range of WTP 
(Rs) 
Cost Package based on 
Upper Range of WTP 
(Rs) 
 
ANC 
 
200-450 
 
586 
 
336 
Normal 
Delivery  
 
795-1375 
 
1942 
 
1362 
 
C – Section 
 
3705-4405 
 
13163 
 
12463 
 
Child illness 
 
230-490 
 
413 
 
153 
 
Provider Incentive: Provider incentives are proposed based on 100% and 50% subsidies on 
average consultation fees in private sector. The provider incentive for ANC based on 100% 
subsidy is Rs.94 while it’s Rs.47 on 50% subsidy. On the other hand the proposed provider 
incentive for normal delivery is Rs.1908 and Rs.954 based on 100% and 50% subsidies 
respectively. Provider incentive for child illness is Rs.275 on 100% subsidy and Rs.138 on 
50% subsidy.  District wise breakups for provider incentives are provided in annex 12.   
 
 
9.5 Review of Existing Targeting Mechanisms  
 
Presently Zakat and Bait-ul-Mal are the two schemes through which some kind of social 
protection is channelized. However targeting mechanisms of both these schemes do not fulfill 
the criteria of inclusivity, transparency and verifiability.  
 
Zakat which is a larger scheme comes under Religious Affairs Ministry and awards are made 
on the basis of religious tenets. It excludes Non-Muslims from its purview and is geared 
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primarily towards the destitute and invalid segment of the population. Selection of 
beneficiaries who qualify under religious grounds is made through local Zakat committees. A 
certain amount of Zakat money is provided to hospitals however beneficiary patients are 
referred to Zakat committee for verification. Verification of income and destitution is 
basically judgemental. Baitul Maal is a smaller scheme but involves broader targeting than 
Zakat, being non-discriminatory on religious grounds. In health it is geared exclusively 
towards life threatening illnesses. Individuals have to directly apply for Bait-ul mal to the 
district level office based on doctor’s certification of illness and thereafter a means test is 
supposedly carried out on for selection of beneficiary.  Verification methods used by Baitul 
Mal and Zakat are unclear and lack sufficient rigor and transparency.  Targeting does include 
the notion of a universe (population census) for disbursement of awards so there is lack of 
means to identify who are the needy and what proportion are being targeted.  
 
The Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) is still in the process of devising a targeting 
system however the key strong point is that the concept of a population universe has been 
accepted for targeting. The proposed targeting system at present relies exclusively on the 
NADRA database. Given that the program intends to target the poorest population, there is 
enough evidence to suggest the issuance of NADRA ID cards amongst the poorest segments 
of the population is the lowest. The Program is in the process of developing a scorecard 
system to target the poorest segments of the population. If developed it will be the most 
robust system of targeting practiced and would align with successful schemes in a number of 
other countries.  
 
9.6 Section Summary 
 
Client Expenditure by Different MNCH Services: 
 
 In the overall client expenditure covering all ten districts, we note that in all the services, 
client expenditure on treatment at public facilities is significantly less than treatment at 
private facilities. In the case of child illness treatment, which is the cheapest form of 
treatment in the package, private treatment is as much as five times the expenditure of 
public treatment.  
 We also note that the amount people are willing to pay is significantly less than the actual 
amounts they are incurring, usually between 25 and 30% of the client expenditure at 
private facilities, and between 30 and 50% of the client expenditure at public facilities. 
Therefore, we see in both types of facilities, people are unwilling to cover most of the 
expenditure on maternal and child care. 
 Client expenditure on normal delivery procedures is on average Rs.2026 at public 
facilities and Rs.3448 at private facilities.  
 Client expenditure on C-Sections, on average is the highest, with an average expenditure 
of over Rs.12000 in public facilities and over Rs.20, 000 in private facilities.  
 
Inter-district Variations on client expenditures:  
 
 In the inter district analysis, we note that there is substantial variation in expenditure 
between districts for each of the services. For Antenatal care and normal delivery 
procedures there is less expensive vouchers However, there are significant outliers in both 
cases. The most significant variation in the client expenditure is seen in treating child 
illnesses. C-section also shows a wider range of expenditure.  
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Willingness to Pay: 
 
 In the case of the amount people are willing to pay, we note that people are willing to pay 
only a small amount for normal delivery procedures as they usually opt for the cheaper 
procedure of home deliveries anyhow. In the case of child illness treatment, we see in 
both cases, across all the districts, people are only willing or able to pay for the treatment 
of minor complications and mild illnesses. 
 
Proposed cost package for services:  
 
 Based on client lower and upper range of WTP the proposed approximate cost package 
for the ANC is Rs.600 and Rs.300, for normal delivery is Rs.1950 and Rs.1350, for C – 
section is  Rs.13000 and Rs.12500 and for child illnesses is  Rs.400 and Rs.150 
respectively.  
 
Proposed cost package for transports:  
 
 Transport costs are lowest for antenatal care while transport costs for delivery procedures 
tend to be the highest, especially C-Sections. Transportation vouchers are needed in all 
districts to offset heavy cost of transport for deliveries and EmONC. Mean voucher value 
of Rs.700 is required for delivery and EmONC with a range of Rs.400 in districts with 
higher physical access and as much as Rs.1100 in districts with poorer access. Transport 
vouchers while offsetting the expense burden on clients of private transport can also serve 
to pull in private transport to remoter areas. 
 
Provider incentive:  
 
 Provider incentive for ANC is lower than normal delivery. Provider incentive for ANC 
based on 100% and 50% subsidies is Rs.95 and Rs.50 respectively, while for normal 
delivery its Rs.1900 and Rs.950 respectively.   
 
Targeting:  
 
 Targeting for vouchers can be piggybacked upon the Benazir Income Support Scheme.  
This scheme is well designed for poverty based targeting at the community level but is 
yet to be implemented.  Alternatively universal targeting of clients in identified 
geographical areas can be done based on pre-selection of geographical areas in NPPI 
districts based on poverty and poor access. Presence of a specialized agency will be 
required for targeting as existing capacity is low in Bait-ul-Mal and other related 
government set-ups.  
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Section  10. LESSONS FROM OTHER PROGRAMS IN PAKISTAN 
 
10.0 Introduction 
 
Section 10 outlines key lessons learnt from incentivized health programs in Pakistan. It 
reviews the extent and scope of implementation of individual projects, key supply or demand 
side areas targeted, effect in terms of service output and nature of incentive disbursement 
systems used. Key lessons learnt are then highlighted for application in NPPI districts.  
 
 
10.1 World Food Program in improving and up taking of Primary Health Care    
through the Government facilities 
 
Focus: World Food Program (WFP) provides cooking oil to pregnant and lactating mothers 
as a demand inducing incentive for increasing the utilization of antenatal and post natal care. 
The program has been in place since 1994 and operates through 452 government first level 
care facilities. 4 tins of cooking oil are provide over the course of a pregnancy with two tins 
linked during prenatal care and two given during the pos-natal and lactation period by trained 
LHVs. The purpose is an increase in TT vaccinations and ANC coverage, PNC coverage, 
early childhood vaccination, and awareness on family planning, breastfeeding and weaning.  
 
Implementation Modalities: WFP is implemented as a vertical program involving both the 
Health Department and WFP office. Program implementation is through the provincial 
government which provides focal staff at provincial level for programming and monitoring, 
bears the transportation costs of edible oil from Karachi port to health centers, and disburses 
oil through its health facilities using existing LHVs and female doctors posted at government 
outlets. The World Food Program provides commodity, training and oversight. Trainings are 
targeted at the LHVs to provide services to the pregnant and lactating women and motivate 
them for further visits. Provision of oil is subject to referral slip from LHWs and CNIC card. 
Monitoring relies on facility based information and there is lack of an independent 
verification system at the community level. Moreover, data recorded is in terms of absolute 
numbers while there is no information on eligible women in the catchment and the proportion 
of them covered for services.  
 
Targeting: All pregnant women at selected health facilities are targeted subject to verification 
by LHWs. Selected health facilities are those which have female health and are selected in 
consultation with Health Department.  
 
Performance Output: WFP evaluation has shown that there was a significant increase in 
registration of pregnant women with WFP assisted centers showing 497% increase versus 
30% increase in non-assisted centers and is corroborated by program records (SuRF 2005). 
Yearly output of WFP although higher than that of non-assisted facilities fluctuates in 
accordance with availability of cooking oil supplies (Figure 10.1). However patient 
attendance progressively drops with progression of pregnancy resulting in low attendance in 
the advanced stages of pregnancy and in the postnatal period (Figure 10.1). Evaluation 
studies indicate low awareness levels amongst mothers of health messages and important 
pregnancy and post-partum milestones. This is reported to be due to primary focus of health 
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providers on management of oil disbursement as well as need for further training of health 
providers. 
Figure 10.1 World Food Program Asst vs Non Asst
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Constraints: Frequent ‘pipeline breaks’ involving disruptions in supply of cooking oil have 
resulted in significant drops in patient attendance during periods of non-supply. This has 
prevented provision of sufficient time to build up client demand and weaning off of food 
incentives is thereby difficult. Targeting of the peri-natal period is poor as there are no 
incentives linked with institutional deliveries while sufficient demand induction has not been 
built for the late pre-natal and postnatal visits. Another drawback of the program is reliance 
mainly on facility based data with lack of verification mechanism to see trickle down effects 
at community level and benefits to the poorer segments.  
 
10.2 Population Welfare Program  
 
Focus: The Ministry of Population Welfare through its provincial Population Welfare 
Programs provides cash incentives to clients, health service provider and community based 
referee to increase the utilization of permanent contraception including tubal ligation and 
vasectomy. Cash based motivation for behavioral change was introduced in the 1980s and is 
provided through Reproductive Health Service (RHS) Centers which are pre-identified 
government facilities equipped for this purpose.  These include a mix of RHS-A centers run 
directly by the Population Welfare Program as well as RHS-B centers set up in those private 
and semi-government hospitals that have a potential clientele and capacity for carrying out 
tubal ligation and vasectomy procedures.  
 
Implementation Modalities: Cash awards are of relatively low value with total incentive 
package per case amounting to Rs1500 which includes incentive of Rs250 for client, Rs 150 
for person who referred, and Rs 700 for service provider.  Rates are fixed and have not been 
subject to annual revision since several years. Financial routing involves disbursement of 
funds from province directly to RHS account. Budgeting of client incentive however is not 
linked to performance targets or reviews of existing demand and involves an incremental 
annual adjustment for inflation. Releases are subject to delays with usual lag time of three to 
four months before release of payment and are due to disbursement of all Population Welfare 
Funds from development budget while shift to operational budget is yet to be sanctioned. 
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Monitoring involves submission of RHS service output records to the province as well as 
randomly verification by province based on list of patients provided by RHS centres.  
 
Performance Output: Contraceptive surgical methods provide a relatively high share of total 
couple years of protection (29%) followed by IUDs (46%).  Reproductive health centers are a 
major source of contraception due primarily to provision of permanent methods and provide 
up to 28% of couple years of protection while Family Welfare Centers providing modern 
methods provide 33% of CYP with rest provided by outreach programs. Feedback from 
program managers shows that volume based incentives are an attractive feature for service 
providers however level of supplementary earning varies widely across districts with earning 
of between 50,000-100,000 in busy areas of Karachi and Rs.10, 000-15000 in the more rural 
postings (GRBI 2006).  
 
Figure 10.2: Couple Years of Protection by Methods 
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Figure 10.3: Performance by Service Outlet 
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Constraints: The Population Welfare Program is an old and established example of cash 
based incentives to clients and providers and also involves purchasing of private sector 
services. However, after introduction of cash incentive there has been no attempt for revision 
of rate or expansion of incentive to other methods such as IUCDs or gradually weaning 
clients off from cash based awards after building of sufficient demand.  
  
10.3 People’s Primary Health Care Initiative (PPHI) 
 
Focus: The People’s Primary Health Initiative makes use of management contracts and 
incentivized salary packages to female staff for improving health facility performance. It was 
initiated in response to poor functioning of BHUs across Pakistan and involves contracting 
the management of BHUs for improved service delivery. Out-sourcing of BHUs has been 
done to the National Rural Support Program (NRSP) and the initiative is administratively 
housed under and financially assisted by the Federal Ministry of Industries. It is an example 
of contracting-in involving transfer of management function and its accompanying budget on 
formal contractual terms from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Industries. In Sindh, 
PPHI was started in 2008 and has been extended in a phase wise manner to 17 out of the 21 
districts and at present covers 558 out of the total 859 BHUs in the province. Key 
management interventions include repair and maintenance of BHUs, provision of equipment 
and furniture, installation of telephones, ensuring of full staff strength, twice weekly visits by 
female doctor, provision of basic laboratory facilities, and conduction of community health 
education sessions.  
 
Implementation Modalities: PPHI has involved single source contracting to the NRSP across 
all the four provinces. The written contract between the PPHI and the Health Department is 
input based and essentially focuses on provision of funds and administrative control for 
management as opposed to performance based targets. Under the terms of contract, budgets 
for BHUs in each district have been transferred to PPHI with provision to re-allocate fund 
across line items for flexible and innovate management. These has been primarily used to 
increase staff salaries in general as well as provide higher packages for remote postings and 
are accompanied by Class I administrative powers over staffing as well as strict monitoring. 
Management control however is restricted to the health facility level and there has been no 
transfer of power over vertical outreach programs. Monitoring is based on the existing HMIS 
system and supplemented with a high level of spot checks through telephone calls and field 
visits.  
 
Performance Output: The PPHI recently started in Sindh in 2008, is undergoing phased 
expansion and is still in an initial stage for result assessment. However data from ten districts 
included in Phase I of PPHI implementation shows that it has been successful in improving 
staff attendance with approximately two fold increase in attendance of doctors after PPHI 
intervention (Figure 10.4). It has also been successful in operationalisation of 10 illegally 
occupied BHUs and approval of operational budget of 98 non-functional BHUs in these 
districts. In terms of service output an increase in female OPD is reported in contracted BHUs 
and is related to improved staff attendance of female paramedics and additionally built in 
twice weekly visits of lady doctor. However there was a baseline assessment for comparison. 
A definitive increase in total OPD has been seen as is more pronounced in some districts 
versus others. (Figure10.5). 
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Figure 10.5  OPD Turnover : Pre PPHI & Post PPHI
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A comprehensive picture on promotive and preventive services such as deliveries, maternal 
care visits, immunization and growth monitoring are as yet not available from Sindh however 
data from case study of district Badin shows that there has been only marginal improvement 
in prenatal, delivery and child immunization services at health care facilities (Figure 10.6). 
This is corroborated by evidence from Rahim Yar Khan evaluation which shows only small 
scale improvement in volume of pre-natal, deliveries and family planning visits despite high 
BHU utilization for curative care (World Bank 2006). On site assessment of Sindh PPHI 
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shows that there is comparatively low emphasis by PPHI management on preventive and 
promotive care indicators as opposed to curative care while BHU linkage with vertical 
outreach programs has also weakened as administrative authority of vertical outreach 
programs still lies with EDO-Health Office.  
 
Figure 10.6: BHU's Pre PPHI vs BHU's Post PPHI
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Hindrances: While PPHI has potential for increasing MNCH service delivery outputs a 
number of factors impede advances in this area. Obtaining sanctioned release of BHU budget 
and ensuring attendance of government staff has been fraught with political tensions and turf 
politics between the two government ministries which raises serious concerns over viability 
of management contracts and leads to sub-optimal coordination for implementation of 
integrated services. Moreover lack of specification of contractual performance targets as well 
as poor orientation of civil service managers in PPHI has led to low attention to MNCH care. 
A fair trail of the PPHI initiative involving rigorous baseline and end project evaluation, a 
stronger reporting and coordination linkage between PPHI, Health Department and donor 
agencies involved in PHC and MNCH, and a future shift to performance based contract 
having preventive care indicators are measures needed for enhancing PPHI potential in the 
MNCH area 
 
10.4 Tawana Pakistan Project  
 
Focus: Meals for school children were used as a demand inducing mechanism by Tawana 
Pakistan Program to increase enrollment among primary school girls and reduce malnutrition 
in the rural areas of the poorer districts of Pakistan. Tawana Pakistan was a project of the 
Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education, implemented across Pakistan for a two 
year period at a cost of 3.6 billion. Freshly cooked meals were provided to 417,000 girls 
enrolled in government primary schools in 29 districts of Pakistan. Meal cost of Rs7 per child 
per day was allotted to government primary girls schools with the fund jointly managed by 
teachers and community while meal preparation and feeding was managed by community.  
 
Targeting: Targeting was by gender and age group, and involved selection of all government 
primary girls schools in program districts and provision of meal to all students. Calibration by 
income levels was not done as government schools were felt to reach out to the poor while 
community mobilization through NGOs was built in to ensure participation of the poorer 
groups amongst the poor.  
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Implementation Modalities: The implementation mechanism comprised of three key 
features: i) use of NGOs for mobilizing and empowering communities to manage school 
feeding and oversee teacher’s attendance; ii) use of Bait-ul-mal for routing of funds and 
program monitoring; iii) use of district stakeholder committees for oversight. Financing route 
involved direct transfer of funds on a per child basis from the Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal to the 
district oversight committee followed by transfer to bank or post office accounts of individual 
schools on a quarterly basis. Fund management at the local level was jointly by mothers’ 
committee and teachers. Monitoring at the field level involved maintaining a universal data 
set on each child registered with technical assistance to communities provided by NGOs 
while overall program monitoring was provided by Bait-ul-Mal.  
 
Performance Output: Incentivized feeding was seen to result in an overall 40% enrollment 
increase across all provinces, AJK and FANA (Figure 10.6). Enrollment increase was 
primarily associated with direct targeting of the girl child through provision of a school meal 
as opposed to targeting directed at family members. Another effect was an increase in the 
nutritional knowledge of women in the community by 30% as well as some reduction in 
underweight and wasted children however (Figure 10.7). However there is lack of data as to 
whether the program was able to target the poorest populations in terms of school enrollment 
and /or improvement in nutritional status. A secondary benefit of this incentivized program 
was empowerment of mothers with the program showing that community women are capable 
of managing small scale local development programs (Tawana Pakistan 2006). 
 
Figure 10.7 Tawana Project
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Constraints: Tawana Pakistan Program was winded up before completing full tenure and 
suffered from interruptions in school feeding during its implementation. Routing of funds 
through the government system and a complex and multi-tiered project structure resulted in 
delayed initiation as well as delays in fund disbursement. Absorptive capacity was low for 
receipt of funds at field level with problems in opening of post office accounts and similarly 
low for managing of data with NGOs also ill-equipped to deal with data issues. Poor 
monitoring capacity of Bait-ul-Mal and unclear roles and responsibilities of different 
stakeholders also created poor oversight Above all, political ownership was the chief barrier 
with poor program acceptance by district oversight committees due to lack of administrative 
and budgetary control, as well as lack of strong leadership at the national level due to 
involvement of multiple ministries.  
 
10.5 UNFPA – FIGO Pilot on Safe Motherhood  
 
Focus: The UNFPA supported FIGO pilot has used cash awards to government secondary 
care facilities to improve institutional deliveries. It is being implemented in Thatta and 
Jacobabad districts of Sindh since 2004, supported by UNFPA and Federal Ministry of 
Health. In Thatta district it has targeted 10 health facilities and involved a total disbursement 
of Rs.10, 000,000 with an average of Rs1, 000,000 per health facility.  
 
Implementation Modalities: Cash awards are given to selected THQs and RHCs for repair 
and out-fitting of delivery rooms and hiring of female doctors and paramedics. Salaries do 
not follow a fixed formula but generally adjustment is made for more peripheral areas. A 
district support team comprising district level stakeholders provides local oversight while 
programming is done through EDO-Health Office. A number of supportive measures have 
also been provided such as moral support and protection to female staff, rehabilitating female 
staff residence, provision of TV cable facilities for posted female staff in remote locations, 
transport allowance, and investment in district level nursing and midwifery school. 
Monitoring relies on facility based HMIs data and there are presently no measures for 
verification at field level.  
 
Performance Output: A sharp rise in antenatal visits has been seen with ANCs more than 
doubling from 923 visits in 2004 to 2233 visits in 2007. Volume of deliveries has shown a 
Figure 10.8: Nutritional Status: Before and End of Project 
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similar two fold increase rising in number from 177 deliveries in 2004 to 353 deliveries in 
2007.  
 
Figure 10.9: UNFPA Performance 
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Constraints: At present the awarding system is mainly input based and experimentation is 
needed to check further increase in volume with move to put based system with funding 
award linked to volume of service. Obstacles reported by program managers included lack of 
health systems vision and capacity in EDO-Health set-up for strategic planning of MCH 
awards, poor priority to MNCH at district level, and pervasive financial and moral corruption 
creating difficulty for deployment and retention of female staff. 
 
10.6  Tabba Foundation  
 
Focus: A public-private partnership for hospital based maternal health care services is being 
implemented by Tabba Foundation, a philanthropic organization, and Jinnah Postgraduate 
Medical Centre. Initiated in 2000, it aims to provide free delivery care to all pregnant mothers 
registered for delivery through private sector financing and management oversight to the 
maternity ward while medical care is provided by government hospital staff.  
Implementation Modalities: The Tabba Foundation has provided funds for building and 
equipping of a new maternity ward at JPMC and in addition contributes to all operational 
expenses except salaries of JPMC appointed staff. Operational expense include medical 
supplies, drugs, diagnostics, maintenance expenses, salaries of extra paramedic and support 
staff, and managerial staff appointed by Tabba. Overall management of running of the ward, 
monitoring of outputs, and managing of finances and book-keeping is provided by Tabba 
staff. Government in addition also maintains records of women registered for deliveries. 
There is no selective targeting of patients and all pregnant women registered at the 
Mohammad Ali Tabba gynaecology wing of JPMC are provided delivery care services free 
of charge with the rationale being that only poor clientele makes use of government hospitals.  
Performance Output: Analysis of hospital data shows doubling in number of deliveries with 
total annual number of deliveries numbering 6019 pre-project, rising up to 13210 by the end 
of 2008. 
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Constraints: Partnership remains informal in nature as the contract drawn between Tabba and 
the Federal Government remains unsigned despite laps of several years. 
 
10.7         Green Star Marketing 
 
Focus: Green star voucher scheme was initiated in August 2008 and provides voucher to the 
poor for family planning and maternal care services. It is currently being carried out in 6 
urban union councils of Dera Ghazi Khan District. As yet it is a pilot project with intention of 
expansion to rural areas in the Jhang District during summer 2009.  
 
Implementation Modalities:  
The vouchers are provided through outreach workers recruited by Green star and are relevant 
for use at green star ‘branded’ clinics. Help is solicited from LHWs for identification of 
beneficiaries and beneficiaries are chosen on two criteria.  
 
i. Women who have not been to skilled birth attendants for delivery.  
ii. Household income from which beneficiaries are chosen should be less than Rupees 
6000 per month.  
 
Green star charges the beneficiaries Rupees 100 for the package of vouchers to create a stake. 
Vouchers that are provided to the beneficiaries have a monetary value of Rupees 5000 for 
covering a normal delivery and a preventive package of mother and child services, and in 
case of a caesarian voucher value of Rupees 10,000 is provided. There are eight vouchers in 
the package; 3 for ANC visits, 1 for post natal visit, 1 for ultra sound, 1 for tetanus shot, 1 for 
delivery and 1 for family planning consultations. In addition, transport costs are provided 
with each voucher of Rupees 250 for delivery and Rupees 50 for other routine services. If 
caesarian section is required, a special referral is made and the rest of the cost – over and 
above that of the normal delivery voucher - is provided for.  
 
Performance Output: Since the program has started only recently, performance indicators 
are preliminary cover a six month period from August 2008 - February 2009. Of the 2000 
women who were selected in the first implementation round, 1600 completed the first 
antenatal visits until February 2009, 1200 women have come for the second antenatal visit 
and 200 deliveries have also taken place. As data from comparable control sites is not 
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available it is difficult tm gauge effects. However 80% of the pregnant mothers are registered 
for delivery while dropout rate is 40%.  Antenatal visits are a good indicator given the period 
when the scheme was initiated. The dropout rate if gauged from the second visit is 40% of the 
original cohort. We were told that the use of delivery vouchers is however high.  
 
Constraints: Building in of controls and poverty assessment of clients is needed to gauge 
comparative increase in services outputs of the program and coverage in reaching the 
poorest.  Moreover scaling up of the project is going to create challenges as most of the 
Green Star brand clinics are in urban areas and will require linking up with public facilities if 
coverage is to be expanded in rural areas.  
 
10.8  Section Summary 
 
 Generally all mechanism of incentivization have resulted in increase in service output 
and measures include incentivized salary packages for providers, management 
contracts, and cash and in-kind incentives for clients.  
 Increasing staff salaries as seen in PPHI and UNFPA-FIGO project improves staff 
attendance and results in rapid rise in target indicators. However careful selection of 
targeted output is needed ensuring that preventive care does not get neglected at the 
expense of curative care.  
 Experience with management contracts has shown that these can deliver in terms of 
curative care, staff attendance and general maintenance of health facility when 
accompanied with increased financial autonomy and strong administrative powers 
however improvement in MNCH output requires specification of performance based 
targets in the contract and better coordinatory linkages between tiers of the health care 
system.   
 Due to poor political acceptance of management contracts, these can at best be 
continued as a contracting-in venture with government agencies better equipped to 
deal with political friction and would have little chances of success as a contracted-
out venture to NGOs.  
 Cash incentives for patients have only been implemented through the Population 
Welfare Program. Low cash value and tight, vertical administrative control has 
minimized potential of leakages.  
 In-kind incentives have been seen to increase targeted outputs as seen in the World 
Food Program and Tawana Pakistan Project however long term continuity of demand 
for services could not be established due to frequent disruptions in funds & supplies. 
 Lack of strong leadership, multiple bureaucratic tiers and poor ownership of district 
stakeholders weakens implementation of incentivized programs. Provision of 
earmarked funds for monitoring and oversight if provided to district government can 
potentially increase political ownership.  
 Universal targeting in government facilities is administratively easy, avoids political 
pressures for selection and reaches out to the poor population as primarily poor 
clientele makes use of government health services.  
 So far there is little evidence on whether client incentives have reached the poorest. 
Reaching out to the poorest and remotest groups will involve use of NGOs for 
community mobilization and empowerment and is likely to increase transaction costs 
but will also have higher equity value.   
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Section  11. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND WAY FORWARD 
 
11.0 Introduction 
 
This final section of the report identifies placement of key financing strategies for 
improvement in MNCH health service coverage. It links the supply and demand side gaps 
identified in previous chapters with key health service and financing inputs needed to 
improve service output. It in addition identifies supportive measures for implementation of 
these strategies. A menu of feasible options is identified for implementation across NPPI 
districts and separate packaging of interventions is also provided by individual districts. The 
section concludes by suggesting future implementation modalities and areas for further 
research.  
 
11.1 Overview of Key Gaps in MNCH Service Delivery 
 
Maternal and child health status in NPPI districts is low and significantly lags behind national 
estimates. Although cause of death data disaggregated by districts is unavailable, national 
level data suggests that targeted interventions are needed in the peri-natal area with attention 
to institutional deliveries, newborn care and EmONC services which are presently over-
looked areas, as well as revamping of existing maternal and child care service elements such 
as immunizations, ANC & PNC visits, and preventive care check-ups for children.  
 
MNCH service coverage is provided by both the public and private sectors however coverage 
levels fall much below MDG targets. There has been an increase in coverage of maternal 
services in NPPI district over the last five years driven by increased private sector usage, 
however close to half of pregnant women are still uncovered with coverage significantly low 
amongst the poor and those residing in peripheral areas. Both maternal and child care outputs 
at government facilities have remained stagnant and volume of service is particularly low at 
FLCFs with bypassing of primary tier by clients in favor of hospitals even for routine 
services such as ANC, deliveries and child illness visits. Outreach programs show a mixed 
picture with drop in EPI coverage over the last five years however contraceptive use has 
shown a modest increase and is probably due to the LHW program.  
 
The under-developed context of NPPI districts poses challenges in utilization of health care 
services in terms of i) low levels of retention of skilled staff; ii) lack of peripheral outreach of 
both public and private sector services, iii) poorly equipped and stocked facilities and limited 
opening times; iv) high transport costs; v) poor community awareness for maternal care and 
child preventive services along with low coverage of LHW program; and vi) community 
inability to pay resulting in marginalization of preventive and promotive care.  
 
These constraints to service utilization are aggravated by low priority and lack of 
programming of MNCH services at district level, insufficient administrative control over 
staffing, inadequate budget and supervision, and need for clinical and managerial skill 
building.  
 
Section 11.2 details specific health service improvement measures for maternal, newborn and 
child care, Section 11.3 recommends needed health financing strategies, and Section 11.4 list 
over-arching governance measures needed to support implementation.  
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11.2 Recommended Health Service Measures 
 
We evaluated the potential to introduce as well as enhance evidence-based interventions in 
the NPPI districts based on existing information on the profile of major causes of maternal 
and child mortality (PDHS 2007) as well as the global evidence base of cost effective 
interventions based on recent Lancet series on Maternal Health, newborn Health, Child 
Survival and Nutrition (Bhutta 2008; Kerber 2007; Campbell 2006; Darmstadt 2005; Hill 
2004). Table 11.1 below indicates some of the potential opportunities for developing 
packages of care while fiscal strategies for scaling these up are provided in Table 11.3. 
 
11.3 Proposed Results Based Financing Mechanisms  
 
As both supply and demand side factors are responsible for low MNCH service coverage 
therefore result based financing mechanisms need to be simultaneously placed on both the 
supply side and demand side of the health care system. Effectiveness of result based 
financing mechanism is highly context dependent and are influenced by the local health 
system and political context, extent of specification to MNCH services and availability of 
technical capacity for implementation. Financing mechanism involving the private sector are 
also dependent on availability of private sector market and its interest in public private 
partnership schemes. Given the NPPI context, strategic placement of strategies is needed to 
pull in government staff into government EmONC centers and FLCFs, supplementation of 
government provision with private sector services and increasing client access to 
transportation.  
 
11.3.1 Supply Side Measures: 
Provider Incentives for Government Staff: Given the acute problem of staff shortage and 
underlying unwillingness to serve in rural peripheral settings provider incentives need to be 
built in to pull in staff to needed areas and to minimize private sector practice at the expense 
of government duties. Volume based incentives can be topped onto the basic salary package 
linking output with service provision. Political acceptability across a range of stakeholders is 
also the highest for provider incentives as compared to other mechanisms.  
 
Up to 50% of fee charged in comparable private sector facilities is acceptable to service 
providers and on average works out to be Rs.50 for ANC, PNC, and well baby visits, Rs.300 
for child OPD and Rs1000 for deliveries. Disaggregated fee expense for C-Section is not 
available but approximate incentive would be Rs.5500 at 30% of total C-Section expense and 
Rs.8500 at 50% of total C-section expense. Further calibration is needed by i) distance of 
health facility from district center, ii) by regular and non-regular timings, and iii) type of 
provider. The first two can be adjusted through provision of a hardship allowance on top of 
the basic salary package while a sliding scale of rates needs to be developed for the third.  
 
Accountability checks need to be built in for ensuring staff attendance and accurate entry of 
service output. Furthermore disbursement related issues will need to be addressed involving 
prompt disbursement of provider incentives, direct bank deposit as opposed to cash dealings, 
and minimization of rent seeking pressures. 
  
Service provider incentivization to effectively address staff shortages also need to be 
accompanied by additional inputs at the health care facility level as well as at district 
management level (See section 11.3).  
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Table 11.1 Recommended Health Service Measures 
Areas  Causes of Deaths 
Existing interventions  
 
Coverage 
from 
Household 
survey 
Coverage from facility survey  
Potential interventions (including new strategies)  
 DHQ THQ RHC BHU 
M
at
er
na
l S
ur
vi
va
l a
nd
 h
ea
lth
 
Eclampsia 
Availability of  delivery room & 
delivery within facilities   20% 12% 62% 20% 
Hypertension screening and treatment for severe hypertension 
Low dose Asprin in pregnancy  (enhanced ANC package) 
Calcium supplementation during pregnancy (enhanced ANC 
package) 
Presence of Magnesium Sulphate 
for control of fits in Eclampsia  20% 4%  
 
20%  Basic obstetric care for eclampsia (Magnesium Sulphate) 
Hemorrhage 
 
Rapid transfer and Provision of 
Blood transfusion services   80% 52% - - Referral for skilled care including oxytocic use and active management of third of labour for prevention of postpartum 
hemorrhage. LSCS as indicated 
 
Misoprostol use / Oxytocic use       
Active management of third stage 
of labor        
Infection 
Women who received antenatal 
care by: 
Doctor 
LHV/ Nurse 
Non SBA  
 
 
60% 
5% 
3% 
    
Continuity of care between trained traditional birth attendants, 
midwives and doctors 
Basic 4 visit antenatal care package including  
1. Counseling for seeking skilled care,  
2. Tetanus toxoid, screening for UTI and hypertension  
3. Iron folate administration 
Provision of IV fluids and 
general support   100% 
76.6
% - - Basic obstetric care  (clean delivery)  
Availability of antibiotics  60% 53% 29%  
Antibiotics for preterm rupture of membranes and suspected 
chorioamnionitis and post abortion care 
Antenatal steroids in preterm labour 
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Table 11.1: Recommended Health Service Measures (Cont’d) 
Area
s  Causes of Deaths 
Existing interventions  
 
Coverage 
from 
Househol
d survey 
Coverage from facility survey  
 Potential interventions (including new strategies)  
 DHQ THQ RHC BHU 
N
eo
na
ta
l H
ea
lth
 
Asphyxia 
Availability Cardio pulmonary 
resuscitation services & trained staff   
 
20% 
 
4% 
 
21% 
 
22%  
Presence of Ambo bag  40% 24% - - Newborn Resuscitation  
Post-asphyxial care including 
phenobarbitone       
Prematurity 
Use of antenatal steroids   - - -   
Presence of warmer/ heater   20% 16% - -  
Presence of incubator  20% 0% - -  
Availability of Oxygen supply  20% 0% 22%   
Infection  
Availability of nasal CPAP       
Cutting cord with clean instrument 
(CDKs) 42%      
Breastfeeding initiated : 
In first hour 
First day  
 
20%  
30%  
    Advice and support for early and exclusive breastfeeding Breastfeeding education/promotion strategies 
Provision of IV fluid administration 
services   80% 47% - -  
C
hi
ld
 H
ea
lth
 
Pneumonia  
 
 
Availability of Oxygen supply  20% 0% - - Community detection and management of pneumonia 
Presence of Nebulizers  60% 40% 14%   
Presence of essential drugs for the 
treatment of pneumonia   
 
20% 
 
8% 
 
71%   
Diarrhea 
Provision of IV fluid administration 
services   100% 53% - - 
 
 
Supply of Zinc & ORS for the 
treatment of diarrhea  
Zinc 
ORS 58% 
20% 
? 
16% 
 4% 
27% 
79%  
Preventive Zinc Supplementation in Children 
Improved diarrhea management by Zinc 
Malnutrition   
Presence of Weighing machine   - - 46%   
Nutritional status of children: 
Severely malnourished   
Moderately malnourished 
Mild malnourished 
5% 
9% 
21%  
     
Strategies to promote optimal complementary feeding through 
nutrition education in food secure populations 
Balanced Energy Protein supplements and nutrition counseling 
 
Vitamin A supplementation (6 – 59 
months)  89%      Vitamin A supplementation x 2 
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ii) Drug and Equipment Budget: Core MNCH fund for purchase of drugs, essential 
commodities and necessary equipment will be needed for government facilities. Budgetary 
boost needs to be linked to service improvement measures identified in Section 11.4. 
 
iii) Commodity Vouchers: Commodity vouchers can be provided for purchase of necessary 
supplies from retail outlets. Key areas are delivery kits, diarrhea kits and IV supplies kit for 
management of neonatal sepsis and puerperal sepsis. 
 
Purchasing of Private Sector Services: Health staff and facility to population ratios will still 
remain sub-optimal even with filling in of all government staff vacancies unless 
supplemented with private sector services. Strategic purchasing of private sector services will 
be required to fill in service delivery gaps and will allow quick roll out of services as well as 
reduction of service overlaps. However purchasing of private sector services should only be 
limited to those private practitioners who do not have a dual affiliation so as to avoid negative 
inducement to health staff for strengthening private practices at the cost of public sector 
facilities.  
 
i) Provider Incentives for Private Practitioners: Given that the private sector mainly 
comprises of individual practitioners rather than organized health care facility set-ups, 
purchasing of private sector services will need to target individual practitioners. 
Incentives can be strategically targeted to improve functioning of pre-identified public 
health care outlets in each district that lack required government staff and involve 
volume based payment to private specialists, doctors and LHVs for provision of 
EmONC and routine MNCH service package at government health care facilities. 
Incentive rate should be kept consistent with that provided to government staff. 
Provision of incentives to private practitioners is also likely to result in healthy 
competition with absentee government staff. Provider incentives will be of greater 
attraction to those practitioners who do not have a well established practice.   
 
ii) Service Vouchers: Purchasing services from private sector facilities through use of 
vouchers can be applied in the few NPPI districts where an organized private sector is 
present having well established clinics and hospitals to provide MNCH services, 
reasonable quality of care and adequate record and book keeping systems. Use of case 
based vouchers instead of facility contracting has better administrative and political 
feasibility. Administratively it can be applied to both small individual practices as 
well as large organized set-ups while politically vouchers have a relatively better 
acceptance amongst the government and private sector as compared to contracting, 
sector and are highly favored by clients.  
 
Cost of service voucher based on low client willingness to pay are Rs.600 for ANC and PNC 
visits, Rs.2000 for delivery, Rs.13000 for C-section, and Rs.400 for child OPD. Service 
voucher costs based on higher willingness to pay are Rs.300 for ANC and PNC visits, 
Rs.1350 for delivery, Rs.12500 C-section, and Rs.150 for child OPD. Implementation of 
vouchers will require listing of accredited private health facilities, provision of information 
on service outlets to community as well as need for community based referees such as LHWs 
or NGOs.  Distribution of vouchers to the poorest clientele will need to be carefully 
safeguarded and rigorously evaluated.  
 
Poor Feasibility of Other Measures: Other measures such as contracting and district SWAP-
like awards were explored but found to be unfavorable for implementation in NPPI districts. 
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SWAP like arrangements at the district level are likely to show poor trickle down effects, 
there is lack of capacity for their implementation and are poorly received by most 
stakeholders.  
 
There is extreme wariness regarding contracting on the part of both public and private sectors 
for management contracts while interest is also low for service delivery contracts. 
Furthermore, existing private sector market in NPPI districts is poorly developed for 
contracting. Management contracts are better managed by contracting-in arrangements 
however the existing arrangement with PPHI although successful in addressing staffing in 
rural areas needs specification of MNCH targets, skill building training of implementers, and 
greater coordination across stakeholders for improvement in MNCH service outputs.  
 
Purchasing of private sector services needs to be backed up with mapping of accredited 
providers, training of private providers, and monitoring of quality of care (See Section 11.3).  
 
11.3.2 Demand Side Measures 
 
Client Incentives: Client incentives, in addendum to provider incentives, can be used at 
designated NPPI supported facilities for routine maternal care and child preventive care visits 
as clients have particularly low levels of demand for these services. Cash incentives are 
commonly disfavored by both service providers and clients due to risk of leakages. In-kind 
incentives such as food ration cards, soap and baby packages are better favored due to lower 
visibility and hence less chance of misappropriation, lower risk of patient displeasure with 
service provider in case of disruptions and easier to wean off over time. In-kind client 
incentives need to target ANC, delivery, PNC & newborn care and child preventive care 
visits in the first year of life. Client incentives need to be target the same service package and 
facilities targeted by provider incentive so as to maximize effect in volume.  
 
Service Vouchers: These can be implemented in few districts having more well developed 
private sector and are detailed above.  
 
Transport vouchers: Transportation vouchers are needed in all districts to offset heavy cost of 
transport for deliveries and EmONC. Mean voucher value of Rs.700 is required for delivery 
and EmONC with a range of Rs.400 in districts with higher physical access and as much as 
Rs.1100 in districts with poorer access. Transport vouchers while offsetting the expense 
burden on clients of private transport can also serve to pull in private transport to remoter 
areas. 
 
Targeting: Targeting for community incentives needs to be based on poverty and physical 
access to health facility. Most administratively feasible option is identification of remote and 
poverty stricken Tehsils or Union Councils and provision to all families with pregnant 
mothers and children <1 yrs. Selective targeting of families is likely to be fraught with 
political interference and is administratively difficult unless piggybacked with planned 
scorecard system for BISC scheme.  
 
Community Health Awareness Interventions: Enhanced health education at village level will 
be required to target importance of maternal care and newborn services, recognition of danger 
signs by mothers, and provide information to clients on where to obtain services. This can be 
targeted through LHW Program or alternatively through NGOs in areas uncovered by LHWs 
Some districts where tribal practices are common would require additional investment on  
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Table 11.2: Summary of Issues , Required Financing Measures and Supportive Measures 
 Service Coverage Issues Financing Mechanisms 
Other Supportive 
Measures 
Public 
Sector 
Low health facility 
utilization for all 
services 
 
Outreach services 
have remained 
stagnant & sub-
optimal in certain 
districts 
 
Shortage of female staff  
 
Poorly equipped health 
facilities 
 
Poor staff skills 
 
Low priority to MNCH  
 
Governance issues 
I. Provider incentives 
to government staff  
FLCF: ANC, delivery, 
PNC & newborn visit, 
2 infant preventive 
care visits  
 
Secondary care tier: 
normal deliveries, 
complicated deliveries, 
C-section, child illness 
OPD, child illness 
admission 
 
II. Drug and 
equipment budget 
 
III. Vouchers for drugs 
and commodities : 
diarrhea kits, IV fluid 
kits, delivery kits,  
Class I powers for staff 
management 
 
Supportive safety & 
security measures for 
female staff 
 
Increase in operational  
budget 
 
Red category list of stock-
outs 
 
Enhancement of 
stewardship role of 
government 
 
Capacity building in 
management + clinical 
skills 
Private 
Sector  
Main provider for 
delivery, acute child 
illness and maternal 
complications 
 
Little role in 
preventive services 
 
Small scoped after 
adjusting for dual 
practices 
 
Individual providers 
rather than well 
developed health 
facilities 
 
Questionable QOC 
 
Clustering in softer 
areas 
Provider incentives: 
Volume based 
incentives to 
individual practitioners 
for practicing at 
government facilities. 
 
Service vouchers  in 
the districts having 
more developed 
private sector  for 
ANC, delivery, 
EmONC, PNC& 
newborn visit, and 2 
infant preventive care 
check-ups 
 
Listing of accredited 
providers 
 
Skill enhancement training 
 
Record keeping training for 
vouchers 
Comm
unity 
Utilize services in 
case of complications/ 
emergency 
 
Better uptake of 
services provided at 
doorstep e.g. EPI 
 
Insufficient coverage 
& weak programming 
of LHW program 
 
Poor financial access 
for all facility based 
services 
 
Poor physical access for 
deliveries and EmONC 
 
Low demand for 
maternal care services 
In-kind incentives for 
ANC, delivery, PNC& 
newborn visit, and 2 
infant preventive care 
check-ups 
 
Service delivery 
vouchers in districts 
having private strength  
 
Transport vouchers for 
deliveries and EmONC 
Extending LHW coverage 
and improving client 
referrals from existing 
covered areas 
 
Community mobilization 
and awareness through 
NGOs in uncovered areas 
 
demand side through community mobilization schemes and modification of targets from 
facility based deliveries to supervised deliveries. A strong NGO role would be needed in 
these districts.  
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Improving Effectiveness of LHW Program: More effective role of LHW program is needed 
for increasing client demand and requires i)expansion of LHW coverage, ii)tightening of 
supervisory control, iii)targeted improvement in LHW knowledge and skills for risk 
assessment and referral, and iv)stronger linkage with health facility. Coverage expansion 
should be in a phased manner involving short and long term strategies such as introduction of 
a career pathway for upward movement of LHWs, relaxing eligibility rules for more remote 
areas and incentivized school education linked to job provision.  
 
For implementation of result based financing measures the government’s stewardship role 
involving strategic planning, purchasing and monitoring of services will need to be 
strengthened. Required measures for movement to this function are listed further on in 
Section 11.4. Furthermore, strict accountability checks will be needed for implementation of 
above listed strategies (Section 11.6). 
 
11.4 Accompanying Supportive Measures 
 
Key supportive measures will be required for implementation of result based financing 
measures across all NPPI districts and include measures for i)human resource strengthening 
;ii) improved service provision at government facilities, and iii) enhancement of stewardship 
function. These are detailed as follows:  
 
11.4.1 Human Resource Strengthening 
 
Staff retention measures: For improved female staff availability financial incentives alone 
will not be enough and need to be accompanied by other measures to ensure adequate 
retention. Supportive security measures are needed such as pairing of female staff for non-
regular duty hours, provision of male chowkidar, adequate night stay facility, sufficient 
incentive level for accompaniment of male family member and strong political emphasis on 
all local stakeholders for protection of female health staff from sexual harassment. Frequent 
transfers to softer areas is likely to remain an issue unless accompanied by Class I powers on 
trial basis in NPPI districts, as already done for PPHI, to counter political interference and 
strengthen administrative control of district government.   
 
Alternative staffing strategies: Availability of specialist and female doctors is likely to 
improve with incentivized pay but will still fall short of required strength in the more remote 
districts and those with law and order problems. Alternative staffing strategies should be 
experimented in such districts involving upgrading skills of general cadre for dealing with 
EmONC and increasing local production of female paramedics for provision of routine 
maternal care at the FLCF tier.  
 
Training: Comprehensive training is needed across all NPPI districts for both government 
staff as well as targeted private sector staff in the areas of IMCI, newborn care and maternal 
complications. Staff training is also needed in data entry and record keeping of MNCH 
indicators.  
 
11.4.2 Improving Service Provision 
 
Budgetary Inputs: Increase in operational budget is needed MNCH and requires increasing 
the budgetary share at district level for non-salary operational costs and increased provincial 
allocations for incentivised staff salaries. In addition, development funds can also be flexibly 
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used towards soft projects such as monitoring, training and public-private partnership 
schemes as opposed to facility construction which entails increased in future recurrent costs. 
Secondly, ring-fencing of non-salary operational funds is needed to avoid squeeze on 
operational expenditure and funds need to be clearly earmarked for essential stocks and 
medicine provision, repair and maintenance, and improved monitoring. Thirdly, tracking of 
funds for MNCH is needed through move from input to output based budgets and would 
require technical assistance for building of appropriate financial information systems and 
training of managerial and technical staff.   
 
Out-fitting of facilities: Significant improvement needs to be made in terms of equipping 
health facilities for provision of MNCH services. Provision of emergency care equipment to 
DHQs and THQs and routine delivery and diagnostic care equipment to RHCs and BHUs is 
needed along with development of a red category stock list for earmarking essential medicine 
and supplies provision for EmONC and routine care services. These need to be accompanied 
by an enhanced MNCH budget as detailed above.  
 
Improved supervision and ear-marked time for MNCH services: Ring-fencing of service 
providers time from polio and other vertical activities is required in addition to outfitting and 
stocking of health care facilities. Quality of supervision also needs to be addressed and would 
require sensitization training of district managers on MNCH services, increased number of 
supervisory visits, and skill building and use of supervisory checklists for quality supervision. 
 
11.4.3 Enhanced Stewardship Role 
 
Enhancement of stewardship role is required for result based financing and will require 
district based planning, public-private partnerships and increased monitoring and 
coordination.    
 
 District health plans: District sector wise plan for MNCH need to be developed in each 
district to set service delivery goals, identify and act on existing gaps in government 
services and identified areas for strategic use of private sector. The practice of district 
needs assessment exercise needs to be institutionalized and conducted on a medium term 
basis, and followed by the development of annual district health plans. Annual budgetary 
process needs to be closely linked with developed annual district health plans.  
 Coordination and monitoring: The stewardship function would require increased 
monitoring of government services as well as enhance coordination with private sector. 
Dialogue and coordination with private sector needs to be initiated for i) involvement of 
private sector in district planning for MNCH;  ii) information collection from private 
sector on staffing and key MNCH outputs; iii) identifying areas of collaboration and 
terms of engagement. Visibly strengthened monitoring of government services need to 
take place supported by ear-marked budget for monitoring visits, skill building training in 
monitoring, shift to DHIS system and incorporation of EMOC indicators for health 
facility monitoring, and building in cross- verification of health facility data through 
better linkage with LHW program as well as community level spot checks..  
 Measures for purchasing private sector services: Careful listing of certified private 
practitioners, development of minimum standards of care, and refresher clinical training 
are required prior to purchasing services of individual practitioners. In instances where 
private sector facilities are used for vouchers, technical assistance on record keeping and 
financial systems will also need to be provided to the private sector facilities.   
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 Reducing fragmentation of health system: MNCH services require critical integration 
across health system tiers. Provision of effective integrated services will require i) 
tangible coordination across the secondary level, first level and community level tiers in 
planning, implementation and monitoring of MNCH services under the umbrella of a 
coordinated district health plan; and ii) reduction in compartmentalized tiers with BHUs 
and community outreach services to be managed by a single agency.   
 Capacity Building: Sensitization and skill building training of district managers are 
needed for move towards a stewardship role. Key areas for formal skill development are 
district health planning, stewardship and purchasing skills, output based budgeting, and 
improved monitoring and need to be accompanied by focal trainings on MNCH needs 
assessment, programming and monitoring. Capacity building needs to be accompanied by 
key measures for effective uptake of imparted skills and these include retention of trained 
managerial staff at place of posting for at least a three year period, mandatory 
development of district health plans, provision of greater administrative control for 
flexible programming and increased budget for monitoring and supervision. Mandatory 
training for administrative cadre linked to service entry and career progression is a larger 
issue which can be addressed through civil service reforms in the health care sector.  
 
11.5  Strategizing Financing Measures by Districts 
 
A meta-analysis of key health system indicators was conducted for each of the districts to 
produce a consolidated and comprehensive picture of district specific constraints so as to 
stratify proposed interventions by districts.  
 
We find that all districts are almost equally poor in terms of health status indicators however 
differ somewhat in terms of public sector performance and even more in terms of private 
sector market and physical access to health facilities.  
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Provider incentives for government providers supplemented by incentives for private 
practitioners to further increases staff strength need to be implemented in all districts as 
staffing is poor across all districts. However higher incentive amount needs to be given to 
Tharparkar, Kashmore and Qambar, lesser incentive to Jamshoro, Umarkot and Larkana 
while lower level incentive can be kept for Ghotki, Nawabshah, Badin and Shikarpur.  
 
Drug, equipment and monitoring budget needs to be provided to all NPPI districts as quality 
of care at health facilities and service outputs are extremely poor in all. Budget allocation 
needs to be heavier for Kashmore, Ghotki, Tharparkar, Umarkot, and Larkana districts as 
compared to other districts. Commodity vouchers for purchase of essential supplies from 
retail outlets can be used in addendum to budget topping in the districts of Kashmore, Ghotki, 
Tharparkar, Umarkot, and Larkana where public sector facilities are the most poorly 
outfitted.  
 
Purchasing of private sector services through service vouchers can be implemented in 
districts Ghotki, Larkana, Badin, Shikarpur, and Nawabshah as these have a relatively more 
developed private sector market.   
 
Transport vouchers for delivery and EMNOC needs to be implemented in all districts except 
Umarkot and Ghotki which have relatively better scoring for physical access to services. 
Higher rates of transport vouchers are needed for Qambar, Jamshoro and Nawabshah as these 
have the lowest physical access and highest transportation charges while lesser value 
transport vouchers can be used for Badin, Shhikarpur, Tharparkar, Kashmore and Larakana.  
 
In-kind client incentives can be used to target ANC, delivery, PNC & newborn care and child 
preventive care visits in the first year of life and commonly preferred by all stakeholders to 
cash incentives. These can be implemented in districts of Tharparkar, Kashmore, and Qambar 
which have the lowest aggregate ranking amongst all NPPI districts.  
 
Financing interventions for each district would need to be supported by over-arching health 
service and governance support measures as outlined in Section 11.2 and 11.4 respectively. 
 
Highest amount of financial and technical investment will be required for the districts of 
Tharparkar, Kashmore and Qambar which have the lowest aggregate score in terms of health 
system performance. Comparatively lesser assistance will be needed by the middle ranking 
districts of Umarkot, Larkana and Jamshoro followed by the relatively higher ranking 
districts of Badin, Ghotki, Shikarpur, and Nawabshah. 
 
Way forward would involve piloting of financing interventions in few selected districts 
accompanied by robust operations research before expanding to other districts. Law and order 
is an overarching issue that needs to be addressed for either private or public sector to 
succeed in some of the surveyed districts. 
 
 11.6 Implementation Modalities 
 
11.6.1 Service Improvement by Government:  
 
Implementation of result based financing strategies would require service improvement 
measures by government supported by increase in operational budget and enhancement of 
stewardship role. Key service improvement measures have been detailed in Section 11.3 and 
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include filling of staff vacancies and improvement in staff retention; identification of 
essential stock and improved stock management; and out-fitting of facilities for new born 
care, IMCI, deliveries and EmONC. These need to be supported by overarching governance 
measures including increase and ring-fencing of operational budget for MNCH, and including 
provision of Class I administrative powers, district health plans linked to ADPs, retention of 
managerial staff, improved monitoring, and output based tracking of expenditure. EDO-
Health offices would need to be supported through budgetary input as well as technical 
assistance for bringing about improvement in service delivery.  
 
11.6.2 Independent Agency for Reward Management 
 
For transparent and efficient functioning, a split needs to be made between the service 
provision function and the performance tracking and award disbursement role. There was 
common consensus amongst all stakeholders including health care managers, health facility 
staff, and private sector and community recipients on need for an independent agency for 
management of financial rewards and monitoring of service volume. Inclusion of an 
independent party is expected to increase transaction costs however cost increase needs to be 
balanced against potential benefits including presence technical capacity, potentially fast 
disbursement system and above all minimization of political interferences and increasing 
recipient confidence in participating in result based financing schemes.  
 
The provision of this role can be competitively contracted out at the provincial level to an 
independent agency having the required expertise followed by setting up of district field 
offices by the selected agency in NPPI districts. Similar independent agency role was built 
into the Enhanced HIV Control Program to for management of contracted NGO awards 
however there was under achievement of designated role due to over-lapping of authority 
between the independent agency and government. Clear-cut TORs, independent financial 
authority, and a separate budget should be provided to the contracted agency however it 
would need to work in close coordination with EDO-Health, PPHI and MS of DHQ hospitals.  
 
11.6.3  External Validation 
 
 External validation is needed on annual basis to provide robust results on actual service 
coverage and trickle down effect to community. Validation checks are needed in addition to 
independent party implementation for two reasons. Firstly, existing monitoring systems lack 
community level verification mechanisms, are susceptible to reporting of inaccurate data and 
cannot capture service distribution in the community in a standardized manner. Secondly, 
although a third party would reduce political interference, however to minimize chances of 
collusion, separate validation checks need to be conducted. A provincial based party can be 
assigned to annually conduct validation checks in each of the districts.  
 
11.6.4 Technical Assistance 
 
Technical assistance is needed in three key areas and can be provided by a single out-sourced 
agency or different agencies: 
 
 Clinical Training: Refresher training of specialists, doctors and LHVs are needed in 
newborn care, IMCI, risk screening for deliveries, and emergency maternal care. These 
need to address both government staff as well as private practitioners used for 
supplementing services. In districts where required number of specialist staff is not 
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available across both public and private sector, upgraded skill enhancement of general 
cadre staff can be done for provision of specialist care.  
 Leadership Training in Health Systems: Sensitization and skill building training of 
district managers are needed for move towards a stewardship role. Key areas for formal 
skill development are district health planning, stewardship and purchasing skills, output 
based budgeting, and improved monitoring and need to be accompanied by focal trainings 
on MNCH needs assessment, programming and monitoring. Key measures need to be 
simultaneously built in for effective uptake of capacity building such as retention of 
trained managerial staff, greater provision of administrative powers, linking of district 
health plan with budgetary process and increased budget for monitoring and supervision. 
A formal training process followed by significant on-job technical assistance will be 
required.  
 Sensitization on MNCH: Sensitization of district health managers and district government 
are needed on importance of MNCH services, key strategies for improvement and use of 
evidence based information for oversight provision. 
   
11.6.5 Structure of Implementing System 
 
 A three tiered system is proposed for implementation and monitoring of proposed output 
based measures (Figure 11.1).  
 
Figure 11.1: Implementation Structure 
 
 
Tier I: This tier would directly deal with the implementation of the project and the specific 
arms would include i) service strengthening; ii) disbursement and monitoring; and iii) 
technical assistance.  
 
i) Service improvement: Service improvement within the government sector through 
provision of delineated responsibilities, service improvement budget and technical assistance 
to the district health set-up.  
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ii) Disbursement and monitoring: Routing of cash rewards and output tracking implemented 
through an independent agency based within the district during the tenure of the project.  
 
iii) Technical Assistance: Provision of formal and on-job training on clinical skills for service 
providers, leadership capacity building of district managers and MNCH sensitization of 
district stakeholders.  
 
Tier II: An overarching body at district level comprising the health department and PPHI 
implementers, the third party, DCO and UN representative to provide two functions: i) 
necessary coordination across service providers including EDO-Health, MS of DHQ and 
PPHI for integrated implementation of MNCH services; and ii) project oversight and review 
at district level.  
 
Tier III: A provincial level body comprising the government, UN agencies, third party, 
external evaluator and donor agency to provide overall oversight on selected project districts. 
A provincially based external validator would conduct annual validation of district 
performance and cross-verification of reward transparency.  
 
11.7 Areas of Future Research 
 
It is recommended that the implementation of NPPI interventions be piloted in 3-4 selected 
districts supported by operations research for rigorous and standardized assessment. It is 
suggested that operations research should involve case and control sites as well as baseline 
and end line evaluations. On the basis of results, the pilots can be extended to other districts.  
 
In addition, formative research is needed in a number of areas:  
 Development of district health profile systematically linking mortality burden, cause of 
death data, service utilization and quality of care indicators.  
 Comprehensive and disaggregated district level mapping of existing sources of MNCH 
funding, spending levels of different stakeholders, and tracking of funding to EmONC 
and routine MNCH service utilization.  
 Establishment of patient out-of-pocket expenditure for MNCH by equity rankings and 
affordability implications for community.  
 Examination of public-private partnerships in terms of : 
o Effective and feasible elements of governance in successful PPP ventures 
o Extent and depth of social accountability to clients and community in public-
private partnerships for MNCH. 
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Annex 2: List of Persons Met 
 
 
Department of Health, Sindh   
Dr. Capt. Abdul Majid, Special Secretary Public Health.  
Dr. Ghulam Nabi, Director General Health Services.  
Dr. Sahib Jan Badar, Director MNCH Program.  
Dr. Mazhar Khamisani, Director EPI Program. 
Dr. Nazar Mohammad Junejo, Provincial Coordinator NPFP & PHC.  
Ms. Ruby Iqbal, Director Nursing. 
Dr. Dur-e-Shewar, Program Director, World Food Program. 
Dr.Masood Solangi, Director Preventive Services, DGHS. 
Dr. Salma Bozdar, Director RCH Program. 
Dr. Thebo, Director Administration & Accounts, DGHS. 
Dr. Mohammed Ali Leghari, Deputy Director HMIS, DGHS, Sindh 
Ms. Mehboob Sultana, Controller Sindh Nurses Examination Board 
Dr. Shaista Mubarak, Planning and Development Wing. 
Mr. Nawaz Burdi, SO, Planning and Development Wing.  
 
Related Government Departments & Agencies 
Lt. Col. Rtd. Nadeem Sipra, Bait-ul-Mal 
Mr. Mohammad Abbas, Director General, Department of Population Welfare, Sindh 
Dr. Fawad Shaikh, Chief Health, Department of Planning and Development, Sindh 
Mr. Atif Aziz, Deputy Secretary, Department of Finance, Sindh.  
Mr. Rizwan Tariq, Deputy Secretary, Department of Finance, Sindh 
Dr.Noor-ul-Haq, Director Devolved Social Sector Program, Sindh 
Dr. Riaz Memon, Director, PPHI Sindh 
Mr. Asif Iqbal Channa, Executive Administrator, PPHI Sindh 
Mr. Tariq Qureshi, Regional Director, PPHI Sindh  
 
International Agencies 
Dr. Asif Aslam, UNICEF  
Dr. Hafeez Pirzado, WHO  
Dr. Jawed Shaikh, WHO 
Dr. Nasreen Khan, WHO  
 
NGOs/ Other Stakeholders 
Ms. Naheed Najmi, Administrator, Tabba Project JPMC.    
Dr. Saif-ur-Rehman, District Program Officer Thatta, FIGO-UNFPA 
Dr. Sohail Agha, Greenstar  
Mr. Habib Peer Mohd, Pakistan Tawana Project, Aga Khan University.  
Dr. Ghazala Rafique, Pakistan Tawana Project, Aga Khan University. 
Mr.Haris Gazdar, Expert, National Social Protection Strategy 
 
District Level  
Dr. Abdul Sattar Channa, EDO-H, Badin 
Mr. Ali Sher Dahri, DPWO, Badin 
Dr. Javed Ali Khowaja, PPHI, Badin  
Dr. Hassan Memon, PMA Badin 
Dr. Anita Khowaja, SMO, Badin 
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Mr. Sardar Ali Gohar Khan Mahar, District Nazim, Ghotki. 
Dr. Ayaz Ali Jumani, EDO (H), Ghotki 
Mr. Choudhry Irshad Ahmed Jat, DPWO, Ghotki  
Dr. Syed Altaf Hussain Shah, District Officer Health (Preventive), Ghotki  
Mr. Irshad Ahmad Jat, DPWO, Ghotki 
Dr. Altaf Soomro , Epidemiologist, Ghotki 
Dr. Ali Hassan Mahar,  PMA, Ghotki. 
Ms. Najeeba Laghari, LHW  Program, Ghotki  
Dr. Syed Munawar Ali Shah, EDO-H, Jamshoro 
Dr. Barkat Ali Laghari, LHW Program, Jamshoro 
Mr. Altaf Jokhi, PWO, Jamshoro 
Dr. Ghulam Akbar, DDO HRD, Jamshoro 
Dr. Riaz Ahmed Qureshi, GP, Jamshoro  
Mr. Zahid Hussain Memon, DCO, Qambar 
Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Detho, DPWO, Qambar 
Dr. Saifullah Abbasi, District Officer (DO), Medical & Public Health, Qambar. 
Dr. Mumtaz Ali, DDO Admin and Accounts, Qambar 
Dr. (Capt.) Munir Ahmed Jokhio, GP, Qambar. 
Dr. Gul Mohammad, MS, THQH (To be upgraded to DHQH), Qambar 
Dr. Syed Imtiaz Ali Shah, MS, THQH, Qambar 
Dr. Agha Noor Ahmed, EDO (Health), Kashmore 
Mr. Imadad Ali Talpur, DPWO, Kashmore 
Mr. Allah Dino Samtio, Deputy DPWO, District Kashmore  
Dr. Ehsan Akhter, LHW Program Kashmore 
Dr. Shaukat Abro, LHW Program, Kashmore  
Dr. Suresh Kumar, PMA, Kashmore 
Mr. Mohammad Yasin Shar, EDO-Finance, Larkana 
Dr. Abdul Fatah Bughio, EDOH, Larkana.  
Mr. Ghulam Abbas Detho, PPHI, Larkana. 
Mr. Arbab Ali Suhag, DPWO, Larkana.  
Dr. Ikram Ahmed Tunio, GP, Larkana 
Mr. Mushtaque Ahmed Mirani, PPHI, Tharparkar  
Mr. Aijaz Ali Siyal, Deputy DPWO, Tharparkar  
Mr. Samiuddin Siddiki, DCO, Tharparkar  
Dr. Bansari Dar, DDO, Tharparkar 
Dr. Mohammad Nawaz Abbasi, DOH, Tharparkar  
Dr. Rafique Ahmed Kolachi, DOH, Tharparkar  
Dr. Chaman Lal , PMA, Tharparkar  
Dr. Nasrullah Thebo , PPHI, Tharparkar  
Mr. Imam Zaidi Chandio, RHSA, Stentroform, Tharparkar  
Dr. Bahadur Khan Khero, EDO (Health), 
Mr. Riaz Ahmed Shar, EDOH, Nawabshah  
Mr. Riaz Ahmed Shar DPWO, Nawabshah 
Dr. Daulat ali Jamali, LHW Program, Nawabshah 
Mr. Khursheed Naeem Malik, Establishment and Revenue department, Nawabshah  
Dr. Naseer Ahmed Shaikh, MS, People’s Medical College (PMC) Hospital, Nawabshah 
Dr. Munir Ahmed Arain, President PMA, Nawabshah.  
Mr. Ali Akber Hingoro. District Coordination Officer, Shikarpur. 
Dr. Kishore Kumar Khatri, District Officer, Admin & Accounts, Shikarpur. 
Dr. Shabbir Aman Shaikh, DDO HRD, Shikarpur 
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Mr. Javaid Ahmed Panhwar, DPWO, Shikarpur. 
Dr. Deepak Kumar, Private Practitioner, Shikarpur. 
Dr. Agha Aftab Ahmed-MS, DHQH, Shikarpur  
Mr. Faquir Maghan Mangrio-District Nazim; Umarkot. 
Dr. Aziz, EDOH, Umarkot 
Mr. Ali Akbar Leghari, District Coordination Officer, Umarkot 
Mr. Ghulam Rasool Memon, DPWO, Umarkot 
Dr.(Capt) Mohammad Umar Rind EDOH Office, Umarkot 
Dr. Om Parkash Mathrani, EDOH office, Umarkot 
Dr. Jadho Mal, PMA, Umarkot 
Mr. Syed Attaullah Shah, PPHI, Umarkot 
Dr. Jewat, Executive Officer M&E PPHI, Umarkot  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NPPI Feasibility Study on Result Based Financing Mechanisms in Sindh 
AGA KHAN UNIVERSITY, KARACHI     Page 131 
 
Annex 3: Rating of Management Information Systems 
 
 
MIS System Relevance Reliability Accuracy Usability Timeliness Completeness Overall 
Ghotki       
MIS/FLCF System 3  3  5 3 3.75 
LHW MIS  3.5  2.5  4 3.5 4.75 
PPHI - BHU Non PPHI       
Population welfare 3 3 2.5 3.5 4 4.5 4 
Jamshoro       
MIS/FLCF System 3  3  2.5 5 4 
LHW MIS  3  3  4.5 5 3.5 
PPHI - BHU Non PPHI       
Population welfare 3 3 3 3.5 4 4 4 
Tharparkar       
MIS/FLCF System 3  3  2 3 3 
LHW MIS  4  4  2.5 4  
PPHI - BHU 3  3  3 3 3 
Population welfare 2  2  2 2 2 
Kambar       
MIS/FLCF System* 3.5 3.5 2 4 3.5 2.5 3.5 
LHW MIS  3 3 3 4 5 4.5 5 
PPHI - BHU Did not cooperate to provide information   
Population welfare        
* Computer was out of order 
Kashmore       
MIS/FLCF System* 4 4.5 4.5 5 4 5 4.5 
LHW MIS  3 5 3 5 5 4.5 2.5 
PPHI - BHU Did not cooperate to provide information   
Population welfare 3 5 3 5 5 4.5 2.5 
*No data entry for the past six months 
Nawabshah       
MIS/FLCF System 4.5 4 4.5 4 5 5 4.5 
LHW MIS  3 3.5 4.5 4 5 5 4 
PPHI - BHU Non PPHI       
Population welfare 3.5 3.5 3 5 4.5 4 3.5 
 
 
       
Larkana       
MIS/FLCF System MIS staff was out of office for training on DHIS in Islamabad  
LHW MIS  4 4 3 3 4 4 4 
PPHI - BHU 3.5 5 5 4 5 4.5 4 
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MIS System Relevance Reliability Accuracy Usability Timeliness Completeness Overall 
Population welfare Did not cooperate to provide information   
Umarkot       
MIS/FLCF System 3  3  4 3 2.5 
LHW MIS  4.5  4  5 4.5 4 
PPHI - BHU 3 2.5 3  3 4 2.5 
Population welfare* 4 2 3.5  5 3.5 3.75 
*The system agreed that they do bogus data for facilities where usage is low  
Source: NPPI feasibility study, Sindh, 1999 
 
 
 
District ratings and ranks 
Districts Rating by system 
District ranking by systems' 
rating 
Badin 2.8 9 
Shikarpur 1.9 10 
Ghotki 3.6 3 
Jamshoro 3.6 3 
Tharparkar 2.7 8 
Kambar 3.6 3 
Kashmore 4.2 1 
Nawabshah 4.2 1 
Larkana 4.1 2 
Umarkot 3.5 6 
Source: NPPI feasibility study, Sindh, 1999 
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Annex 4: Flow of Information 
HMIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LHW Program  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Health facility 
District HMIS cell 
MO in-charge, MO and 
WMO 
Provincial HMIS cell 
National HMIS cell 
EDO Health 
Facility staff 
DOH Medical and Public 
Health 
Monthly 
Tuberculosis MCH Malaria 
 
 
 
Third Party Evaluation – 
Every fifth year 
20-22 LHWs’ report 
Trainer collate information 
with LHS 
DPI 
Assistant District 
Coordinator – NP (DMR) 
PPIU 
Provincial Coordinator- NP 
(PMR) 
LHS 
FPO 
FPO 
Federal 
Level 
One person in each monthly meeting and then 
quarterly and annual meetings are organized by the 
Federal office  
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 Population Welfare Program  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daily client register 
 
 
Compile manually and form a report  
 
 
 
District level (35 facilities +MM) 
 
 
Monthly performance report  
 
 
 
Provincial  
 
 
 
  Federal  
 
Doctor FTO In charge 
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Annex 5: Ratings of Financial Information Systems 
KASHMORE 
Criteria EDO LHW OVERALL RATING 
Output-Linked Information Non-Existent 1 
Non-Existent 
1 1 
Computerization Manual System  2 Manual System  2 2 
Frequency of Record-Updating 
Monthly Account 
Settlements. Report then 
sent to DCO  
 4 
 
Quarterly Account 
Settlements. 
  4 
4 
Trained Personnel 
-All sanctioned posts are 
filled. 
-All officers are B.Com 
-No training received by 
government. 
  3 
 
 
-All sanctioned posts 
are filled.  
-All officers are 
B.Com 
-Some workshops 
organized, the last 
one being a year ago.  
 4 
3 
Timeliness of Disbursement  
-Monthly release of salary 
and non-salary component.  
-No delays in fund release.  
4 
-Quarterly release of 
non-salary 
component  
-Some delay in 
release of funds. 
3 
3 
QAMBAR 
Criteria EDO LHW PWO OVERALL RATING 
Output-Linked 
Information 
Non-Existent 
 1 
Non-Existent 
1 
Non-Existent 
1 1 
Computerization 
Partial: Manual system 
but account 
reconciliation is done 
on monthly basis on 
Excel 
                  3 
Manual System 
 2 
Manual System 
 2 2 
Frequency of 
Record-Keeping 
Monthly Account 
Settlements 
 4 
Quarterly 
Account  
Settlements 
4 
Quarterly 
Account 
Settlements 
4 
4 
Trained Personnel 
-All sanctioned posts 
are filled. 
-DCO complained no 
one is prepared to go 
for additional 
training/higher training. 
                  2 
-All sanctioned 
posts are filled. 
-No mention of 
training. 
            3 
-All sanctioned 
posts are filled.  
-No mention of 
training. 
              3 
3 
Timeliness of 
Disbursement 
-Monthly release of 
salary and non-salary 
component.  
-No delays in fund 
release. 
                 4 
-Quarterly 
release of non-
salary component 
and monthly 
release of salary 
component. 
-Some delay in 
fund release.   3 
-Quarterly 
release of salary 
and non-salary 
components. 
-  Extensive 
delays in release 
of funds. 
                  2 
3 
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    LARKANA 
Criteria EDO LHW PWO OVERALL RATING 
Output Linked 
Information 
Non-Existent 
1 
Non-Existent 
 1 
Non-Existent 
 1 1 
Computerization  
Manual system but account 
reconciliation is done on 
monthly basis on Excel. 
- 3 
Manual System 
 2 
Manual System  
 2 2 
Frequency of 
Record-Keeping 
-Monthly Accounts 
Settlements.  
-Report then sent to DCO. 
 4 
-Quarterly Account 
Settlements. 
 4 
 
Quarterly Account 
Settlements. 
 4 
4 
Trained 
Personnel 
-All sanctioned posts are 
filled. 
DCO explained no formal 
training is given, and 
officers in accounts 
division are just graduates.  
 3 
-All sanctioned posts 
are filled. 
-No mention of 
training. 
 3 
 
- All sanctioned 
posts are filled. 
- No mention of 
training. 
 3 
3 
Timeliness of 
Disbursement 
- Monthly release of salary 
and non-salary component. 
- No delays in fund release. 
 4 
- Quarterly release 
of non-salary 
component and 
monthly release of 
salary component. 
- Some delay in 
release of funds. 
 3 
-Quarterly release 
of salary and non-
salary components. 
-extensive delays in 
release of funds. 
 2 
3 
 
 
NAWABSHAH 
Criteria EDO LHW PWO OVERALL RATING 
Output-Linked 
Information 
Non-Existent 
 1 
Non-Existent 
 1 
Non-Existent 
 1 1 
Computerization Manual System  2 
Manual System 
 2 
Manual System 
 2 2 
Frequency of 
Record-Keeping 
Monthly Account Settlement 
after which report is sent to 
DCO. 
 4 
Quarterly Account 
Settlements. 
 4 
Monthly Account 
Settlements. 
 4 
4 
Trained 
Personnel 
-All sanctioned posts are 
filled. 
No mention of training. 
- No info on qualifications  
 2 
-All sanctioned posts 
are filled. 
-No mention of level 
of training. 
 3 
-All sanctioned 
posts are filled. 
-No mention of 
level of training. 
 3 
3 
Timeliness of 
Disbursement 
-Monthly release of salary 
and non-salary component. 
-No delays in fund release. 
 4 
-Quarterly release of 
non-salary 
component and 
monthly release of 
salary component. 
- Some delay in 
release of funds. 
 3 
-Monthly release 
of salary and 
quarterly release 
of non-salary 
components. 
-extensive delays 
in release of 
funds. 
 2 
3 
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BADIN 
Criteria EDO LHW PWO OVERALL RATING 
Output-Linked 
Information 
Non-Existent 
 1 
Non-Existent 
 1 
Non-Existent 
 1 1 
Computerization Computerized  4 
Computerized 
 4 
Manual System 
 4 4 
Frequency of 
Record-Keeping 
-Monthly Account 
Settlement after which 
report is sent to DCO. 
 4 
Quarterly Account 
Settlements. 
 4 
Monthly Account 
Settlements. 
 4 
4 
Trained 
Personnel 
-All sanctioned posts are 
filled. 
No mention of training. 
- Requisite qualifications 
of staff 
 3 
-All sanctioned posts 
are filled. 
-No mention of level 
of training. 
 2 
-All sanctioned 
posts are filled. 
-No mention of 
level of training. 
 2 
2 
Timeliness of 
Disbursement 
-Monthly release of 
salary and non-salary 
component. 
-No delays in fund 
release. 
 4 
Quarterly release of 
non-salary component 
and monthly release of 
salary component. 
-No delays 
 4 
-Monthly release 
of salary and 
quarterly release 
of non-salary 
components. 
-some  delays in 
release of funds. 
 3 
4 
 
 
          SHIKARPUR 
 
 
 
 
Criteria EDO LHW PWO 
OVERA
LL 
RATING 
Output-
Linked 
Information 
Non-Existent 
 1 
Non-Existent 
 1 
Non-Existent 
 1 1 
Computeriz
ation 
Computerized system 
 4 
Manual System 
 2 
Manual System 
 2 3 
Frequency 
of Record-
Keeping 
Monthly Account Settlement 
after which report is sent to 
DCO. 
 4 
Quarterly Account 
Settlements. 
 4 
Monthly Account 
Settlements. 
 4 
4 
Trained 
Personnel 
-All sanctioned posts are 
filled. 
No mention of training. 
- No info on qualifications  
 3 
-All sanctioned posts are 
filled. 
-No mention of level of 
training. 
 3 
-All sanctioned 
posts are filled. 
-No mention of 
level of training. 
 3 
3 
Timeliness 
of 
Disburseme
nt 
-Monthly release of salary 
and non-salary component. 
-No delays in fund release. 
 4 
Quarterly release of non-
salary component and 
monthly release of salary 
component. 
- Extensive delay in 
release of funds. 
 2 
-Monthly release of 
salary and quarterly 
release of non-
salary components. 
-extensive delays in 
release of funds. 
 2 
3 
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THARPARKAR 
 
Criteria EDO PPHI PWO OVERALL RATING 
Output-Based 
Information 
Non-Existent 
 1 
Non-Existent 
 1 
Non-Existent 
 1 1 
Computerization - Computerized System  4 
- Computerized System 
 4 - 
4 
(PWO not 
included) 
Frequency of 
Record-
Updating 
- Facilities’ medicine 
utilization recorded in 
MIS forms 
 3 
- Monthly Account 
Settlements. 
 4 
- Monthly Account 
Settlements. 
 4 
4 
Trained 
Personnel - 
- Executive 
administration and 
accounts officer have 
resigned. No substitute 
presently available. 
 2 
- 
3 
(EDO and 
PWO not 
included) 
Timeliness of 
Disbursement 
- Quarterly Release of 
Funds 
- No delays in fund 
release. 
 4 
- - 
4 
(PPHI and 
PWO not 
included) 
*Ratings Based on Incomplete Information Not Adequate for Accurate Rating 
 
UMERKOT 
Criteria EDO LHW PWO PPHI OVERALL RATING 
Output-
Linked 
Information 
Non-Existent 
1 
Non-Existent 
 1 
Non-Existent 
 1 
Non-Existent 
 1 1 
Computerizati
on 
- 
Computerized 
System 
 4 
- 
Computerized 
System 
 4 
- Computerized 
System 
 4 
-Computerized 
System 
 4 
4 
Frequency of 
Record-
Keeping 
- 
Monthly 
Settlement of 
Accounts 
 4 
- 
- Monthly 
Settlement of 
Accounts 
 4 
4 
(EWO and 
PWO Not 
Included) 
Trained 
Personnel 
- All 
sanctioned 
posts are 
filled.  
- Personnel 
all trained to 
use computer 
system. 
 3 
- Personnel 
trained for 
computerized 
system once 2 
years back.  
- Refresher 
conducted 
every year. 
 4 
- All sanctioned 
posts are filled. 
- No mention of 
level of training. 
2 
- Minimum 
training level 
for accounts 
officer is 
B.Com degree. 
 2 
3 
Timeliness of 
Disbursement 
- Quarterly 
Release of 
Funds. 
- No delays in 
fund release. 
 4 
- Some delay 
in release of 
funds. 
 3 
- Quarterly release 
of funds. 
- No discussion of 
delays. 
3 
- 3 
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GHOTKI  
Criteria EDO LHW PWO OVERALL RATING 
Output Linked 
Information - - 
Non-Existent 
1 
1 
(EDO and LHW not 
Included) 
Computerization - - Manual System 2 
2 
(EDO and LHW not 
Included) 
Frequency of Record-
Keeping - - 
Monthly Account 
Settlements 
4 
4 
(EDO and LHW not 
Included) 
Trained Personnel - - 
-All sanctioned posts are 
filled. -No mention of 
level of training. 
3 
3 
(EDO and LHW not 
Included) 
Timeliness of 
Disbursement - - 
-Monthly release of salary 
and quarterly release of 
non-salary components. 
-Extensive delay in 
release of funds. 
2 
2 
(EDO and LHW not 
Included) 
*Ratings Based on Incomplete Information Not Adequate for Accurate Rating 
 
 
JAMSHORO 
Criteria EDO LHW PWO OVERALL RATING 
Output Linked 
Information 
Non-Existent 
1 
 
- - 
1 
(EDO and 
LHW not 
Included) 
Computerization Computerized System 4 - - 
4 
(EDO and 
LHW not 
Included) 
Frequency of 
Record-Keeping 
Monthly Account 
Settlement after which 
report is sent to DCO. 
4 
- - 
4 
(EDO and 
LHW not 
Included) 
Trained 
Personnel 
-All Sanctioned Posts are 
filled. 
-Training for computerized 
system is done. 
3 
- - 
3 
(EDO and 
LHW not 
Included) 
Timeliness of 
Disbursement 
-Quarterly release of both 
salary and non-salary 
components. 
-No delay in release of 
funds. 
4 
- - 
3 
(EDO and 
LHW not 
Included) 
*Ratings Based on Incomplete Information Not Adequate for Accurate Rating 
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ANNEX 6: Client Expenditure on MNCH and Willingness to Pay 
 
 
BADIN PRIVATE FACILITY PUBLIC FACILITY WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 Expenditure  (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs)  
Expenditure  
 (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs)  
ANC 550-1250 350 200-575 30 325 
Normal Delivery 4350-5650 850 160 350 500-5000 
C-Section 17500 850 17000  3000-6000 
Child Illness 550-1250 150 525-875 30 200-650 
 
JAMSHORO PRIVATE FACILITY PUBLIC FACILITY WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 Expenditure  (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs)  
Expenditure  
 (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs)  
ANC 650-1250 400 300-500 300 170 
Normal Delivery 4000-5050 750 1400-2300 600 500-1250 
C-Section 13500-16500 1100 8500-11500 1100 3000-5750 
Child Illness 150-3900 625 175-2800 700 100-400 
 
UMERKOT PRIVATE FACILITY PUBLIC FACILITY WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 Expenditure   (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs) 
Expenditure  
(Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs)  
ANC 1050 450 475-750 150 275 
Normal Delivery 2650-3400 450   1625 
C-Section 16750 450   6000 
Child Illness 300-1750 450 60-3800 100 400-800 
 
GHOTKI PRIVATE FACILITY PUBLIC FACILITY WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 Expenditure   (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs) 
Expenditure  
 (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs)  
ANC 1200 175 550 70 700 
Normal Delivery 3700-5200 400   600-1000 
C-Section 19750 400 8750 600 1500-2750 
Child Illness 200-1700 350 50-850 205 150 
 
THARPARKAR PRIVATE FACILITY PUBLIC FACILITY WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 Expenditure   (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs) 
Expenditure  
 (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs)  
ANC 825 275 550 475 0 
Normal Delivery 2750-3400 700   400-550 
C-Section 25000 700 12500  3000 
Child Illness 1100-4500 300 200-2050 250 110-900 
 
KASHMORE PRIVATE FACILITY PUBLIC FACILITY WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 Expenditure   (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs) 
Expenditure  
 (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs)  
ANC 1075 250 475 150 325 
Normal Delivery 5750 550 1100-2000 800 1250 
C-Section 27500 550 13750 800 2800 
Child Illness 1250-4000 250 400-1100  550-850 
 
 
NAWABSHAH PRIVATE FACILITY PUBLIC FACILITY WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
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 Expenditure   (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs) 
Expenditure  
 (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs)  
ANC 1250-1700 350 550 250 325 
Normal Delivery 4500-5750 750   1375 
C-Section 28250 750 10500 900 3250 
Child Illness 900-1250 350 100-300  235 
 
SHIKARPUR PRIVATE FACILITY PUBLIC FACILITY WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 Expenditure   (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs) 
Expenditure  
 (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs)  
ANC 1300 450 600 10 280 
Normal Delivery 2600-3650 550 1450 600 625 
C-Section 12500-20000 900 20000  5000 
Child Illness 150-1550 525 100-450 210 300-550 
 
LARKANA PRIVATE FACILITY PUBLIC FACILITY WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 Expenditure   (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs) 
Expenditure  
 (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs)  
ANC 500 50 475 180 350 
Normal Delivery 2300-3500 1000 2350 375 500 
C-Section 25000 1000 9000 250 5000 
Child Illness 100-1000 150 100-650 300 100-200 
 
QAMBAR PRIVATE FACILITY PUBLIC FACILITY WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 Expenditure   (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs) 
Expenditure  
 (Rs) 
Transport  
(Rs)  
ANC 1400 390 400 150 450 
Normal Delivery 2500-4000 1000 1250  575 
C-Section 22500 1000 10000 1000 4500 
Child Illness 550-1100 125-700 60-500 150 250 
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Annex 7: Cost Packages for Service Vouchers 
 
Cost Packages for Vouchers 
District  Services 100% Subsidy (Rs.) 75% Subsidy (Rs.) 
Badin 
ANC 644 483 
Normal Delivery  2580 1935 
C – Section  17250 1294 
Child illness  90 68 
Umarkot  
ANC 831 632 
Normal Delivery  3025 2269 
C – Section  16750 12563 
Child illness  1990 1493 
Shikarpur  
ANC 950 713 
Normal Delivery  2288 1716 
C – Section  18125 13594 
Child illness  563 422 
Ghotki 
ANC 875 656 
Normal Delivery  4450 3338 
C – Section  14250 10688 
Child illness  750 563 
Jamshoro 
ANC 675 506 
Normal Delivery  3188 2391 
C – Section  12500 9375 
Child illness  1756 1317 
Tharparkar  
ANC 650 488 
Normal Delivery  3075 2306 
C – Section  18750 14063 
Child illness  1963 1472 
Larkana 
ANC 488 366 
Normal Delivery  2625 1969 
C – Section  17000 12750 
Child illness  463 347 
Qambar  
ANC 900 675 
Normal Delivery  2250 1688 
C – Section  16250 12188 
Child illness  553 415 
Kashmore  
ANC 775 581 
Normal Delivery  3650 2738 
C – Section  20625 15469 
Child illness  1688 1266 
Nawabshah  
ANC 1013 760 
Normal Delivery  5125 3844 
C – Section  19375 14531 
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Annex 8: Provider Incentives for Government Staff 
 
District 
Antenatal Care Normal Delivery 
Private Sector 
Fee 
Incentive @ 
50% of Fee Private Sector Fee 
Incentive @ 
50% of Fee 
Badin 60 30 1750 875 
Jamshoro 120 60 1500 750 
Umarkot 100 50 1750 875 
Ghotki 100 50 2500 1250 
Tharparkar 90 45 2375 1188 
Kashmore 65 33 1500 750 
Nawabshah 250 125 2000 1000 
Shikarpur 55 28 1750 875 
Larkana 25 13 1950 975 
Qambar 175 88 2000 1000 
NPPI Districts  94 47 1908 954 
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Annex 9: Summary of FGDs 
Client utilization level/Reasons 
ANC 
1. Routine ANC is very rare   
2. ANC is sought only incase of any ailment  
3. 50 to 60% women seek ANC (LHW) 
Reasons:  
1. Mostly women seek ANC (ultrasound) to know the fetus representation, sex 
    And to know either delivery will be complicated or normal  
2.  To know the HB.  
Maternal 
complication 
1. Almost every woman used to seek care in severe maternal complication (severe headache, excessive vomiting, swelling, severe 
anemia, bleeding) due to the fear of miscarriage and death fear of mother and fetus. 
2. Poor families use to seek care from public sector while well off families use to seek care from private sector.  
3. In periphery women also seek care from LHVs. 
4. Very poor people and those who are living in kacho remote areas (have not facility of routine transport) mostly rely on home 
remedies.  
 
Institutional 
Delivery  
1. Majority of normal deliveries are held at Homes by TBAs, because TBAs are less expensive, highly trusted, they are familiar.  
2. Daies facilitate delivery on credit and they also deliver other services like massage of newborn and mother, cloth washing etc.  
3.  There is emotional support at home.  
Institutional delivery 
3. All complicated deliveries (prolong labor) conducted at hospitals; very poor people go to civil and well of families use to go to private 
lady doctors.  
4. Very few educated and well of families also use private clinics for normal deliveries.  
5. On the basis of ultrasound findings, if doctor suggest delivering at facility then people also use to have institutional delivery.  
  
Family 
planning 
1. Round About 40% t0 50% pairs are using family planning methods as reported by LHWs. 
2.  Injections and pills are most common contraceptives.  
3. In district Tharparkar there is relatively no concept of birth spacing though few women use to have sterilization after 8-10 
children,(Reasons: unawareness, no services is being provided in peripheries)  
Reason: 
2. Due to over burden of children (large family size) 
3. Poverty (cannot afford the expenses of pregnancy and of newborn) 
4. People using contraceptives and having sterilization because service is being  delivered at free of cost 
Immunization  
1. Almost all (100%) people use to have vaccines for their children in order to save them from lethal diseases. 
2. Very few people resist because of fever after having vaccine 
3. In peripheries service is not provided appropriately (especially in uncovered area (Umerkot/Tharparkar))  
Reasons:   
1. It is provided at door step and at free of cost 
2. To save the children from abnormalities like polio 
 
Acute 
childhood 
illness  
1. Health seeking practices are good; parents consider it important to immediately 
seek care.  
Pattern:  
2. Initially poor people use to seek care from village based facility and then if baby 
don’t recover then they use to take him/her to private clinics. 
3. As reported by LHWs they are providing medicine of Diarrhea, fever and 
pneumonia at home.  
4. In periphery people use self medication in mild diseases. Somewhere pneumonia is 
parallel treated by home remedies.  ORS is given at home every where in case of 
Diarrhea.  
5. well of families directly seek care from private clinics  
  Poor 
 
Well 
of  
Immediate Home remedies/ self medication 
Directly 
jump to 
private 
Mild  Village based RHC/BHU  
Severe Private clinics   
Clients reason for non-usage 
ANC 
 
1. It is considered unnecessary to seek care without any ailment.  
2. Unavailability of facilities (lady doctor, ultrasound and other diagnostics) at village based BHU/RHC. 
3. Poverty is big concern in rural areas; so people don’t have enough earnings to go to cities for seeking ANC services. 
4. Government Doctor don’t oblige at government facility and refer patients to their own private clinics.  
5. Mistrust with health system; In government hospital mostly house job doctor get experience on patients. 
6. Transport is also big problem as reported by people of periphery.  
impossible   
7.  Unawareness  
8. In very few communities practice of Pardah is also a barrier towards ANC seeking   
 
Maternal 
complication 
1. Unavailability of facilities at village based RHC/BHU (lady doctor, attitude of staff and investigation). 
2. Government Doctor don’t oblige at government facilities and refer patients to their private clinics. 
3. Poverty is big concern in rural areas; so people don’t have enough earnings to go to cities for care seeking. 
4. Short opening timings.   
5. In government hospital mostly house job doctor get experience on patients.  
6. Transport is also big problem in periphery. 
 
Delivery  1. TB s are low cost, experienced and highly trusted amongst the majority of communities. Reasons: 
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2. Home based delivery is Low cost as compared to Hospital based. 
3. Unavailability of lady doctor, LLHV and maternity home at village based or near by public health facility. 
4. Mistrust with health system (due to fear of unnecessary C-section and internal examination)   
5. Mistrust on public health care providers (“house job doctors only getting experience”) 
6. On the basis of ultrasound findings and incase of prolong labor deliveries are conducted at facility, poor people utilize public and well 
of go to private clinic/ maternity homes.   
 
Family 
planning 
1. Unawareness and lack of knowledge  
2. It is considered great of God. 
3. Adverse effect of (especially of pills) like excessive bleeding and over weight.  
4. Failure of using contraceptives  
5. Desire of male child 
6. Few mothers are afraid of infertility due to the usage of contraceptive, which may cause the second marriage of their husbands.   
 
Immunization  
1. Inappropriate provision of services in peripheries, especially in uncovered areas 
2. children/newborn falls in fever after getting vaccination  
 
Acute 
childhood 
illness  
1. Unavailability of better facilities (irregular staff, short and low quality medicine) at public Hospitals and less attention of staff. 
2. Poverty 
3. Transport is also big problem in periphery.  
4. Distance of health facilities (as reported in periphery)  
5. short opening timings  
 
Provider preference of client/ Reason 
 
ANC 
1. Private Providers (24 hours availability of trained lady doctors and other facilities like Ultrasound) 
2. Quality care (prescription of quality medicine and attention of doctors, proper care)    
3. Patient recovers his/her health quickly at private practitioner.  
4. Diagnose, prescription and skills of doctors are trusted.    
 
Maternal 
complication  
1. Private Providers (24 hours availability of trained lady doctors and other facilities like Ultrasound) 
2. Quality care (prescription of quality medicine and attention of doctors, proper care)    
3. Patient recovers his/her health quickly at private practitioner.  
4. Diagnose, prescription and skills of doctors are trusted.    
5. Government Doctor don’t oblige at government facility and refer patients to their own private clinics.  
6. In government hospital mostly house job doctors get experience on patients.  
7. “In civil hospital house job doctor even cannot prick canola”.  
8. short opening timings   
9. Transport is also big problem as reported by people of periphery.  
Delivery  
1. Institutional deliveries (mainly conducted in case of complications) preferred at private sector due to quality care and availability of 
facilities to manage unexpected emergency. 
2. 24 hours service  
3. Existing pattern is of home Based delivery because of low cost, trust on Dais skills, they are familiar also provide other services; like 
massage, clothes washing etc  
 
Family 
planning 
1. LHWs; for providing different contraceptives at door to door at free of cost. 
2. Public Health facilities for sterilization which is free of cost. 
 
Immunization  1. Public health facilities due to home based delivery of service at free of cost.   
Acute 
childhood 
illness  
1. Private Providers (24 hours availability of doctor and other facilities like X-ray) 
2. Quality care (prescription of quality medicine and attention of qualified doctors, cleanness at facility) 
3. Patients recover quickly. 
4. Trust on private Doctors diagnosis. 
5. Poor people seek care from government facilities because of low cost treatment.  
 
CCT or Voucher/ Reasons 
 
1. Voucher is preferred because it is prepaid so there is no chance of corruption.    
2. It should be reserved for acute childhood illness as said by majority of mother. 
3. It should be reserved for Delivery (Fathers from almost all districts)    
 
